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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an ) 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, ) 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN ) 
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR, ) 
individually and the community property ) 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, ) 
a single person; and, JOLEE DUCLOS, ) 
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE ) 
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho corporation; and ) 
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401 (K) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR ) 
THE AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, ) 
) 
Intervenor. ) 
Defendants Freeman and Duclos join in the responses to Reed Taylor's opposition to 
Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed this date by AIA 
Services Corp., AlA Insurance, Inc., Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corinne Beck, Defendants, 
and Intervenor, 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan for AlA Services Corporation. 
Intervenor's response makes the point that " ... [t]he admissions made by the Plaintiffs 
expert are absolutely remarkable ... " That affidavit neither disagrees with Defendants' expert's 
explanation of earned surplus nor does it disagree with the application to the audited financial 
DEFENDANTS DUCLOS AND FREEMAN'S 
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OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR AND 
JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2 
statements for 1994 through 1996. Rather, Mr. Pederson appears to base his affidavit on the 
solvency of AlA Services Corporation in the years following the redemption. While irrelevant to 
the issues in the motion for summary judgement these admissions are in direct conflict with the 
substance of Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants Freeman and Duclos. Plaintiff predicates 
his allegations of liability and duty owed by Defendants Freeman and Duclos as directors to 
Plaintiff based upon the insolvency of AlA Insurance and AlA Services during the years they 
served as directors. Plaintiffs expert witness, Mr. Pederson, offered his opinions in Paragraph 
12 of his affidavit at Page 8 as follows: 
"To my knowledge, and based upon our review of AlA's accounting 
documents from 1995 through 2006, AIA's business operations were never 
impaired because of a failure to pay operating expenses and maintain positive 
financial relationships with third-party vendors. In fact, for the II-year period 
between 1996 through 2006, AIA has generated Operating Income after Interest 
Expense of$3,867,584, and Net Income of$10,194,714 ... " 
Paragraph 13 goes on to state: 
"By all accounts, AIA was able to continue operations and generate 
positive cash flow from 1996 through 2006, and is still in business today." 
Paragraph 21, in Mr. Pederson's 20-20 hindsight, further states: 
"With the passage of 13Yz years since the date of the 1995 Agreement, one 
is now afforded the opportunity to take a more practical and realistic approach as 
to the question of solvency. As noted above, for the II-year period from 1996 
through 2006, AIA generated Operating Income after Interest Expense of 
$3,867,584, and Net Income of$10,194,714. These financial results, including 
the ability to continue to operate for no less than an additional eleven (11) years, 
should resolve any issue regarding whether or not AlA was solvent." 
Paragraph 27 summarizes Mr. Pederson's opinion that AIA was solvent from 1996 through 2006. 
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Defendant Freeman served on the Board of Directors of AlA Services Corp. from 2003 to 
February 22, 2007, and on the Board of Directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. from 2003 to February 
22,2007 [Affidavit of Bryan Freeman in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated February 26, 2009]. Defendant Duclos served as Director for both AlA Services 
Corp. and AIA Insurance, Inc. from1999 to February 22,2007 [Affidavit of JoLee Duclos in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated February 26,2009]. It was this 
service during the years Mr. Pederson opines that the corporations were solvent that form the 
basis of Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants Freeman and Duclos. 
In direct contradiction to Plaintiff's expert witness, Plaintiff alleges insolvency of AIA 
and AlA Services during the years that Defendants Duclos and Freeman acted as Directors. In 
paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6 of Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), he alleges that 
these Defendants, " ... owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of AIA 
Services." Paragraph 2.21 of the Complaint further makes the allegation that: 
"During relevant times, the fair market value of AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance was less than the aggregate amount of their total debts, which 
constitutes AIA Services and AIA Insurance's insolvency. During relevant times, 
AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance were unable to pay their debts as they became 
due (including, without limitation, debts to Reed and Donna Taylor), which also 
constitutes AlA Services (sic) insolvency and AlA Insurance's insolvency." 
Plaintiff then predicates a fiduciary duty by the Directors to Reed Taylor as a creditor based upon 
this insolvency. Paragraph 2.2 of the Complaint reads as follows: 
"During all relevant times, Reed was the largest and most significant 
creditor of AIA Services. Because AIA Services has filed to timely and properly 
pay creditors as required during certain relevant times and/or was insolvent, John, 
Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or Beck owed fiduciary duties to creditors, 
specifically Reed because of his status as AlA Services' largest and most 
significant creditor." 
Plaintiff's Complaint makes numerous allegations that Defendants Freeman and Duclos breached 
their fiduciary duties owed to a creditor of the corporation. 
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Why does Plaintiff in his Complaint make such a point of the insolvency of AlA and AlA 
Insurance? That is because his claims as a creditor against Defendants Freeman and Duclos 
require the finding of a duty to him. Members of the Board of Directors owe a duty to the 
corporation and the shareholders, not creditors of the corporation. The statutory duties found in 
IC §§ 30-1-830, et seq., run to the corporation and its shareholders. " ... [A creditor's] redress 
for any breach for a non-statutory duty attendant upon [a director's] fiduciary status would 
belong to the corporation alone, not to its creditors." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Greer, 911 P.2d 
257,264-265 (OK 1995). While not specifically relevant to the pending motion for partial 
summary judgment before the Court, this issue will likely be addressed in a subsequent motion to 
be filed by Defendants Freeman and Duclos. 
Although Idaho has little law in this area, Idaho has adopted a version of the Model 
Business Corporation Act ("MBCA"). Other states which have adopted the MBCA have 
addressed this issue in evaluating a director's responsibility to creditors of the corporation. 
Montana is an MBCA state. In a case involving an employment contract the Montana Court 
discussed liability for corporate directors and officers arising from that contract and alleged 
tortious conduct. The Court found, inter alia, that a director's liability is only predicated upon 
personal gain or intent to harm, not when the breach is for the benefit of the corporation. Phillips 
v. Montana Ed. Assn., 610 P2d 154, 158, 187 Mont. 419 (1980). In fact, the court said 
"[ c ]orporate officers or directors are privileged to interfere with or induce breach of the 
corporation's contracts or business relations with others as long as their actions are in good faith 
and for the best interests of the corporation." 610 P.2d at 158 citing Wilson v McClenny 262 
N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569 (1964) and Allison v. American Airlines, 112 F.Supp. 37 (N.D. Okla. 
1953). The fundamental underlying reason for this rule is that to allow an individual to sue 
directors for their actions on behalf of the corporation would be contrary to the limited liability 
that the corporate veil provides. It would prevent directors from acting in the best interests of the 
corporation. As such, directors are generally immune from both tort and contract liability. lOS 
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CapitaL Inc. v. Phoenix Printing, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 606, 283 Ill.Dec. 640 (2004). Although 
relevant, Illinois is not an MBCA state. 
The duty that Plaintiff alleges arises from corporate insolvency. A director does not owe 
a duty to a creditor unless the corporation is insolvent. Upon the declaration of insolvency, the 
directors become trustees of the corporation for the creditors. Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 561 P2d 
367,372,39 Colo.App. 84 (1977). Colorado's corporate law is also based upon the MBCA. 
As regards the issue of standing, Plaintiff simply asserts that Defendants Freeman and 
Duclos lack standing as they were not shareholders. Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' 
argument that these Defendants asserted the illegality of the contract as an affirmative defense to 
Plaintiffs lawsuit against them. It is the alleged breach of that very contract that is Plaintiffs 
claim against these Defendants. As argued in the previous brief, Plaintiff conferred standing by 
naming Defendants Freeman and Duclos as Defendants. 
-
DATED this j-" day of March, 2009. 
DEFENDANTS DUCLOS AND FREEMAN'S 
RESPONSE TO REED TAYLOR'S 
OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR AND 
JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
LA W OFFICES OF DAVID A. GITTINS 
By:QA~ 
David A. Gittins , 1sBi65 14 
Attorney for Defendants Freeman and Duclos 
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Notice of Service by Electronic Mail 
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CONNIE TAYLOR'S AND JIM BECK'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL DISCOVERY, MOTION TO 
SEQUENCE MOTIONS, AND MOTION 
FOR RULE 56(F) CONTINUANCE 
CONNIE TAYLOR'S AND JIM BECK'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO REED 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, MOTION TO SEQUENCE MOTIONS, 
AND MOTION FOR RULE 56(F) CONTINUANCE - 1 7~" '-
Connie Taylor and Jim Beck submit this memorandum in opposition to Reed Taylor's 
Motion to Compel Discovery, Motion to Sequence Motions, and Motion for Rule 56(f) 
Continuance. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Procedural History 
In April 2008, Connie Taylor and Jim Beck filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
(hereinafter "motion") on grounds that the agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's shares in AIA 
Services Corporation is illegal, void and unenforceable. This motion was noticed up to be heard 
on May 15, 2008. The Plaintiff, Reed Taylor, filed a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) on April 24, 
2008 requesting the Court "extend the time afforded to Reed to serve his Response and opposing 
Affidavits for at least 60 days or such time as depositions may be taken and discovery 
conducted .... " See, Motion to Enlarge Time, filed April 24, 2008. The notice of hearing was 
withdrawn at that time to accommodate Plaintiffs counsel, Mr. Bond. This Motion is now set 
for hearing on March 12, 2009, almost one year since the date of original filing. 
Other defendants have since joined in the motion and/or filed their own motions for 
summary judgment on the same grounds. In addition, the AIA Services Corporation 401(k) Plan 
has also intervened in this case and filed its own motion for summary judgment on the same 
grounds. 
It is not clear, but it appears that all motions pertaining to the summary judgment on the 
grounds of illegality will be heard on March 12, 2009. 
This Court clearly recognized the facts material to this issue in its order of January 30, 
2009, that reads, in material part, as follows: 
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(a) Relevant to Defendants Connie Taylor's and James Beck's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment shall be allowed, including 
the following: 
(1) The financial status of AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance in 1995 and 1996. 
(2) The source of funds received by Reed Taylor in 
1995 and 1996 pursuant to the 1995 and 1996 Stock 
Redemption Agreements between Reed Taylor and 
the AIA Corporations. 
(3) The Corporate accounting for all funds paid to Reed 
Taylor pursuant to the 1995 and 1996 Stock 
Redemption Agreements between Reed Taylor and 
the AIA Corporations. 
(4) The negotiation and approval process of the 1995 
and 1996 Redemption Agreements between Reed 
Taylor and the AIA Corporation. 
See, Opinion and Order on Motions to Stay Discovery Pending Hearing and Ruling on 
Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment, filed January 30,2009. 
B. Issues Germane to the Illegality Motion. 
The core issue to the illegality motion is whether the redemption of Reed's stock 
complied with then applicable Idaho Law. Former Idaho Code § 30-1-6 allowed the redemption 
of Reed Taylor's shares only "to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus 
available therefor." The motion for summary judgment is factually based on the undisputed fact 
that AIA Services did not have any earned surplus with which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares in 
1995 or 1996. This rule, applied to undisputed facts, leaves little room for productive discovery 
on any other fact issues. 
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As indicated above, former Idaho Code § 30-1-6 allowed the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares only "to the extent of umeserved and unrestricted earned surplus available 
therefore." Thus, absent $7.5 million in earned surplus, any agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's 
shares was illegal as in violation of Idaho statute and, therefore, void. "Earned surplus" is 
equivalent to "retained earnings (deficit)" in GAAP accounting. See, Kenneth Hooper Expert 
Report and Drew Voth Expert Report. As set forth in audited financial statements that were 
prepared while Reed Taylor was on the AIA Services Board of Directors, it is indisputable (and 
Plaintiff's expert did not dispute) that AIA Services did not have any retained earnings, but 
rather negative retained earnings (i.e., deficit), and therefore did not have any earned surplus at 
any time in 1995 or 1996. 
As conclusively established by the audited financial statements, AlA services had 
negative earned surplus of ($919,700) at 1994 year-end, ($18,827,250) at 1995 year-end and 
($14,792,476) at 1996 year-end. See also Hooper Expert Report. Thus, it is indisputable that 
AIA Services did not have any earned surplus with which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares, much 
less than the $7.5 Million that would have been required to lawfully redeem the shares pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 30-1-6. 
"Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from all the 
facts and circumstances of each case." Farrell v. Whiteman, 2009 WL 198516 (Idaho, January 
22, 2009). Thus, to defeat the motion for summary judgment, Reed Taylor would have to 
establish that AIA Services had $7.5 Million in earned surplus with which to redeem Reed 
Taylor's shares - an obviously impossible task in light of the audited financial statements. 
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Faced with the insurmountable task of overcoming the illegality of the agreement to 
redeem his stock, Reed Taylor is now attempting to delay resolution of the illegality issue. First, 
he filed a separate motion for summary judgment attacking the "standing" of the various 
defendants. Now he seeks a Rule 56(f) continuance, demanding that resolution of the illegality 
issue wait until after he has overturned every stone through his scorch-the-earth style of 
discovery, including no fewer than 16 more depositions. 
Despite Reed Taylor's general assertions that he wants to take more discovery, he fails to 
satisfy the standard set forth in LR.C.P. 56(f). He fails to establish how taking additional 
discovery would help him defeat the pending motion for summary judgment. Reed Taylor's 
motion should be denied and the March 12, 2009 hearing on Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's 
motion for summary judgment should proceed as scheduled. 
II. MOTION FOR 56(F) CONTINUANCE 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure establish a very specific process for determining 
whether a continuance should be granted for the taking of additional discovery after a motion for 
summary judgment has been filed. The standard is not that a party is entitled to whatever 
discovery he wants. Instead, LR.C.P. 56(f) provides: 
I.R.C.P. 56(f). 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion 
[for summary judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated 
present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
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The rule imposes two main requirements on a party who invokes its protection: (1) the 
party must explain why he cannot present, by affidavit, facts that are essential to oppose the 
motion; and (2) the party must explain how more time will facilitate the filing of a response that 
is sufficient to avoid summary judgment by creating a genuine issue as to a fact material to the 
motion: 
It has been noted that a party who invokes the protection of Rule 
56(f) must "do so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating 
why he cannot respond to a movant's affidavits ... and how 
postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by 
discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the 
absence of a genuine issue of fact." Allen v. BridgestonelFirestone, 
Inc., 81 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1996). Further, in order to grant a 
motion for additional discovery before hearing a motion on 
summary judgment, the plaintiff has the burden of setting out 
"what further discovery would reveal that is essential to justify 
their opposition," making clear "what information is sought and 
how it would preclude summary judgment." Nicholas v. 
Wallenstein, 266 F.3d 1083,1088-89 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380,386 (2005) (emphasis 
added). 1 
The decision to grant or deny a Rule 56(f) motion for continuance is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Carnell v. Barker Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329, 48 P.3d 
651, 658 (2002). "The burden is on the party seeking additional discovery to proffer sufficient 
facts to show that the evidence sought exists and that it would prevent summary judgment." 
Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912,921 (9th Cir. 1996). It is insufficient to baldly 
1 Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is similar to the Idaho rule. As evidenced 
by Jenkins, the Idaho Supreme Court has relied on federal case law describing the standard 
required for obtaining a Rule 56(f) continuance. Id. 
CONNIE TAYLOR'S AND JIM BECK'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO REED 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, MOTION TO SEQUENCE MOTIONS, 
AND MOTION FOR RULE 56(F) CONTINUANCE - 6 7(,0 , 
allege that there are facts that would prevent summary judgment - the party asking for a 
continuance must specifically identify what "particular facts" it seeks to learn and how those 
facts would create a genuine issue of material fact. See Mackey v. Pioneer Nat 'I Bank, 867 F.2d 
520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1989); see also U.S. v. 5,644,540.00 in U.S. Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 
1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that a party moving under Rule 56(f) "may not simply rely on 
vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts") (citations 
omitted). Moreover, a party that has failed to diligently seek discovery cannot rely on Rule 56(f) 
to delay the court's decision on a motion for summary judgment. See Brae Transp., Inc. v. 
Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the party asking for a 
Rule 56(f) continuance "cannot complain if it fails to pursue discovery diligently before 
summary judgment"). 
Reed Taylor fails to satisfy the Rule 56(f) standard. He lists 16 individuals (Plus 
"others") that he wants to depose, but he does not specifY what "particular facts" he intends to 
obtain from those individuals, much less how the additional discovery would help him defeat the 
motion for summary judgment. Instead, he simply asserts that these 16 individuals have 
"knowledge" pertaining to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and that Reed Taylor is 
entitled to find out what they know. 
Resolution of the motion for summary judgment turns on one single question - whether 
AIA Services had sufficient earned surplus with which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares in AIA 
Services. That question is answered by audited financial statements. Reed Taylor does not - and 
cannot - establish that any information he could obtain from the individuals he wants to depose 
could do anything to controvert the fact that AIA Services did not have any earned surplus at any 
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time in 1995 or 1996. It simply does not matter what the 16 proposed deponents knew, or 
thought, or said. The single fact material to the pending summary judgment motion is the 
indisputable fact that AIA Services had no earned surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's shares. 
Based on that one fact, the stock redemption agreement violated Idaho Code § 30-1-6 and is 
therefore illegal, void and unenforceable as a matter of law. 
Reed Taylor also asserts that he needs additional time to depose Kenneth Hooper and 
Drew Voth, the expert witnesses that have submitted reports in support of the motions for 
summary judgment. That is not how summary judgment motions work. If Reed Taylor thinks 
the opinions expressed by Mr. Hooper and Mr. Voth are incorrect, he is free to submit an expert 
affidavit challenging those opinions. In fact, Reed Taylor has submitted an expert report 
prepared by Paul Pederson. Notably, that expert report does not opine that AIA Services had 
sufficient earned surplus with which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares. 
Defendants' expert witnesses are subject to deposition only if Reed Taylor can establish, 
under Rule 56(f), grounds for a continuance to conduct additional discovery as to a material 
fact.2 In other words, Reed Taylor must demonstrate to the Court that, absent a continuance, he 
cannot, for reasons stated by affidavit, present an expert's affidavit controverting the fact that 
2 Plaintiffs counsel states, in his affidavit filed February 19, 2009, that "[w]e have not been 
provided with all of the documents provided to and relied upon by Mr. Voth and Mr. Hooper 
in their expert witness affidavits .... " This statement is false. Mr. Hooper's affidavit 
identifies the documents on which he relied to reach his opinion. Those documents have not 
only been produced and/or made available to Reed Taylor, but they were submitted to the 
Court in the Affidavit of Amy Gordon, dated February 12, 2009. See Affidavit of D. John 
Ashby, filed March 6, 2009. 
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AIA Services had no earned surplus in either 1995 or 1996. Reed Taylor has failed to meet that 
standard. 
The fact of the matter is that there is no need for additional discovery to take place prior 
to resolution of the motion for summary judgment. The illegality of the agreement to redeem 
Reed Taylor's shares is established by the audited financial statements, and Reed Taylor cannot 
point to any additional discovery that would enable him to controvert that fact. Instead, Reed 
Taylor insists that he is entitled to exhaust all methods of discovery until he is satisfied that no 
stone has been left unturned. He insists on taking (at least) an additional 16 depositions. If Reed 
Taylor gets what he demands, this case will not be over any time soon. Plaintiff's counsel took 
three full days to depose Jim Beck and two full days to depose Connie Taylor. Yet he still 
insisted that he was not finished with the depositions. Taking 16 more depositions would be an 
enormous waste oftime and money. 
Finally, Reed Taylor'S motion for Rule 56(f) continuance should be denied on grounds 
that he has had more than enough time to conduct discovery. Connie Taylor'S and Jim Beck's 
motion for summary judgment were filed almost one year ago, giving Reed Taylor's more than 
enough time to prepare a response and conduct any necessary discovery. In fact, this is actually 
Reed Taylor'S second 56(f) motion for continuance. Shortly after Connie Taylor and James 
Beck filed their motion for summary judgment, Reed Taylor filed a motion pursuant to Rule 
56(f) asking the Court to "extend the time afforded to Reed to serve his Response and opposing 
Affidavits for at least 60 days or such time as depositions may be taken and discovery conducted, 
whichever is dated." See, Motion to Enlarge Time, filed April 24, 2008. Connie Taylor's and 
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James Beck's fonner counsel agreed to continue the hearing, and the motion has now been set 
for hearing almost a year later. The Plaintiff has had more than the 60 days he requested. 
Amazingly, Reed Taylor is back before this Court asking for exactly what he was given 
almost a year ago - time to conduct discovery. These facts beg the question of why Reed Taylor 
did not conduct the discovery that he infonned the Court he needed almost one year ago, and the 
answer is telling. Reed did not do the discovery related to illegality in the "time afforded" him. 
Instead, he successfully disqualified Mr. Hally. Then, he brought suit against Hawley, 
Troxell, Ennis and Hawley, LLP and Clements, Brown and McNichols, P.A. and bootstrapped a 
motion to disqualify those counsel. These efforts ultimately failed, but only after stalling the 
case for many months. 
Reed Taylor cannot reasonably contend that he has been denied the opportunity to take 
discovery. 
III. MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
Reed Taylor also moves to compel discovery, without specifying the discovery that he 
wants to compel) Reed Taylor's motion is really a motion to reconsider the Court's January 30, 
3 The only specific documents that Reed Taylor seeks to compel are the "joint defense 
documents pertaining in any way to the illegality argument." In other words, Reed Taylor 
wants to see any emails or other communications between defense counsel related to the 
illegality issues. Communications between defense counsel related to the illegality issue are 
clearly protected by the joint defense privilege set forth in Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(b)(3). 
Reed Taylor unsuccessfully challenged the defendants' joint defense agreement in his motion 
to disqualify counsel. Moreover, the Court held in its January 9,2009 Order that certain joint 
defense communications, including the joint defense agreement, are privileged. Reed Taylor 
now raises a new argument that, in order to qualify for joint defense or common interest 
privilege, each party must be represented by separate counsel. See Reed Taylor's February 
19, 2009 Motion, p. 5. None of the authorities cited by Reed Taylor hold that the joint 
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2009 order limiting discovery to issues related to the pending motion for summary judgment. 
That order was perfectly appropriate in light of the motion for summary judgment. There is no 
reason to conduct discovery on every possible issue involved in this case when the motion for 
summary judgment set for hearing on March 12,2009 will very likely dispose of the entire case. 
Re-opening discovery on all issues would do nothing to speed this case along. The 16 
depositions Plaintiff asks for in his 56(f) motion are only the tip of the iceberg with regard to 
deposition that will be taken if discovery is reopened on an unlimited basis. Plaintiff's counsel 
has previously sent a list of 44 individuals he wants to depose, along with a disclaimer to "please 
keep in mind that there will certainly be others and that the [list of deponents] is not exhaustive." 
See 3/5/09 Ashby Aff., Exh. A. 
Discovery has properly been limited to issues related to the motion for summary 
judgment, and the relevant documents have been produced. If Reed Taylor believes that 
documents relevant to the motion for summary judgment have not been produced, he should 
identify those documents with specificity. Unlike parties in other cases, Reed Taylor should 
have no problem identifying relevant documents that he believes have not been produced. As the 
founder of AIA Services and its Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of its Board of Directors 
at relevant times, Reed Taylor has as much familiarity with the relevant documents as anyone. 
defense privilege is inapplicable if two or more parties to the joint defense agreement happen 
to share counsel. Nor does LR.E. 502(b)(3) contain any such exception. Further, Reed's 
contention flies in the face of Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
clearly permits a single lawyer to jointly represent more than one client under appropriate 
conditions, as the Court has already acknowledged in this case. 
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IV. ALL DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON BY MR. HOOPER HAVE BEEN PRODUCED 
Plaintif.fs fonner counsel asserts that Reed Taylor has not been provided with all the 
document provided to and relied upon by Mr. Hooper in his expert report. See Supplemental 
Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, filed February 19, 2009, ~ 8. This assertion is false. The expert 
report identifies with specificity all documents that Mr. Hooper relied upon to support his 
opinion. These same documents are also attached to the affidavit of Aimee Gordon, filed 
February 12, 2009. Mr. Hooper did not need to rely on'the ledgers, journal entries and source 
document to reach his conclusion that AIA Services did not have any earned surplus in 1995 or 
1996. Independent auditors had already done that work for him and had issued audited financial 
statements long ago. Thus, Mr. Hooper relied on the audited financial statements. 
It is true that some of the documents Mr. Hooper relied upon have only recently been 
bates numbered and physically produced to Reed Taylor's counsel. There is a very simple 
explanation for this. The documents Mr. Hooper reviewed are the financial statements of the 
companies from 1986 (the year AIA Services began operations) through 1997, and quarterly 
financial statements from 1995. All of these documents were either physically produced to Reed 
Taylor or made available for inspection by Reed Taylor's counsel. Very early in this litigation, 
year-end financial statements (beginning with 1995)4 for AIA Services and AIA Insurance were 
produced. Reed Taylor'S Request for Production No. 139 requested all documents "that 
4 Reed Taylor's requests for production of documents specifically requested documents only 
from 1995 to current. Financial statements prior to 1995 fall outside of his requests for 
production of documents, but have now been produced because they were relied upon by Mr. 
Hooper. 
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evidence, refer, or relate in any way to financial statements prepared by you, prepared on your 
behalf, or submitted to any lender or financial institution, or prospective lender (including 
individuals), other than those financial statements that have already been produced." AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance responded to Request for Production No. 139 as follows: "All AIA 
financial statements have been produced or are available for your review at the AIA offices." 
Thus, all AIA financial statements have been made available for inspection by Reed Taylor's 
counseL It is not AIA's fault that Reed Taylor's counselor expert did not ever return to AIA's 
office to inspect additional financial statements. See Affidavit of D. John Ashby, filed March 5, 
2009, ~ 9. 
Mr. Hooper reviewed the same 1995 to current year-end financial statements that had 
been produced to Reed Taylor long ago. Mr. Hooper also reviewed additional financial 
statements that, although not bates numbered and physically produced, were made available for 
inspection to Reed Taylor's counseL The documents that were reviewed by Mr. Hooper were 
then Bates numbered, physically produced to Reed Taylor, and submitted to the Court through 
Aimee Gordon's affidavit contemporaneously with service of Mr. Hooper's Affidavit. ld. at 
~ 10. 
v. MOTION TO SEQUENCE HEARING 
Finally, Reed Taylor requests that the Court "sequence the hearing of motions" such that 
his motion for partial summary judgment be heard prior to the motion for summary judgment 
filed by Connie Taylor and Jim Beck and joined in by other defendants. Much like his motion to 
compel, his motion to sequence hearing is really just a motion for reconsideration. The Court 
has already entered an order establishing what motions will be heard at what time. That order 
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provides that the motion for summary judgment filed by Connie Taylor and Jim Beck will be 
heard on March 12, 2009, and there is no reason to alter that order. 
Reed Taylor has filed his own separate motion for summary judgment, which addresses 
so-called "standing" issues. Reed Taylor's motion more properly would have been submitted as 
a memorandum in opposition to Connie Taylor'S and Jim Beck's motion for summary judgment. 
Nevertheless, the Defendants do not object to having Reed Taylor's motion heard at the March 
12, 2009 hearing. The subject matter of that hearing will be the legality of the agreement to 
redeem Reed Taylor's shares in AIA Services. The subsequently filed joinders, the motion filed 
by AIA Services, and the motion for summary judgment filed by Reed Taylor all deal with that 
same subject matter. In the interest of judicial efficiency and resolving this case once and for all, 
these defendants respectfully suggest that all motions involving the illegality issue (including 
Reed's motion for partial summary judgment) be heard on March 12,2009. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's motion for summary judgment has been set for hearing 
on March 12, 2009. The motion for summary judgment was originally filed almost a year ago, 
so Reed Taylor has had more than enough time to prepare his opposition. Reed Taylor fails to 
establish grounds for a continuance pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(f). The motion for continuance 
should be denied and the summary judgment hearing should proceed as scheduled. 
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A lot can be said in 105 pages. In order to avoid a response of equal length, this 
memorandum will focus on the issues that are truly germane to the matter before the Court. This 
memorandum will not exhaustively address the myriad of collateral, and in our view irrelevant, 
matters tossed up by Reed Taylor, but nor should that focus be seen as an admission of the 
viewpoints expressed by Reed Taylor. 
Reed Taylor's brief completely ignores the one fact material to defendants' motion for 
summary judgment: AIA Services had no earned surplus in 1995 or 1996. AIA Services' 
audited financial statements conclusively answer that question. See a/so, Hooper Expert Report. 
From this undisputed fact, it follows that the redemption agreement therefore violated 
Idaho Code § 30-1-6 and is void and unenforceable. 
Reed Taylor's expert, Paul Pederson, has submitted an affidavit. However, that affidavit 
effectively concedes that AIA had no earned surplus. While Mr. Pederson quibbles with some of 
the auditor's work, he does not opine that the 1995 or 1996 financial statements, which were 
audited by two nationally recognized independent auditing firms, fail to comply with GAAP or 
are otherwise incorrect. Most importantly, Mr. Pederson does not, because he cannot, opine that 
AIA Services had any earned surplus at the time of the redemption agreement. 
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Instead, Mr. Pederson employs the diversionary tactic of plaintiff's counsel by focusing 
on the "fair market value" of AIA Services assets or stock, a concept unrelated to earned surplus 
that is wholly irrelevant to the illegality issue under Idaho Code § 30-1-6. 
The undisputed fact that AIA Services did not have any earned surplus in 1995 or 1996 
establishes the illegality of the agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's stock. The agreement is, 
therefore, void and unenforceable. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Agreement To Redeem Reed Taylor's Shares Violated Idaho Code § 30-1-6 
Idaho Code § 30-1-6 imposes two separate restrictions on a corporation's redemption of 
its stock. First, the statute provides that redemption of corporate stock "shall be made only to the 
extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor." This is a bright-line 
rule. A corporation may redeem its stock only if it has sufficient earned surplus (in short, 
accumulated net earnings) for the redemption. The statute also imposes a second restriction: 
"No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the corporation is 
insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent." Both restrictions apply 
to any redemption of corporate stock. 1 
1 Reed Taylor asserts that a stock redemption agreement need only satisfY one of the two statutory 
restrictions. This argument is contrary to the clear language of the statute, which contains two 
separate restrictions. See Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 
303, 303 (1965) ("The Model Business Corporation Act, now the most widely copied provision, 
limits repurchases to the amount of earned surplus, or capital surplus if a charter provision or 
stockholders' vote so provides, and for good measure adds the further restriction that no purchase of 
or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the corporation is or would be rendered 
insolvent."). 
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Reed Taylor attempts to divert the Court's attention away from the earned surplus 
restriction contained in Idaho Code § 30-1-6, which is the crux of the pending motion for 
summary judgment. Instead, he focuses on the supposed "fair market value" of AIA Services, 
arguing that the fair market value of AIA Services' assets or stock exceeded its liabilities at the 
time of the redemption. Reed Taylor erroneously asserts that, if the fair market value of the 
assets of AIA Services exceeded the debts owed by AIA Services, the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares was legal. One need only review the definition of "earned surplus" to realize 
that this argument fails as a matter of law: 
The fundamental (and very obvious) flaw Reed Taylor's argument is that fair market 
value of the corporation's stock or assets has nothing whatsoever to do with earned 
surplus, as that term is defined in Idaho Code § 30-1-2(1) and used in Idaho Code § 30-1-6. 
The latter statute does not state that the fair market value of a corporation, or any other measure 
of value, is the test for determining whether a stock redemption agreement is lawful. Fair market 
value is mentioned nowhere in the statute, nor in any case law interpreting a statute similar to 
Idaho Code § 30-1-6. 
To the contrary, the test for determining Idaho Code § 30-1-6 is very clear. The 
redemption of corporate stock is permitted only out of a corporation's earned surplus, which is 
equivalent to retained earnings on a balance sheet prepared in accordance with GAAP. As 
defined in Idaho Code § 30-1-2(1), earned surplus consists of the accumulated profits, net of 
losses and previous dividends and other distributions to shareholders, since inception of the 
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corporation. Earned surplus is a statutory accounting concept completely separate from fair 
market value of the corporation's stock or assets.2 
Idaho Code § 30-1-6 also imposes a restriction related to the solvency of the corporation: 
Purchase of or payment for a corporation's shares is prohibited at any time that the corporation is 
insolvent or would be rendered insolvent by the purchase or payment, where insolvency is 
defined as the inability of the corporation to pay its obligations as they become due in the usual 
course of its business. Idaho Code § 30-1-2(n). But, like the earned surplus test, the insolvency 
test has nothing to do with the fair market value of the corporation's assets compared to its 
liabilities. The statutory insolvency test under Idaho Code § 30-1-6 is not a balance sheet test; 
nor does it have anything to do with the fair market value of the corporation's assets. 
1. AlA Services Did Not Have Any Earned Surplus In 1995 or 1996 
Despite the large volume of briefing that has been submitted, defendants' motion for 
summary judgment turns on one single issue whether AIA services had sufficient earned 
surplus with which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares. Earned surplus is the balance of net profits, 
income, gains and losses of a corporation from the date of incorporation after deducting 
distributions therefrom to shareholders and transfers therefrom to capital stock or capital surplus 
2 For example, if AlA Services had owned a real property bought for $1 million but worth $10 million, 
adjusting the balance sheet to increase the fair value of assets would not affect the corporation's 
accumulated net earnings or deficit as determined under GAAP or the equivalent earned surplus as 
determined under Idaho Code § 30-1-2(1). Similarly, if AIA Services had been successful in raising 
$25 million of new capital from the sale of Series B Preferred Stock in 1995, the corporation's net 
worth (i.e., assets in excess of liabilities) would have been positive in 1995; but the redemption of 
Reed's shares would still have been illegal because an increase in contributed capital does not enter 
into the calculation of the corporation's accumulated earnings from its operations pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 30-1-2(1). 
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accounts. See Hooper Expert Report, p. 2 (citing Accounting Tenninology Bulletin Number 1 
(ATB-I». "Earned surplus" is the equivalent of retained earnings (or retained deficit) under 
GAAP.ld. 
Neither Reed Taylor's opposition brief nor his expert witness contests that earned surplus 
is the equivalent of retained earnings/deficit. In fact, as demonstrated by the chart on page 7 of 
Mr. Pederson's expert report, Mr. Pederson agrees with this concept and uses the tenns "earned 
surplus/deficit" and "retained earnings/deficit" interchangeably. See also Lendman v. Lendman, 
460 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Wis. App. 1990) ("The tenn 'retained earnings' is, after all, another name 
for 'earned surplus' which is defined as that resulting from the profitable operations of the 
company."); Richard A. Booth, FINANCING THE CORPORATION, § 30:1.3 (,,[EJarned surplus is 
surplus that arises from profitable operations, that is, it is essentially the same thing as retained 
earnings under GAAP."); MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW, § 14.01 (explaining how 
stock redemption statutes generally prohibit "the repurchase of shares except out of 'earned 
surplus' (or what the accountants now called retained earnings)." 
To detennine whether AIA Services had the $7.5 million in earned surplus that would 
have been required to lawfully redeem Reed Taylor's shares, one need look no further than to the 
audited financial statements of AIA Services Corporation prepared at times while Reed Taylor 
served as an AIA Services Director. The financial statements for the pertinent years were 
audited by KPMG Peat Marwick and BDO Seidman, two independent, nationally recognized 
auditors, each of which opined that the financial statements present fairly, in all material 
respects, the consolidated financial position of AIA Services as of the respective dates thereof 
and the results of its operations and cash flows for the respective periods then ended in 
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conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Significantly, Mr. Pederson does not 
dispute these opinions. 
As established by those audited financial statements, AIA Services already had a negative 
earned surplus even before it entered into the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. The 1994 
audited financial statements report a retained deficit - i.e., negative earned surplus of 
($919,700) as of December 31,1994. The 1995 audited financial statements report a retained 
deficit (or negative earned surplus) of ($18,827,250) as of December 31, 1995, which is just 
shortly after the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. The 1996 audited financial statements 
report a retained deficit of ($17,03 7,673) as of December 31, 1996, which is just shortly after the 
1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. These audited financial statements establish 
that AIA Services did not have any earned surplus with which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares, 
much less the $7.5 million in earned surplus that would have been required to redeem his shares 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-6. Reed Taylor's expert witness, Paul Pederson, has done nothing 
to challenge this conclusion. Notably, Mr. Pederson's expert report focuses primarily on the 
concept of the fair market value of AIA Services, a concept that is wholly irrelevant to the 
illegality issues under Idaho Code § 30-1-6. 
Without ever offering an opinion that AIA Services had sufficient (or any) earned surplus 
with which to redeem Reed Taylor's shares, Mr. Pederson quibbles with the amount of the 
retained deficits stated in the audited financial reports, suggesting that they were "overstated." 
See Pederson Aff, ~ 9-10. He spends some time with the details of proper accounting for 
discounted operations. 
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Conspicuously absent from Mr. Pederson's affidavit is any opinion that the 1994 or 1995 write-
offs relating to discontinued operations failed to comply with generally accepted accounting 
principles. In other words, Mr. Pederson does not go so far as to opine that the write-offs in 
1994 and 1995 were incorrect. 
Even more telling is the absence of any opinion by Mr. Pederson that AIA could possibly 
have had any earned surplus in 1995 or 1996, much less the $7.5 million in earned surplus that 
would have been required to redeem Reed Taylor's shares without violating Idaho Code § 301-1-
6. In fact, the chart on page 7 of Mr. Pederson's affidavit affirms the substantial retained 
deficits during those years: 
Operating 
Total Income after 
Stockholder's Interest 
Earned Deficit Deficit Expense Net Income 
1994 ($919,700) ($852,374) ($260,640) (4,867,962) 
1995 ($18,827,250) (17,018,838) (84,479) (10,650,150) 
1996 (17,037,673) (14,792,476) 868,033 1,722,454 
1997 (7,247,168) (5,223,433) 1,162,900 9,790,505 
1998 (7,881,005) (6,053,439) 820,960 (726,381) 
Id. (emphasis added to the "Earned Deficit" column). 
The most important point to be gleaned from Mr. Pederson's affidavit is not the opinions 
that he offers, but the opinion that he does not offer. Mr. Pederson does not opine that there is 
any possibility that AlA Services had any earned surplus in 1995 or 1996, much less $7.5 
million in earned surplus. Thus, the fact that AIA Services lacked earned surplus with which to 
redeem Reed Taylor's shares remains undisputed. 
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Reed Taylor next argues that, despite the enormous year-end earned deficits, the 
defendants cannot point to the exact earned deficit number as of precise date of July 22, 1995. 
See Response Brief, p. 64. This argument is absurd. It would be one thing to quibble over exact 
numbers on specific dates if AIA Services had anywhere close to $7.5 million in earned surplus 
at some time around 1995 or 1996, but the argument is preposterous in light of the fact that AIA 
Services was so far upside-down. AIA Services ended 1994 with an earned deficit, which 
increased to over $18 Million by the end of 1995 and was still hovering around $17 Million at 
the end of 1996. Moreover, unaudited fmancial statements show quarterly earned deficits of 
($1,677,974), ($3,284,877) and ($21,740,295) in March, June and September of 1995. Reed 
Taylor cannot possibly argue that there was any point in 1995 or 1995 when AIA Services had 
any earned surplus, much less $7.5 Million in earned surplus. In fact, even his expert witness 
fails to make any such assertion. Reed Taylor' contention is like arguing that, although the 
United States' national debt was approximately $9 Trillion at the end of 2007 and over $10 
Trillion at the end of 2008, the United States might have had a surplus on some specific date in 
2008. 
The fact that AIA Services did not have any earned surplus with which to redeem Reed 
Taylor's shares is undisputed. Because of the absence of earned surplus, the agreement to 
redeem Reed Taylor's shares violated Idaho Code § 30-1-6. 
2. Because Of The Lack Of Earned Surplus, The Court Need Not Even Address 
The Solvency Issue 
Given the undisputed fact that AIA Services did not have any earned surplus with which 
to redeem Reed Taylor's shares, there is no reason for the Court to even analyze the solvency of 
AIA Services. The solvency test would only need to be analyzed if AlA Services had sufficient 
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earned surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's shares. Moreover, the allegations in Reed Taylor's 
complaint make it unnecessary to analyze the solvency of AlA Services. 
Reed Taylor argues that AIA Services may have been solvent in 1995 and 1996. This 
argument, however, is inconsistent with the fact that AIA Services was unable to pay the $1.5 
million downpayment at closing as originally agreed and then was unable to pay the short term 
downpayment note and was thereafter never able to pay the $6 million note in accordance with 
its terms. Moreover, while Reed Taylor may attempt to argue solvency in 1995, he certainly 
cannot argue that AIA Services is solvent now, was solvent at the time his note became due (July 
22, 2005), or was solvent at any time in the recent past. Idaho Code § 30-1-6 makes clear that 
the solvency restriction applies not only at the time of redemption, but also at the time of any 
subsequent payment for the redeemed shares. See I.C. § 30-1-6 ("No purchase of or payment for 
its own shares shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase 
or payment would make it insolvent."). 
Reed Taylor has specifically alleged in his Complaint that AIA Services is insolvent and 
has been insolvent since at least 2001. See Fifth Amended Complaint, ,,2.21, 2.23. He is 
judicially estopped from now asserting otherwise. See White v. Lorimer's City Dye Works, 269 
P. 90, 90 (Idaho 1928) (finding that the allegation of insolvency in the plaintiffs complaint was 
dispositive of the plaintiffs claims arising out of stock redemption agreement because "[a] 
contract by a corporation to repurchase its capital stock is not enforceable against the corporation 
while insolvent"). Reed Taylor's allegation of insolvency establishes conclusively that AIA 
Services is prohibited from making any payment on the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. 
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3. "Fair Value" Is Irrelevant 
Both Reed Taylor and his expert witness assert that AIA services had a positive fair 
market value in 1995 and 1996. They rely heavily on the assertion that an appraisal of the value 
of AIA Services stock as of December 31, 1995 obtained for purposes of the company's 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan indicated that, in 1995, AIA Services has a positive fair market 
value as a going concern. 3 This assertion is a red herring. The fair market value of a 
corporation as a going concern is not the test under Idaho Code §30-1-6, nor is it even mentioned 
in the statute or in cases interpreting the statute or similar statutes. Earned surplus is based on 
accumulated net earnings, not on fair market value of the corporation's assets or stock. 
Courts in other jurisdiction have rejected attempts by parties to equate earned surplus 
with the fair market value of a corporation as a going concern. For example, in Sajer v. Pitzer, 
36 Pa. D. & C.2d 33, 1964 WL 8400 CPa. Com. PI. 1964), the court analyzed the legality of a 
stock redemption agreement under a statute providing that "purchases by a business corporation 
of its own shares shall not be made except ... to the extent of its unrestricted and unreserved 
earned surplus .... " Id. at 35. To determine whether the corporation had sufficient earned 
surplus to redeem the shares, the court looked to the "financial statements of the corporation," 
which showed a surplus deficit. The party seeking to enforce the stock redemption agreement 
3 Despite diligent efforts, AIA Services had not previously been able to locate the 1995 appraisal. 
Upon further searching, AIA was able to locate the document. See Affidavit of D. John Ashby, filed 
March 5, 2009, ~ 11; Exh. D. The purpose of the appraisal "is to express an opinion of the fair 
market value of the common stock of the Company to serve as a valuation basis for stock transactions 
involving the Company Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)." Id. 
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argued that, despite the earned deficit, a company appraisal indicated that the company had 
substantial good will that gave the company a positive value as a going concern. Id. at 35-36. 
Just like Reed Taylor is arguing now, the party seeking to enforce the stock redemption 
agreement in Sajer argued that, despite the absence of earned surplus, the stock redemption 
agreement was legal because the corporation had a positive value as a going concern. The court 
rejected this argument, concluding that the a positive value as a going concern does not 
constitute earned surplus. Id. (analyzing the appraisal as either an "appraisal of anticipated 
income" or an "attempt to appraise the value of the company as a going concern," and explaining 
that "neither theory would constitute the item as 'earned surplus. "'). 
Thus, the fair market value of AIA services at the time of the agreement to redeem Reed 
Taylor's shares is irrelevant. The only relevant issue is whether AIA Services had earned 
surplus, and the fair market value ofthe corporation has nothing to do with earned surplus. 
B. Reed's Lengthy Arguments Related To Allegedly "Inappropriate" Corporate 
Actions Beginning In 1999 Are Irrelevant 
A very large part of Reed Taylor's brief is wasted on plaintiff's mantra that AIA Services 
has engaged in certain "inappropriate" transactions beginning in 1999. This argument is a 
blatant attempt to color the defendants as bad actors and to divert the Court's attention away 
from the illegality of the 1995 agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's stock. Reed Taylor lists a 
litany of transaction and events that he labels as "inappropriate" or "corporate malfeasance." 
The appropriateness of these transactions, however, has never been substantively briefed and is 
not now before this court. 
More importantly, the transactions of which Reed Taylor complains occurred long after 
the redemption of Reed Taylor's stock and, therefore, have nothing to do with the financial status 
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of AIA Services at the time of the redemption of Reed Taylor's stock in July 1995. The central 
question in this motion for summary judgment is whether AIA Services had earned surplus at the 
time of the redemption agreements. Thus, the relevant time frame is 1995 and 1996, and 
subsequent events are not relevant. The reason that these transactions are irrelevant to this 
motion is highlighted by Reed Taylor's own expert. Mr. Pederson explains in his affidavit that 
"beginning in 1999, AIA management begins to conduct a series of questionable transactions." 
See Pederson Aff., ~ 14. In fact, the vast majority of the transactions of which Reed Taylor 
complaint occurred much later than even 1999. Transactions occurring in 1999 or later have 
absolutely no bearing on whether AIA Services has earned surplus in 1995 or 1996. 
C. As An Illegal Contract, The Agreement To Redeem Reed Taylor's Shares Is Void 
And Unenforceable 
The Idaho Supreme Court has broadly held that all illegal contracts are void and 
unenforceable: 
The law is well settled, however, that illegal contracts are void and 
cannot be enforced Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345,351,924 P.2d 
607,613 (1996). A party to an illegal contract cannot ask the Court 
to have his illegal objects carried out, as the law will not aid either 
party to an illegal agreement. 
Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 400, 49 P.3d 402, 405 (2002) (emphasis added); see also 
Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611-12, 990 P.2d 1219, 1222-1223 (Ct. App. 1999) 
("Contracts to do acts forbidden by law are void and cannot be enforced" because "a contract 
which is made for the purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by statute . . . IS 
void."). 
In Farrell v. Whiteman, 2009 WL 198516 (Idaho 2009), the Court explained that "[a]n 
illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act or forbearance 
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which is contrary to law or public policy." Id. "Generally, when the consideration for a contract 
explicitly violates a statute, the contract is illegal and unenforceable." Id. Here the Stock 
Redemption Agreement was illegal because the "consideration" for the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares "explicitly violates a statute." Id. Idaho Code § 30-1-6 limited the consideration 
that could be paid for the redemption of stock and specifically prohibited the payment of 
consideration out of any source other than unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus. Because 
the Stock Redemption Agreement with Reed Taylor violated Idaho Code Section 30-1-6, it is 
void and unenforceable. 
Reed Taylor makes several assertions to the contrary, none of which find support in 
Idaho case law and most of which have been expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
For example, without citing any Idaho case law, Reed Taylor asserts that a contract will only be 
declared illegal and void if doing so would protect an "intended beneficiary" of a statute. This 
argument has been expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 
Idaho 33, 35, 436 P.2d 248,250 (1968) (rejecting the argument that only the individuals whom a 
statute was intended to benefit can assert a contract's illegality). Reed Taylor attempts to 
distinguish Wheaton on its facts, but the legal principles adopted in Wheaton are clearly 
applicable. 
Similarly, Reed Taylor argues, without citing to any Idaho case law, that an illegality 
defense is barred by estoppel if the parties "acquiesce" to the illegal contract. This argument has 
also been expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. See, e.g., See Worlton v. Davis, 73 
Idaho 217, 222-23, 249 P.2d 810, 814 (1952) ("The doctrines of estoppel by conduct and 
ratification have no application to a contract which is void because it violates an express mandate 
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of the law or the dictates of public policy. Such a contract has no legal existence for any purpose, 
and neither action nor inaction of a party to it can validate it, and no conduct of a party to it can 
be invoked as an estoppel against asserting its invalidity."). 
Reed Taylor next argues, again without citation to any Idaho authority, that a contract 
will only be declared illegal and void if it violates a criminal statute or a statute that declares a 
certain action to be "unlawful." The Idaho Supreme Court has never adopted such a rule. 
Instead, the Court has much more broadly held that any contract in violation of a statute is 
illegal, void and unenforceable. For example, in Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 
the Court broadly explained that "[a]n illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration 
consisting of any act or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy." (Emphasis 
added). This rule is not limited to only certain illegal contracts under certain circumstances. 
Instead, the illegality rule "applies on the ground of public policy to every contract which is 
founded on a transaction prohibited by statute" because "where a statute intends to prohibit an 
act, it must be held that its violation is illegal, without regard to the reason of the inhibition ... or 
to the ignorance of the parties." Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, there is no support for Reed Taylor's argument that only the violation of a criminal 
statute or a statute using the word "unlawful" will result in a contract becoming void and 
unenforceable. In fact, the contract need not even violate a statute. A violation of public policy 
will also render a contract void and unenforceable. Hancock v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 548, 
186 P.2d 494 (1947) ("Illegality vitiates agreements of every description and the courts decline 
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to enforce them. Within this rule, illegality includes agreements in violation of some prohibitive 
statute, [or] in violation of express rules of the common law .... ") (citation omitted)4 
In short, the rule in Idaho is that the courts will not enforce a contract that violates a 
statute. This rule is made for the benefit ofthe public and is founded on the principle that a court 
should refuse to use its resources to enforce an illegal contract: 
This rule is made for the protection of the public and not for the 
benefit of the parties; its object in refusing relief to either party 
where the contract is executed is not to give validity to the 
transaction but to deprive the parties of all right to have either 
enforcement of, or relief from, the illegal agreement. In such cases 
the defense of illegality prevails, not as a protection to defendant, 
but as a disability in plaintiff. ... 
Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, 133 Idaho 608, 612 (1999) (citations omitted).5 
D. Reed Taylor's Standing Arguments Fail 
Unable to seriously argue that the agreement to redeem his shares was anything but 
illegal, Reed Taylor attempts to argue that the various defendants lack "standing" to assert the 
illegality of the stock redemption agreement. Reed Taylor supports his standing argument with a 
handful of out-of-state authorities. Those out-of-state authorities are, of course, not binding on 
4 For example, two Idaho Supreme Court cases have held that stock redemption agreements are void 
and unenforceable, based not on violation of an express statute, but based on violation of the common 
law rule against redeeming stock when a corporation is insolvent. See White v. Lorimer's City Dye 
Works, 269 P. 90 (Idaho 1928); Brown v. T.E. Reed & Co., 31 Idaho 529 (1918). Notably, in both 
cases the Court allowed the illegality defense to be raised by the corporation. 
5 Reed Taylor also asserts arguments related to statutes of limitations, release provisions, derivative 
action limitations and the contemporaneous ownership rule. Each of these issues is applicable only to 
affirmative claims for relief, not affirmative defenses raised by defendants. These issues were briefed 
in Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's response to Reed Taylor's motion for summary judgment. That 
response brief is incorporated herein by reference and will not be repeated here. 
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Idaho courts. More importantly, the out-of-state authorities cited by Reed Taylor are contrary to 
binding Idaho Supreme Court precedent. 
The standing issue has already been briefed extensively, both in support of Connie 
Taylor's and Jim Beck's motion for summary judgment and in opposition to Reed Taylor's 
motion for summary judgment. It will not be repeated here. 
E. The Illegality Defense Is Not Subject To A Pleading Requirement 
Reed Taylor argues that the Court should not analyze the illegality of the contract 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-6 because "the Defendants have not pled a violation ofLC. § 30-
1-6 as an affirmative defense." See Response Memorandum, p. 98. Like most of the other 
arguments being asserted by Reed Taylor, this argument has also been expressly rejected by the 
Idaho Supreme Court. In Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 290 (1952)), the Court explained: 
A party to a contract, void as against public policy, cannot waive 
its illegality by failure to specially plead the defense or otherwise, 
but whenever the same is made to appear at any stage of the case, 
it becomes the duty of a court to refuse to enforce it ... ; again, a 
court of equity will not knowingly aid in the furtherance of an 
illegal transaction; in harmony with this principle, it does not 
concern itself as to the manner in which the illegality of a matter 
before it is brought to its attention .... Furthermore, the court 
itself will raise the question of the invalidity of a contract which 
offends public policy and, as stated before, the parties cannot 
waive it. 
Id.; see also Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 566-567,944 P.2d 695, 701 - 702 (1997) ("[The 
trial court] has a duty to raise the issue of illegality, whether pled or otherwise, at any stage in the 
litigation.") (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the defendants did properly raise and plead the illegality defense in their 
answers to Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint. See the 16th Affirmative Defense in these 
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defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint, filed April 16, 2008 (asserting the 
illegality of the agreement because "AIA had an accumulated deficit, and/or said transaction 
renders AIA Services insolvent"). 
Since Idaho is a notice pleading state, this affirmative defense is clearly adequate to raise 
the illegality defense based on whatever legal basis it might rest. 
Although other statutes were mentioned in the answer, Plaintiff certainly cannot feign 
surprise that the illegality defense is based on Idaho Code § 30-1-6. For at least the last seven 
months, Reed Taylor's briefing has recognized that the illegality defense is governed by Idaho 
Code § 30-1-6. See Reed Taylor's Preliminary Response To Connie Taylor's James Beck and 
Corrine Beck's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 17, 2008, p. 7 ("In 1995, I.e. § 30-1-6 
was the applicable law pertaining to stock redemptions. Connie and Becks erroneously rely on 
I.e. § 30-1-46".) 
F. Reed Taylor's Motion To Strike and/or Motion in Limine Should Be Denied 
Reed Taylor moves to strike the expert report filed by Kenneth Hooper on grounds that 
Mr. Hooper had not previously been disclosed as an expert witness. Reed Taylor's citation to 
cases holding that an expert witness can be excluded under certain circumstances is not 
applicable here. For example, Reed Taylor cites cases holding that a Court could exclude an 
expert disclosed on the eve of trial on grounds that the other party would be prejudiced. Here, 
however, Mr. Hooper has submitted an expert report in connection with a motion for summary 
judgment filed in a case without a trial setting. Reed Taylor had 14 days in which to file a 
counter-affidavit submitted by Reed Taylor's expert, and did in fact file the Affidavit of Mr. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 18 7(,21 
Pederson. Thus, Reed Taylor has had time to do exactly what the summary judgment process 
contemp lates. 
Reed Taylor also argues that Mr. Hooper was not disclosed prior to the disclosure 
deadlines in a prior scheduling order. The trial setting in this case, however, has been continued 
at Reed Taylor's request. Thus, the original scheduling order has been mooted at Reed Taylor's 
request, and a new scheduling order will presumably be issued in the event that there are still 
issues to be tried after this the Court's disposition of defendants' motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
Finally, Reed Taylor's argument that Mr. Hooper was concealed by the parties is wrong. 
In fact, Mr. Hooper was disclosed as an expert within one week of being retained. Counsel first 
communicated with Mr. Hooper about preparing an expert report late in the week of February 2, 
2009. See, the Affidavit of David R. Risley filed herewith. Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's 
statements in their deposition that they had not retained an expert witness were truthful. In fact, 
it was Reed Taylor's counsel's week-long barrage of deposition questions, focusing on irrelevant 
issues like fair market value, that made the defendants realize that an expert witness would be 
helpful to address the earned surplus test. 
There is similarly no merit to Reed Taylor's assertion that Mr. Hooper was provided with 
documents not produced to Reed Taylor. Mr. Hooper's expert report states with specificity the 
documents he reviewed in preparing his expert report. Those documents have all been produced 
and the same documents are also attached to the affidavit of Amy Gordon, filed February 12, 
2009. See 3/5/09 Ashby Aff., ~~ 8-10. 
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G. Reed Taylor's Allegation Of Discovery Violations Are Without Merit 
Reed Taylor has been misleadingly accusing AIA Services of discovery violations 
throughout this litigation. That mantra is now being adopted by his expert witness, who asserts 
that he has been unable to calculate the exact financial status of AIA Services at July 22, 1995 
because ofa lack of production of documents. See Pederson Aff., ~~ 7,15,25. Any assertion by 
Reed Taylor or his expert that AIA Services is withholding financial documents is false. Reed 
Taylor and his expert have had access to ALA Services' and AIA Insurance's financial 
documents since September 2007. 
Since the very beginning of this case, Reed Taylor has made clear that he want to see 
every single financial document in ALA Services' and AIA Insurance's possession. He has 
served hundreds of extremely broad requests for production of documents. 
Even though ALA Services has been audited by independent, nationally recognized 
aUditing firms during the relevant time periods, Reed Taylor insisted on the entire universe of 
financial documents of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. When Reed Taylor refused to narrow 
his requests, ALA relented and agreed to allow Reed Taylor and his expert witness access to 
virtually all of ALA Services' and AIA Insurance's financial records. See Stipulation Regarding 
Discovery Disputes filed September 4,2007. 
Through the stipUlation, Reed Taylor's counsel and expert witness were given access to 
not only ALA Services' and AlA Insurance's ledgers and journal entries, but also all source 
documents supporting the ledgers and journal entries. The ledgers and journal entries document 
the transactions, expenses, payments, etc. entered into by ALA Services and ALA Insurance. If 
Reed Taylor questioned a particular transaction or payment, he could then look to the source 
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documents (i.e., bills, receipts, etc) for further information.6 Thus, Reed Taylor and his expert 
have been allowed the opportunity to scrutinize literally every financial transaction in the history 
of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. 
Pursuant to the stipulation, Rod Bond and Mr. Pederson went to the offices of AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance and inspected documents. On one day, they identified almost 
15,000 documents for copying, including ledgers, journal entries, year-end closing notebooks 
and tax documents. Mr. Bond and Mr. Pederson indicated that they would return the next day to 
inspect additional documents, but they did not return. Mr. Bond indicated on several other 
occasions that he wanted to return to AIA' s offices to inspect additional documents, but he never 
did so. See 3/5/09 Ashby Affidavit, ~~ 5-6. 
Most recently, in response to an inquiry from Mr. Bond, Gary Babbitt sent an email 
stating that Mr. Bond and his accountant expert could return to inspect additional document any 
time between February 9 and February 20, 2009. Mr. Babbitt asked Mr. Bond to "[p]lease 
advise what days you or your accountant will be there." Mr. Bond did not respond. Id. at ~ 7. 
Mr. Pederson's expert affidavit states that he cannot opine as to the financial condition of 
AIA Services in 1995 or 1996 because of a lack of documents: 
At this time, I have not determined the financial status as of July 
22, 1995 or any other date within the 2005 (sic) and 2006 (sic) 
calendar years. Such a review is not possible based upon the 
documents produced to date and would required an exhaustive 
review of the AIA's books of original entry and ledgers .... 
6 These financial documents are contained within literally hundreds of boxes. It would cost hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to copy and bates number all of these documents, which is why they were 
made available for inspection in the form in which they are maintained in the ordinary course of 
business. 
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Pederson Aff., ~ 15. Mr. Pederson further asserts that "[a]t this time, we still have not been 
granted access to the full range of documents necessary to adequately investigate this matter." 
Id. at ~ 7; see also ~ 25 ("currently our investigation is incomplete because documents requested 
during the discovery process have not yet been produced."). These assertions are wrong. The 
very documents that Mr. Pederson states would have to be reviewed to fully analyze AIA's 
financial condition - "AIA's books of original entry and ledgers" - have been available to Reed 
Taylor's counsel and expert witness since September 2007.7 
III. CONCLUSION 
Reed Taylor entered into a stock redemption agreement with AIA Services at a time 
when AIA Services not only lacked any earned surplus, but had an enonnous earned deficit. The 
decision to enter into the agreement was wholly within Reed Taylor's control as the Chainnan of 
the AIA Services Board of Directors, the Chief Executive Officer and the majority shareholder 
of the company. Through the stock redemption agreement, Reed Taylor bailed from a sinking 
ship, and left that sinking ship with an enonnous debt obligation that it would never be able to 
repay. Through the same illegal transaction, Reed Taylor purports to have stepped in front of all 
other common shareholders, as well as general unsecured creditors. Even though he has been 
paid over nine million dollars, he now contends that he is entitled to every last dime salvageable 
7 Reed Taylor cites La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120,369 P.2d 48 (1962), for the proposition 
that experts must "reconstruct" the solvency of the corporation by determining whether the 
corporation's liabilities exceeded its assets. The test applicable in La Voy, however, is not applicable 
in this case. La Voy predated Idaho Code § 30-1-6, so the court applied the common law solvency 
test of comparing assets to liabilities. Here, Idaho Code § 30-1-6 supplies the applicable test, which 
is earned surplus, not common law solvency. Thus, there is no basis for the assertion that an expert 
needs to "reconstruct" the financial status of AIA Services to determine whether its assets exceeded 
its liabilities at the relevant time. 
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from AIA Services and that all other common shareholders - his equals before the illegal stock 
redemption agreement - are entitled to nothing. 
Despite Reed Taylor'S attempts to cloud this motion for summary judgment with 
irrelevant issues of "standing", "fair market value", "corporate malfeasance" and "discovery 
misconduct", the one fact crucial to the this motion remains undisputed:. AIA Services did not 
have any earned surplus with which to redeem Reed Taylor's stock in 1995 or 1996, much less 
the $7.5 Million in positive earned surplus that was required by Idaho Code §30-1-6 for a lawful 
stock redemption. Reed Taylor's expert witness essentially concedes this issue. Neither Reed 
Taylor nor his expert witness contends that there is any possibility that AIA Services had 
sufficient earned surplus in 1995 or 1996 to redeem Reed Taylor's stock. Thus, the agreement to 
redeem Reed Taylor's stock violated Idaho Code § 30-1-6. Under well-established Idaho law, 
that illegal agreement is void and unenforceable. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2009. 
RANDALL, BLAKE & COX, PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, 
J ames Beck and Corrine Beck, and 
Counterclaimants Connie W. Taylor and 
James Bec 
BY:~*-hh~ __________________ __ 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
DAVID R. RISLEY, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes and says that: 
1. Prior to the depositions that began on February 2, 2009, I had not hired nor 
spoken to or otherwise communicated with any expert that I might consult with or hire on James 
Beck's or Connie Taylor's behalf. 
2. During the depositions, it appeared that Plaintiffs counsel was attempting to 
direct inquiry toward attacking the audited financial statements and asserting other valuation 
methods other than earned surplus. 
3. It became clear that to meet that challenge, we would need to hire an expert 
witness. 
4. Discussions took place with Mr. Hooper late that week. These discussions were 
delayed by the depositions of James Beck and Connie Taylor. 
5. Mr. Hooper was authorized to begin work no earlier than the afternoon of 
February 6, 2009. 
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CASE NO. CV07-00208 
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS 
TO BE HEARD MARCH 12, 2009 
AND MOTIONS TO BE VACATED 
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS TO BE HEARD 
MARCH 12,2009 AND MOTIONS TO BE VACATED 
7//'/1 
Due to the large number and nature of filings since the Court's previous hearing in the 
above-entitled matter, the Court finds it necessary to establish a new schedule for the hearing of 
motions. IT IS HEREBY THE ORDER OF THE COURT that the follow motions will be heard 
by the Court on MARCH 12,2009 at 1:30 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time: 
a) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery. 
b) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike I In Limine Expert Witness Affidavits of Kenneth 
Hooper and Drew Voth. 
c) Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions of the Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. 
Peterson. 
IT IS FURTHER THE ORDER OF THE COURT that the following motions previously 
scheduled to be heard on March 12,2009, ARE HEREBY VACATED, to be rescheduled for a 
later date: 
a) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants/Counterclaimants Connie 
Taylor and James Beck. 
b) Plaintiff's Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Relinquish 
Collateral to Reed Taylor. 
Dated thifo day of March 2009. 
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS TO BE HEARD 
MARCH 12,2009 AND MOTIONS TO BE VACATED 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER was: 
V hand delivered via court basket, ~ 
<fAr 
___ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this ~ day of 
March, 2009, to: 
Ned Cannon 
Smith and Cannon 
508 Eighth St 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Michael S. Bissell 
7 S Howard St 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
PO Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
David A. Gittins 
PO Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D John Ashby 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
PO Box 1617 
Taylor v. AlA, et al. 
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Lewiston,ID 83501 
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Hawley Troxell Page 4 
COMES NOW AIA Selvices, Inc, by and thTOUgh its counsel ofIccord, Hawley Troxell 
Ennis & Hawley LLP, and respectfully moves the Court fOl additional time to secure the 
additional $400,000 Bond for the following reasons: 
1. The Comt has set March 6, 2009, as the last day for AlA Service's 
procurement ofan additional $400,000 sUIety but on March 12, 2009, the COUIt will hear the 
Defendants' motions fOl pattial summary judgment on the illegality of the Reed L Taylor stock 
redemption which make the bonding requirement moot; 
2.. Previously, in July, 2008, AIA SeIvices renewed the $200,000 surety 
previously ordered by the Court at a cost of $4,000 .00; 
3. AlA has at tbis time only identified bonding companies lhat will issue a 
$600,000 surety for a premium between $90,000 to $120,000, wbich is non-refundable .. A 
bonding company will cancel the $200,000 surety, an industry practice, and then issue a new 
sUTety in the total amount of $600,000 The fee for Ienewing the $200,000 bond will be lost 
Therefore, AIA prays for the Comt to enter an order to extend the time for obtaining a 
bond until after the COUIt enters an order on the Defendants' motions for partial summary 
judgment if one is necessary at that time 
This Motion is suppoIted by the Affidavit ofJoLee Duclos who is Secretary of AIA 
SeIvices Inc .. 
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR OBTAINING BOND - 2 
400050006 1442041 1 
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Defendant AIA Services will not file a notice of hearing on this Motion as the Court has 
retained jurisdiction over its Docket and hearings. Moreover, this matter has been fully briefed 
and does not require a hearing 
DA TED THIS 6th day of March, 2009 
HA WLE Y TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
~ ,426~ 
arYD.Babbi)SB No. 1486 
Attorneys for AIA SeIvices COIporation, 
AIA Insurance, Inc, and CropUSA 
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR OBTAINING BOND - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of March, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
copy ofthe foregoing MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR OBTAINING BOND by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each ofthe following: 
Ned A.. Cannon 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Sheet 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ned@scblegal.com 
[Attomeys fm Plaintiff] 
Michael S. Bissell 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC 
416 Symons Building 
7 South Howard Street 
Spokane, W A 99201 
mbissel1@cbklawyers.com 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David A Gittins 
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A.. GITTINS 
P,O. Box 191 
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david@gittinslaw.com 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Michael E, McNichols 
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Lewiston, ID 83501 
mmcnichols@clbrillc.com 
[Attomeys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
David R. Risley 
RANDALL, BLACK & COX, PLLC 
p.o .. Box 446 
1106 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, In 83501 
D avid@rbcox.coill 
[Attorneys for Defendants. Connie I aylm, .Tames Beck 
and Conine Beck] 
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US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
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James J Gatziolis 
Charles E HaIpeI' 
QUARLES & BRADY LLP 
Karen Ramos 
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700 
Chicago, IL 60661-2511 
JJG@guarles.com 
chaIper@guarles.com 
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance] 
Charles A. Brown, Esq, 
324 Main Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ChallesABrown@eableone.net 
[Intervenor, 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan] 
Hawley Troxell 
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I, ToLee K, Duclos, duly sworn and state as follows: 
11 
1 This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge, infOImation and belief; 
2. I am Secretary f01 AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc,; 
3. One of my tasks as Secretary to the cOIporations is to find a surety to issue an 
additional $400,000 bond and post the bond with the Court on or before March 6, 2009; 
Page 9 
4., On July 23,2008, the smety bond pleviously ordered by the Court in the name of 
AIA Services CorpOIation, AlA Insurance, Inc, and R John Taylor in the amount of$200,OOO 
was renewed at a cost of $4,000; 
5 Said surety bond was issued by The Hartford; 
6, Between July and the present time, the overall economy has worsened, the Dow 
Jones has declined steadily and the fmancial markets are in turmoil; the financial and insurance 
industries have been particularly hard hit; 
7 During The Hartford's underwriting process after our request to increase the bond 
to $600,000, they noted that they must underwrite using the consolidated financials and had issue 
with a line item labeled "Obligation to fmmer majority shareholder" in the amount of $8 .6M 
which eliminated the positive equity ofAIA Insurance; 
8, The Hartford did not feel it was a good risk to increase the current bond; 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOLEE K, DUCLOS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR 
OBTAINING BOND - 2 
3/6/2009 3:49:46 PM en Ramos Hawley ell Page 10 
9.. Through a broker, the cO!porations have contacted the following additional 
companies that will issue surety bonds: CBIC, Travelers, Safeco and North Platte; 
10. The surety companies will not stack one bond on top of another. Consequently, 
the surety companies, according to industry practice and custom, will issue a new surety in the 
total amount of$600,OOO; 
11. The fee paid for the $200,000 bond in July will be lost; 
12. The cost for bonding has increased due to the unceItainty in the financial and 
insurance markets; and as a result of the pending lawsuit, the corporations have had to approach 
the "high risk" maIket for bonding pUIposes; 
13 Based on quotations :from the bonding companies, the bonding cost will be 
between $90,000 and $120,000 for a $600,000 surety; 
14. The bonding companies have advised that bonding fees are not refimdable and 
bond premium is earned in filll upon execution oftbe bond; 
15 AIA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc .. and R John Taylor have all joined 
in the motions for partial summalY judgment on the illegality of the Reed J. Taylor's stock 
redemption The Defendants' motions for partial summary judgment may make the bonding 
requiremenl moot 
7t,~1 
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Further your affiant saycth lliIught 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of March, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF TOLEE K. DUCLOS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 10 
EXTEND TIME FOR OBIArn1NG BOND by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ned@scblega1.com 
[Attomeys for Plaintiff] 
Michael S, Bissell 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC 
416 Symons Building 
7 South Howard Street 
Spokane, VVA 99201 
mbissell@cbklawyeI's.com 
[Attomeys for Plaintiff] 
David A Gittins 
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A, GIIIINS 
PO Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
david@gittinslaw.com 
[Attomey for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Michael E.. McNichols 
CLEMENTS BROWN & MCNICHOLS 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
mmcnichols@c1brmc.com 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. Tohn Taylor] 
David R Risley 
RANDALL, BLACK & COX, PLLC 
P,O Box 446 
1106 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
pavid@rbcox.com 
[Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck 
and Conine Beck] 
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[Attorneys for Crop USA InsUIance] 
Charles A. Brown, Esq .. 
324 Main Street 
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[Intervenor, 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan] 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TA YLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN T AYLOR and CONNIE 
T AYLOR, individually and the community 
property comprised thereof; BRYAN 
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, 
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and 
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S 
EMERGENCY MOTION TO 
DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION, EMERGENCY 
MOTION TO RELINQUISH 
POSSESSION OF AlA INSURANCE, 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO AlA 
SERVICES AND AlA INSURANCE'S 
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR 
OBTAINING BOND, AND 
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RULE 
67 DEPOSIT 
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Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court as follows: 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The posting security is mandatory for a party to be enjoined under LR.C.P. 65. AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance failed to post the $600,000 in security ordered by the Court. As a 
matter of law, the preliminary injunction should is unenforceable and possession and control of 
AlA Insurance should be relinquished to Reed Taylor. 
Paul Durant II, a 14-year veteran of AlA Services and former President and Director of 
The Universe and Executive Vice-President of AlA Services who has extensive experience in the 
insurance industry, has agreed to operate AlA Insurance solely for the benefit of the corporation, 
submit detailed reports to the Court, and ensure all additional funds beyond those needed to 
operate AlA Insurance are timely deposited with the Court. Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor both 
agree that AlA Insurance should be protected and operated properly, and that Paul Durant II is a 
capable and experienced person to do so in the best interests of AlA Insurance. 
Accordingly, the best interests of all parties will be served by dissolving the preliminary 
injunction against Reed Taylor, transferring possession and control of AlA Insurance 
relinquished to him, ordering the business be operated by Paul Durant II, and ordering that all 
funds over and above those required to operate AlA Insurance be deposited with the Court. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On July 22, 1995, AlA Services agreed to redeem Reed Taylor's shares in AlA Services 
by executing a $6 Million Promissory Note ("$6M Note"), security agreements and related 
agreements. See Hearing, Ex. A, Z, AA-AB. On July 1, 1996, the parties agreed to modify 
certain terms of the redemption agreements by executing amended and restated agreements, 
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however, the $6M Note remained unchanged as did the various security interests granted to Reed 
Taylor. See Hearing, Ex. A-E. 
Under the terms of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended 
Stock Pledge Agreement"), AlA Services granted Reed an irrevocable proxy and an irrevocable 
power of attorney to vote, sell and/or transfer the shares of AlA Insurance. See Hearing, Ex. C, 
p. 7, § 6; p. 11, § 11.2. Upon the occurrence and failure to cure a default of the $6M Note, the 
authority to vote the shares of AlA Insurance rests exclusively with Reed (and AlA Services 
right to vote the shares ceases). Id. at p. 7, § 6 and p. 8, § 7(a). AlA Services defaulted on its 
obligations to Reed when, among other things, it failed to pay the $6M Note. See Hearing, Ex. 
C, E-F. 
Under the terms of the Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended Security 
Agreement"), AlA Services and AlA Insurance granted Reed a security interest in all of their 
right, title and interest in "all commissions from the sale of insurance or related services received 
by or on behalf of, or payable to ... " AlA Services and AlA Insurance. See Hearing, Ex. E, p. 2, 
§ § 1-2. Under the terms of the Amended Security Agreement, events of default are determined 
in accordance with the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. See Hearing, Ex. E, p. 3, § 5. In 
addition, under the terms of the Amended Security Agreement, "[a]ll rights and remedies of 
[Reed] shall be cumulative and may be exercised at such times and in such order as [Reed] 
determines." See Hearing, Ex. E, p. 4, § 7.3. 
Reed Taylor has a valid and perfected security interest in the shares of AlA Insurance and 
the commissions and receivables of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, and he is entitled to 
possession of such funds under the terms of the Amended Security Agreement. See Hearing, Ex. 
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C-E; Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond dated March 28,2007, Ex. 2. 
On August 1, 2005, Reed Taylor's $6M Note matured. See Hearing, Ex. A. On 
December 12, 2006, Reed Taylor provided AlA Services with written notice of its failure to pay 
the $6M Note and the related defaults in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. See Hearing, 
Ex. F. AlA Services failed to cure the defaults with the required time limits. See Hearing, Ex. 
A, C and E; Court File. 
On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor exercised his contractual right and voted the shares 
of AlA Insurance that were pledged to him as collateral when AlA Services failed to pay all 
amounts owed under the $6M Note (among other defaults). See Hearing, Ex. K. Under the 
powers granted to Reed Taylor by AlA Services, he voted all of the outstanding shares of AlA 
Insurance pledged to him by executing a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting and 
Consent in Lieu of Meeting of the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance. See Hearing, Ex. K-L. 
Under the terms of the Consents, Reed Taylor appointed himself as the sole director and officer 
of AlA Insurance. Jd. 
Nevertheless, on March 1, 2007, the Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order 
against Reed Taylor. See Court Order dated March 1, 2007. On March 8, 2007, the Court 
denied Reed Taylor's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and granted the Defendants' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction against him (which prevented Reed from operating AlA Insurance or 
contacting its employees). See Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, p. 7. 
On May 31, 2007, the Court denied Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration the 
Court's Order enjoining Reed Taylor, but increased the amount of the required bond for the 
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preliminary injunction issued against Reed Taylor to $200,000. See Opinion and Order on 
Plaintiff's Motions for Reconsideration, Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining 
Order, p. 13. However, the Defendants did not post the bond until July 18, 2007; over 1 YS. 
months later and only after Reed Taylor moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction. See 
$200,000 Hartford Bond Posted with the Court; Court File. 
On November 25, 2007, Reed Taylor moved the Court for Partial Summary Judgment of 
AlA Services' default of the Promissory Note and default under the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement. See Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On February 8, 2008, 
the Court granted Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Opinion and Order 
on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. A finding of a default under the terms of 
the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement also constitutes a default of the Amended Security 
Agreement. See Hearing, Ex. E, p. 3, § 5. 
On October 23, 2009, Reed Taylor filed a Motion to Increase Preliminary Injunction 
Bond. See Reed Taylor'S Motion for Relief from Stay and Motion to Increase Preliminary 
Injunction Bond. The Court never ruled on this motion. See Court File. 
On December 16, 2008, Reed Taylor filed his Amended Motion to Increase Bond. See 
Reed Taylor's Amended Motion to Increase Bond. The Motion was heard on December 30, 
2008. See Court File and Reed Taylor'S Notice of Hearing. On February 5, 2009, the Court 
entered an order increasing the required security to $600,000. On February 26, 2009, the Court 
entered a deadline requiring AlA Services and AlA Insurance to post the additional security in 
the total amount of $600,000 by March 6, 2009. See Court's Order Setting Deadline to Increase 
Surety Bond filed on February 26, 2009. 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISSOLVE INJUNCTION, RELINQUISH 
CONTROL OF AlA INSURANCE, RULE 67 DEPOSIT AND RESPONSE ... - 5 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance failed to post the $600,000 in security as ordered. See 
Court File. Instead, at approximately 4:00 p.m. on March 6, 2009, AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance served a Motion to Extend Time for Obtaining Bond on Reed Taylor's, and without 
citing any legal authority, they requested an indefinite extension of the deadline for posting the 
bond. l See AlA Services and AlA Insurance's Motion to Extend Time for Obtaining Bond dated 
March 6,2009. 
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Have Failed to Post the $600,000 Security and 
The Court Should Dissolve The Preliminary Injunction Against Reed And 
Hold The $200,000 Bond Until Further Motion By Reed Taylor 
1. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Failed to Post the $600,000 As Ordered 
By The Court. 
"No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of 
security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper. .. " I.R.C.P. 65(c) (emphasis 
added). The requirement for the posting of a bond for a preliminary injunction is mandatory. 
Valley View Farms v. Westover, 96 Idaho 615, 615, 533 P.2d 736 (1974) (emphasis added); 
Hutchins v. Trombley, 95 Idaho 360, 365, 509 P.2d 579 (1973). 
In Hutchins, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically addressed the mandatory requirement 
of security for a preliminary injunction to be issued: 
[W]e hold that before an injunction is issued under Rule 65 the giving of security by the 
applicant for the payment of costs, damages and attorneys fees as provided in Rule 65(c) 
is mandatory, unless the trial court makes a specific finding based upon competent 
evidence that no such costs, damages or attorneys fees will result to the restrained party 
as a result of a wrongful issuing of the injunction or restraining order. Since there is no 
I Not surprising, The Hartford requested the Consolidated Financial Statement after seeing the Court's Order 
increasing the security and "The Hartford did not fell it was a good risk to increase the current bond." See Affidavit 
of JoLee Duclos dated March 6, 2009, p. 2, "7-8. Obviously, The Hartford is not placing much value upon the 
Defendants' alleged "illegality" argument. 
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such finding in this case, the trial court improperly issued the order pendente lite without 
requiring security as provided for in Rule 65(c). 
Hutchins, 95 Idaho at 365 (emphasis in original and added). 
Here, AlA Services and AlA Insurance have failed to post the $600,000 in security by 
March 6, 2009, as ordered by the Court. The Court made no findings that Reed Taylor would 
not incur any damages from being enjoined, and, in fact, increased the amount of security 
required to enjoin him to $600,000. Instead of timely posting the required security ordered by 
the Court, AlA Services and AlA Insurance, without citing any authority, requested an indefinite 
amount of additional time to post the security. However, as a matter of law AlA Services and 
AlA Insurance's failure to post the required security renders the Preliminary Injunction 
unenforceable and void as a matter of law. 
2. The $200,000 Bond Should Be Held By the Court. 
Security posted by a preliminary injunction is subject to a motion by the wrongfully 
enjoined party for damages and attorneys' fees for such wrongful enjoinrnent. See I.R.C.P. 
65(c). 
Thus, the Court should include in its order dissolving the preliminary injunction that the 
$200,000 bond is to be held by the Court pending Reed Taylor's future motion against the bond 
to recover any applicable damages and attorneys' fees from the bond. 2 
B. The Court Should Order The Defendants To Relinquish Possession and 
Control of AlA Insurance To Reed Taylor. 
After default, a secured party may "foreclose or otherwise enforce the claim, security 
interest or. .. lien by any available judicial procedure; and [i]f the collateral is documents, may 
2 Notably, the $200,000 bond is insufficient to compensate Reed Taylor for the damages, attorneys' fees and costs 
that he has incurred from being wrongfully enjoined. 
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proceed either as to the documents or as to the goods they cover." I.C. § 28-9-60 1 (a)(1)-(2). 
"After default, a secured party [mJay take possession of the collateral..." I.e. § 28-9-609(a)(1). 
In addition, after any event of default, a secured party may" ... require the debtor to assemble the 
collateral and make it available to the secured party ... " I.C. § 28-9-609(c). 
1. The Preliminary Injunction Against Reed Taylor Should Be Dissolved 
and the Defendants Should Be Ordered To Immediately Relinquish 
Possession and Control of AlA Insurance To Reed Taylor. 
When a right to vote shares is granted through an irrevocable power of attorney coupled 
with an interest, a pledgee's right to vote the shares is irrevocable under Idaho law. See I.C. § 
30-1-722 (emphasis added). A secured party may use or operate the collateral for the purpose of 
preserving the collateral. See I.C. § 28-9-207. 
Once shares of stock have been voted, a party may not be enjoined because the vote has 
already taken place. Cooper v Milam, 256 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)("Regardless 
of whether the Bank did or did not have the right to vote the Barrett stock, conditionally or 
unconditionally, it has done so and no preliminary injunction can effectively undo that which has 
been done,,).3 
AlA Services pledged AlA Insurance as collateral for the punctual payment of Reed 
Taylor's $6M Note. See Hearing, Ex. C, p. 2, § 2. Upon a default, AlA Services expressly 
granted Reed the contractual right to vote all of the shares of AlA Insurance. See Hearing, Ex. 
C, p. 7, § 6. 
1/1 
3 For all of the reasons articulated in Reed Taylor's Motion to Relinquish Control and Possession of AlA Insurance, 
the Court should dissolve the preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor and grant his Emergency Motions as there 
is no legal basis to enjoin Reed Taylor since he already voted the shares and AlA Services is in default of the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. Thus, Reed Taylor moves the Court to dissolve the preliminary injunction even 
if the required security is posted. 
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Reed Taylor's irrevocable contractual right to vote the shares m AlA Insurance IS 
unmistakably clear: 
... Upon the occurrence and continuation of a Default, [AlA Services'] right to exercise 
such voting rights shall immediately cease and terminate and all voting rights with 
respect to [AIA Insurance] shall rest solely and exclusively in [Reed]. The foregoing 
sentence shall constitute and grant to [Reed] an irrevocable proxy coupled with an 
interest to vote the [shares of AlA Insurance] upon the occurrence and continuation of 
such a Default ... 
See Hearing, Ex. C. p. 7, § 6 (emphasis added). In order to provide Reed with all rights 
necessary to vote the shares and take over AlA Insurance as provided under Idaho law, AlA 
Services also expressly agreed to: 
... sign such additional documents relating to [AlA Insurance] as [Reed] may reasonably 
request in order to provide [Reed] with the full benefit of this Agreement. [AlA 
Services] hereby grants to [Reed] a power of attorney to execute any such documents as 
[AlA Services'] attorney-in-fact. Such power of attorney is coupled with an interest and 
shall be irrevocable until the [$6M Note has] been fully and finally paid. 
See Hearing Ex. C. p. 11, § 11.2 (emphasis added). 
Thus, Reed's right to vote the shares of AlA Insurance was irrevocable and authorized by 
AlA Services and LC. § 30-1-722. In accordance with the contractual rights expressly granted to 
Reed Taylor by AlA Services, Reed Taylor duly exercised his right to vote all of the shares of 
AlA Insurance on February 22, 2007. See Hearing, Ex. K. It follows that Reed Taylor cannot 
be enjoined from now operating AlA Insurance in the manner set forth below. See e.g., Cooper 
v Milam, 256 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) ("no preliminary injunction can effectively 
undo that which has been done"). 
The Court has found that AlA Services is in default of the $6M Note and Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement for its failure to pay Reed Taylor as required. Because all of the shares of 
AlA Insurance are pledged to him as collateral and AlA Services gave him the irrevocable right 
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to vote the shares and operate the company, he is entitled to take immediate possession of it, 
regardless of any defenses being asserted by the Defendants. Therefore, the Defendants should 
be ordered to assemble AlA Insurance (including all assets such as vehicles, equipment and 
receivables) and immediately relinquish possession to Reed Taylor. 
2. Reed Taylor Has Made Arrangements for the Former President and 
Director of The Universe and Executive Vice-President of AlA Services to 
Operate AlA Insurance. 
Reed Taylor has arranged for Paul Durant to be appointed as acting President of AlA 
Insurance in the event the Court grants Reed Taylor possession and control of AlA Insurance. 
Reed Taylor has given Mr. Durant explicit instructions to operate AlA Insurance in the best 
manner possible for the benefit of the corporation. Mr. Durant is the former President and 
Director of The Universe and former Executive Vice-President of AlA Services. Mr. Durant 
worked in senior executive positions in AlA Services and its subsidiaries for approximately 14 
years and has extensive experience in the operations of AlA Insurance. Moreover, Mr. Durant 
was a long-time Certified Public Accountant and has extensive experience in accounting. 
Reed Taylor has also given Mr. Durant explicit instructions to do the following until 
further order of the Court (which the Court can include in its order relinquishing possession of 
AlA Insurance to Reed Taylor):4 
a. Pay no money to Reed Taylor or any other party in this action (other than 
reasonable expenses incurred for the benefit of AlA Insurance) unless their 
services are specifically required as an employee of AlA Insurance. 
b. Prepare and submit under seal to the Court monthly reports of all business 
activities and balance sheets. 
4 If, for any reason, Mr. Durant refuses to remain employed by AlA Insurance, Reed Taylor will hire an alternative 
executive and provide the same instructions to operate AlA Insurance in the best interest of the corporation. 
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c. Operate AlA Insurance in the best interests of the corporation. 
d. Utilize Reed Taylor's services, \vithout compensation, to the extent Mr. Durant 
deems appropriate in his sole discretion. However, Mr. Durant is under no 
obligation to utilize Reed Taylor's services. 
e. Deposit all funds in excess of those required for working capital and normal 
operation into the Court's registry at the end of every month. If no funds are 
available to deposit, Mr. Durant is directed to submit a report to the Court with an 
explanation. 
f. Ensure that all allocations between CropUSA and AlA Insurance were reasonable 
and that any future allocations (to the extent the companies may work together) 
are allocated fairly. 
g. Ensure that AlA Insurance's financial statements are prepared accurately, 
correctly, and in accordance with GAAP. Provide when appropriate a break-
down of each material line item on the financial statement. 
h. Ensure that AlA Insurance is operated as efficiently as possible, while providing 
the best service possible to AlA Insurance's customers, agents, and sponsoring 
associations. 
1. Ensure that AlA Insurance is operated with the proper number of employees 
without consideration for the needs of CropUSA or any other entity in which AIA 
Insurance holds no ownership interest. 
J. Re-evaluate any purported contracts with CropUSA to ensure that they are arm-
length transactions and in the best interests of AlA Insurance. 
k. Assist in re-establishing AlA Insurance's relationships with sponsoring 
associations. 
1. Verify all of AlA Insurance's state licenses are in force and are kept in force and 
in good standing. 
m. Assist in re-establishing AlA Insurance's agency force, obtaining viable products 
to sell and implementing and marketing the selling of new products. 
n. Ascertain the location and approximate value of any assets of AlA Insurance that 
have been misappropriated or transferred to others (including, transactions lacking 
consideration or fair consideration and transactions that were not arms-length). 
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o. Establish a value of AlA Insurance as an agency and the value of its contracts 
with sponsoring associations. 
p. To the extent that time permits, review the books of AlA Insurance pertaining to 
certain past allocations, expenses, and receipts (i.e., payments received from 
Trustmark). 
q. Ensure that all related party transactions involving AlA Insurance are arms-length 
transactions and in the best interests of ALA Insurance. 
r. Ensure that full and complete transparency is provided for all transactions and the 
operations of AlA Insurance to those parties entitled to such information or as 
ordered by the Court (except to the extent that information is a trade secret or is 
otherwise confidential information). 
s. Provide a monthly report to the Court under seal of the status of all of the above. 
Significantly, Mr. Durant has agreed to provide the above services on a full-time basis to 
AlA Insurance for the payment of $5,000 per month in salary and employee benefits normally 
paid to employees at AlA Insurance, plus performance bonuses to be determined at a later date 
(Reed Taylor has agreed to be obligated to pay bonuses to protect his collateral). See Affidavit 
of Reed Taylor dated March 9, 2009; Affidavit of Paul Durant dated March 9,2009. 
The interests of Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor, ALA Insurance, AlA Services and any other 
party with claims to the assets and business of AlA Insurance will be best served by ordering 
possession and control of AlA Insurance relinquished to Reed Taylor upon the above terms and 
conditions, subject only to further order of the Court and all parties in this action reserving all 
rights and remedies. 5 Moreover, the Defendants have not operated AlA Insurance in a manner 
even close to that being offered by Reed Taylor. Thus, the Court should order possession and 
5 AlA Services, AlA Insurance, or AlA Services 401(k) Plan can hardly argue that having a neutral party operate 
AlA Insurance is not in the their best interests when the record is full of evidence demonstrating that millions of 
dollars in funds and assets have been unlawfully transferred and/or misappropriated to CropUSA and others under 
the express consent of the current management. Indeed, Reed Taylor looks forward to seeing Joinders filed in 
support of his Emergency Motions. 
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control of AlA Insurance turned over to Reed Taylor. 
3. Donna Taylor Approves the Possession and Control of AlA Insurance 
Being Relinquished to Reed Taylor. 
Like Reed Taylor, AlA Services has ceased paying Donna Taylor. Like Reed Taylor, 
Donna Taylor has not been provided notice of any board meetings and her required seat on AlA 
Services' board has not been honored. Like Reed Taylor, AlA Services has failed to honor its 
contractual obligations to Donna Taylor and the defendants have diverted millions of dollars 
from AlA Services and AlA Insurance to her detriment. See Affidavit of Donna Taylor dated 
March 9, 2009. 
Donna Taylor fully supports and consents to AlA Insurance being relinquished to Reed 
Taylor and operated in the manner set forth above. Like Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor is 
concerned there will be nothing left by the time this action is tried. See Affidavit of Donna 
Taylor dated March 9,2009. 
C. Reed Taylor Moves the Court for AlA Insurance to Deposit All Funds After 
Those Funds Necessary To Operate AlA Insurance into the Court Registry 
The Court has authority to order a party in possession of funds to deposit such funds due 
other parties into the Court registry. See LR.C.P. 67. 
As part of relinquishing control and possession of AlA Insurance to Reed Taylor, he is 
moving the Court, on behalf of himself and AlA Insurance (if the Court dissolves the injunction), 
for an order permitting AlA Insurance to deposit all funds in excess of the funds required to 
operate AlA Insurance into the Court's registry. Depositing the excess funds into the Court's 
registry will protect all parties in this action and is supported by Reed Taylor, the secured 
creditor, and Donna Taylor, the only shareholder entitled to the remaining funds and assets of 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISSOLVE INJUNCTION, RELINQUISH 
CONTROL OF AlA INSURANCE, RULE 67 DEPOSIT AND RESPONSE ... - 13 
7f/t, 7 
AlA Services for the over $450,000 owed to her.6 See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated March 9, 
2009; Affidavit of Donna Taylor dated March 9, 2009; Affidavit of Paul Durant dated March 9, 
2009. Reed Taylor's Motion for Rule 67 Deposit is also on behalf of AlA Insurance if the Court 
grants the above Motions. 
The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for Rule 67 Deposit and permit excess 
profits and/or funds to be deposited in the Court registry to protect all parties until further order 
of the Court. 7 
D. AlA Services and AlA Insurance's Motion to Extend Time for Obtaining Bond 
Should Be Denied 
As indicated above, the requirement for the posting of a bond for a preliminary injunction 
is mandatory. Valley View Farms v. Westover, 96 Idaho 615, 615,533 P.2d 736 (1974). 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance failed to post the $600,000 in security ordered by the 
Court by 5 pm on March 6, 2009. As a matter of law, the deadline cannot be extended. 
Therefore, AlA Services and AlA Insurance's Motion should be denied and the Preliminary 
Injunction against Reed Taylor is null and void. 
Moreover, even if AlA Services or AlA Insurance posted the security late, the Court 
should still order possession and control of AlA Insurance relinquished to Reed Taylor based 
upon the terms, conditions and authority cited above. Although the Defendants assert that their 
alleged "illegality" defense provides a basis to enjoin Reed Taylor, the arguments and authorities 
cited by Reed Taylor in his Response in Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion 
6 As indicated above, Paul Durant will file weekly reports of the business activities and financial reports of AlA 
Insurance to the Court and counsel for all parties under seal. 
7 Reed Taylor is not waiving any contractual or legal rights that he has to possession of all commissions and 
receivables or for the complete possession and control of AlA Insurance, and his Rule 67 Motion is not a waiver or 
relinquishment of such rights. To the contrary, Reed Taylor is simply concerned about the preservation of his 
collateral which has been depleted in value over the past two years. 
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for Partial Summary Judgment prove the issues are not as simple as the Defendants would like 
the Court to believe, and that their alleged "illegality" defense fails as a matter of law. 
Moreover, the Defendants have failed to cite any authority for the proposition that there should 
be any further delay in turning over AlA Insurance to Reed Taylor. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor should be dissolved since AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance failed to post the required $600,000 in security on or before March 6, 2009, 
and he should be granted immediate possession and control of AlA Insurance. Furthermore, his 
Motion for Rule 67 Deposit should be granted. The $200,000 bond presently posted should be 
held by the Court as security until such time as Reed makes a motion to recover fees, costs, and 
damages pursuant to LR.C.P. 65. 
DATED: This 9th day of March, 2009. 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & RBY PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I caused to have served a 
true and correct copy of (1) Reed Taylor's Emergency Motion to Dissolve Preliminary 
Injunction, Reed Taylor's Emergency Motion to Relinquish Possession and Control of AlA 
Insurance, Reed Taylor's Response in Opposition to AlA Services and AlA Insurance's Motion 
to Extend Time for Obtaining Bond; (2) the Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated March 9, 2009; (3) 
the Affidavit of Donna Taylor dated March 9, 2009; (4) the Affidavit of Paul Durant dated 
March 9,2009; (5) Reed Taylor's Motion to Shorten Time and Proposed Order; and (6) Request 
for the Court to Hear the foregoing Motions on March 12, 2009, on the following parties via the 
methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and 
Bryan Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for R. John Taylor 
David R. Risley 
Randall, Blake & Cox 
1106 Idaho St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and 
Corrine Beck 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and 
Crop USA Insurance Agency 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
e ) Facsimile 
eX) Email (pdf attachment) 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISSOLVE INJUNCTION, RELINQUISH 
CONTROL OF AlA INSURANCE, RULE 67 DEPOSIT AND RESPONSE ... -16 
7(, 71J 
James J. Gatziolis 
Charles E. Harper 
Quarles & Brady LLP 
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street 
Suite 3700 
Chicago, IL 60661-2511 
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services 401 (k) Plan 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered - Via Messenger 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Signed this 9
Th 
day of March, 2009, at LeWist~ 
--if~cannon 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISSOLVE INJUNCTION, RELINQUISH 
CONTROL OF AlA INSURANCE, RULE 67 DEPOSIT AND RESPONSE ... - 17 
7(P7! 
~AR-09-2009 02:55 PM D.B. K.SHIP. 
NED A. CANNON. ISBA No. 2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston~ Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746w 8421 
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Tel: (509) 455~ 7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TA YLOR. a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION. an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR. individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN. a single person; IOLEE 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and 
CORRINE BECK. individually and the 
conun.unity property comprised thereof; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF ARIZONA ) 
) 88: 
COUNTY OF MARICOPA ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL D. DURANT II - 1 
Case No.: CV~07-00208 
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l~ PaulO. Durant II, being first duly swom on oath. deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in coUI't, and 
make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. Prior to my retirement in 1999. I had been in the insurance business since 
1965. Prior to joining AlA Services and its subsidiaries, I held senior executive positions 
with The Sentry Insurance A Mutual Company ("Sentry Insurance Company") and 
Southland Life Insurance Company. I am also a past Director of the Council for 
Affordable Health and the National Alliance of Life Insurance Companies. 
3. Prior to joining AlA Services, I was Chief Financial Officer and 
Operations Officer for operating units of Sentry Insurance Company (a corporation that 
had several hundred million dollars in assets). Prior to joining Sentry Insurance 
Company, I was the Treasurer and Chief Planning Officer of Southland Life Insurance 
Company (a corporation that had several hundred million dollars of assets). 
4. I first became associated with AlA Insurance in 1982 when I was Semor 
Vice-President for Sentry Insurance Company. At this time, SentrY Insurance Company 
had assumed the responsibility for underwriting AIA Insurance's association sponsored 
group health and life insurance policies. 
5. I joined AIA Services in Octoher 1985. I was employed by AIA Services 
and its subsidiaries The Universe Life lnsw:ance Company ("The Universe") and AIA 
Insurance for approximately 14 yeats. I am the past President and a past Director of The 
Universe Life which was a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services. During the tenure 
of my employment with AIA Services, The Universe and. other subsidiaries of AIA 
Services. I was responsible for the acquisition of other companies and general operations 
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of The Universe, along with the creation of the universal health policies sold by AlA 
Insurance which were initially underwritten by Sentry Insurance Company. I am also a 
former Director of AlA Insurance and AlA Services. Finally, I am a past Executive 
Vice-President of AlA Services. 
6. I was contacted by Reed Taylor to see if I was interested in assisting in the 
operation of AlA Insurance. I have agreed to act as President of AlA Insurance and 
oversee its operations if the Court gives Reed Taylor possession and control of AlA 
Insurance. I have been asked by Reed Taylor to discharge my duties exclusively for the 
benefit of AlA Insurance. I am amicable to receiving input from. aU parties on the 
operation of AlA Insurance) however, I understand that Reed Taylor has directed that I 
will have final say on the operation of AlA Insurance to ensure that decisions are made 
only in the best interests of the corporation. I understand that I will be paid $5,000 per 
month by AlA Insurance and will be provided the standard employee benefits provided to 
other employees at AlA Insurance. As part of my duties, I will direct and supervise the 
production of the reports identified below and submit them to the Court to the extent 
ordered, and, to the extent ordered by the COl!I\ ensure that any excess funds are 
deposited monthly in the Court's registry (after retaining necessary working capital). 
. Reed Taylor has agreed that I will have the exclusive right to hire and fire all employees 
necessary to operate AlA Insurance. Reed Taylor has asked and I have agreed to perform 
all duties required to act as President of AlA Insurance and perform the duties outlined in 
Reed Taylor~s Emergency Motions. 
7. Reed Taylor has agreed to provide me with performance bonuses. We 
have not worked out a written agreement on the amount or payment of any bonuses, but 
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we anticipate doing so if the Court turns over possession and control of AlA Insurance to 
Reed Taylor. Based upon my past dealings with Reed Taylor, I believe that he will trea.t· 
me faitly and we will amicably agree upon terms of my bonuses in a written agreement 
(which will be agreed upon between me and Reed Taylor if AlA Insurance is turned over 
Reed Taylor). I understand that Reed Taylor will be solely responsible for the payment 
of any performance bonuses to the extent that they are agreed upon by us and I will not 
make any claims against AlA Insurance for any bonuses. 
8. As part of my duties operating AlA Insurance, Reed Taylor has requested. 
and I have agreed, to the following as a condition to my employment by AIA Insurance 
(to the extent that I am able and to best of my knowledge)= 
a. Pay no money to Reed Taylor or any other party in this action unless their 
services are specifically required as an employee of AlA Insurance. 
b. Prepare and submit under seal to the Court monthly reports of all business 
acti vities and balance sheets. 
c. Operate AlA Insurance in the best interests of the corporation. 
d. Utilize Reed Taylor's services. without compensation, to the extent I deem 
it appropriate in my sole discretion. However, I am under no obligation to 
utilize Reed Taylor's services. 
e. Deposit all funds in excess of those required for working capital and 
normal operation into the Court' 8 registry at the end of every month. If no 
extra funds are available to deposit, I will submit a report to the Court with 
an explanation. 
f. Ensure that all allocations between CropUSA and AIA Insurance were 
reasonable and that any future allocations (to the extent the companies 
may work together) are allocated fairly. 
g. Ensure that AIA Insurance's financial statements are prepared accurately, 
correctly, and in accordance with GAAP. Provide when appropriate a 
break-down of each material line item on the fmancial statement. 
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h. Ensure that AIA Insurance is operated as efficiently as possible. while 
providing the best service possible to AlA Insurancets customers, agents~ 
and sponsoring associations. 
i. EnslU'e that AlA Insurance is operated with the proper number of 
employees without consideration for the needs of CropUSA or any other 
entity in which AlA Insurance holds no ownership interest. 
j. Re-evaluate any purported contracts with CropUSA to ensure that they are 
arm-length transactions and in the best interests of AIA Insurance. 
k. Assist in re-establishing AlA Insurance's relationships with sponsoring 
associations. 
1. Verify all of AlA Insurance's state licenses are in force and. are kept in 
force and in good standing. 
m. Work on re-establishing AlA Insu.rance's agency force~ obtaining viable 
products to sell and implementing and marketing the selling of new 
products. 
n. Ascertain the location and approximately value of any assets of AlA 
Insurance that have been misappropriated or transferred to others 
(including. transactions lacking consideration or fair consideration and 
transactions that were not anus-length). 
o. Establish a value of AlA Insurance as an agency and the value of its 
contracts with sponsoring associations. 
p. To the extent that time permits, review the books of AIA Insurance 
pertaining to certain past allocations, expenses, and receipts (Le., 
payments received from Trustmark). 
q. Ensure that all related party transactions involving AlA Insumnce are 
arms-length transactions and in the best interests of AIA Insurance. 
r. Ensure that full and complete transparency is provided for all 1tansactions 
and the operations of AIA Insurance to those parties entitled to such 
information or as ordered by the Court (except to the extent that 
information is a trade secret or is otherwise confidential infonnation) . 
. DATED~2009. 
Paul D. Durant II 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL D. DURANT II - 5 
P.05 
MAR-09-2009 02:58 PM D.B CK.SHIP. 
6238 P.06 
, . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of March, 2009. 
KAYI M. COLON 
Notary Publlo • AtllOI'lO 
MarlcOpg county 
"" .-__ J My Comm. ElcpIreI Apr 21. 2009 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7lO0 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
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I, Donna Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in cOUli, and 
make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. Since my last Affidavit, the Defendants have not honored my right to be a 
member of the board of AlA Services. AlA Services has ceased making payments to me 
since last summer when I filed suit against John Taylor. In addition to my regular 
monthly payments, AlA Services was obligated to pay me $100,000 every six months 
after Reed Taylor's Down Payment Note was paid in full. AlA Services has never paid 
me any additional $100,000 payments, even though the records show that millions of 
dollars have been transferred to CropUSA since Reed Taylor's Down Payment Note was 
paid in full in 2001. The Defendants continue to ignore all contractual obligations to me, 
while certain directors pay themselves $20,000 per year to serve on AlA's purported 
board, when I was supposed to be paid in full by the end of2003. 
3. I believe that it would be in the best interests of all parties that AlA 
Insurance be turned over to Reed Taylor and that Paul Durant be employed to operate 
AlA Insurance. I agree, and consent, to AlA Insurance being relinquished to Reed 
Taylor and the following actions that Reed Taylor intends to take (whether through Paul 
Durant or another qualified person): 
a. Pay no money to any other party in this action unless their services are 
specifically required as an employee of AlA Insurance. 
b. Prepare and submit under seal to the Court monthly reports of all business 
activities and balance sheets. 
c. Operate AlA Insurance in the best interests ofthe corporation. 
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d. Mr. Durant can utilize Reed Taylor's services, without compensation at 
this time (other than reimbursement of reasonable expenses), to the extent 
I deem it appropriate in my sole discretion. However, Mr. Durant is under 
no obligation to utilize Reed Taylor's services. 
e. Deposit all funds in excess of those required for working capital and 
normal operation into the Court's registry at the end of every month. If no 
extra funds are available to deposit, I will submit a report to the Court with 
an explanation. 
f. Ensure that all allocations between CropUSA and AIA Insurance were 
reasonable and that any future allocations (to the extent the companies 
may work together) are allocated fairly. 
g. Ensure that AlA Insurance's financial statements are prepared accurately, 
correctly, and in accordance with GAAP. Provide, when appropriate, a 
breakdown of each material line item on the financial statement. 
h. Ensure that AlA Insurance is operated as efficiently as possible, while 
providing the best service possible to AlA Insurance's customers, agents, 
and sponsoring associations. 
1. Ensure that AlA Insurance is operated with the proper number of 
employees without consideration for the needs of CropUSA or any other 
entity in which AlA Insurance holds no ownership interest. 
J. Re-evaluate any purported contracts with CropUSA to ensure that they are 
arm-length transactions and in the best interests of AlA Insurance. 
k. Assist in re-establishing AlA Insurance's relationships with sponsoring 
associations. 
1. Verify that all of AlA Insurance's state licenses are in force and are kept 
in force and in good standing. 
m. Assist in re-establishing AlA Insurance's agency force, obtaining viable 
products to sell and implementing and marketing the selling of new 
products. 
n. Ascertain the location and approximate value of any assets of AlA 
Insurance that have been misappropriated or transferred to others 
(including, transactions lacking consideration or fair consideration and 
transactions that were not arms-length). 
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o. Establish a value of AlA Insurance as an agency and the value of its 
contracts with sponsoring associations. 
p. To the extent that time permits, review the books of AlA Insurance 
pertaining to certain past allocations, expenses, receipts (i.e., payments 
received from Trustmark) and payments made to other or received by AlA 
Insurance. 
q. Ensure that all related party transactions involving AlA Insurance are 
arms-length transactions and in the best interests of AlA Insurance. 
r. Ensure that full and complete transparency is provided for all transactions 
and the operations of AlA Insurance to those parties entitled to such 
information or as ordered by the Court (except to the extent that 
information is a trade secret or is otherwise confidential information). 
4. I am requesting that the Court permit Reed Taylor be granted possession 
and control of AlA Insurance and the right to deposit all funds that exceed the funds 
needed to operate AlA Insurance with the Court registry to protect me and Reed Taylor. 
I also fully support AlA Insurance being turned over to Reed Taylor so that it can be 
properly operated and its funds and assets preserved. These actions would be in the best 
interests of AlA Insurance and AlA Services and would ensure that the money held by 
AlA Insurance and its value will be safeguarded. Nevertheless, I am not waiving any of 
my contractual rights or any of my rights under Idaho law. I am expressly reserving all 
rights and remedies, including, without limitation, AlA Services' default of its 
obligations to me and the legal ramifications of its default. 
DATED: This 9th day of March, 2009. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of March, 2009. 
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Notary PUbl~ Idaho. 
Residing at: ,J-"W""-=-..... IS ....:fo~f..-.t1'-----,-_---o-_ 
My commisslO~ expires: {,III J?f)/t/ 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRY AN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
AFFIDA VIT OF REED TAYLOR - 1 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S 
EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISSOLVE 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, 
EMERGENCY MOTION TO RELINQUISH 
POSSESSION AND CONTROL OF AlA 
INSURANCE AND EMERGENCY MOTION 
FOR RULE 67 DEPOSIT 
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I, Reed 1. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, am the 
plaintiff in this action, and make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. Since my last Affidavit, the Defendants have not honored my right to be a 
member of the board of AlA Services. AlA Services has ceased making payments to me 
for almost one year. We have never been provided any detailed reports of any allocated 
expenses or reports of any new business at AlA Insurance. The items set forth in my 
Emergency Motions, this Affidavit and the Affidavit of Paul Durant have not been 
provided to us. I am also entitled to significant information as outlined in the Amended 
Stock Pledge Agreement and this information is not being provided (other than belated 
financial statements provided at the Defendants' discretion). 
3. If the Court orders the Defendants to turn over possession and control of 
AlA Insurance to me and enters an order approving the deposit of funds into the Court's 
registry, I will retain Paul Durant II to act as President of AlA Insurance. I have agreed 
with the terms of Mr. Durant's employment as outlined in his Affidavit dated March 9, 
2009, which includes the payment of his $5,000 monthly salary by AlA Insurance. I will 
also work with Mr. Durant to amicably agree upon the terms of reasonable bonuses (for 
which I will be liable until this action is resolved or until further motion or order of the 
Court). My goal is to take all actions necessary to preserve the value of AlA Insurance. 
4. If I am granted possession of AlA Insurance, I will discharge my duties in 
the best interests of AlA Insurance, agree to ensure that the following items are 
completed and have directed Paul Durant to do the following as a condition of his 
employment by AlA Insurance (the following and other terms will be placed in an 
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employment contract with Mr. Durant): 
a. Pay no money to me or any other party in this action unless their services 
are specifically required as an employee of AlA Insurance. 
b. Prepare and submit under seal to the Court monthly reports of all business 
activities and balance sheets. 
c. Operate AlA Insurance in the best interests of the corporation. 
d. Mr. Durant can utilize my services, without compensation at this time 
(other than reimbursement ofreasonable expenses), to the extent I deem it 
appropriate in my sole discretion. However, Mr. Durant is under no 
obligations to utilize my services. 
e. Deposit all funds in excess of those required for working capital and 
normal operation into the Court's registry at the end of every month. If no 
extra funds are available to deposit, I will submit a report to the Court with 
an explanation. 
f. Ensure that all allocations between CropUSA and AlA Insurance were 
reasonable and that any future allocations (to the extent the companies 
may work together) are allocated fairly. 
g. Ensure that AlA Insurance's financial statements are prepared accurately, 
correctly, and in accordance with GAAP. Provide, when appropriate, a 
breakdown of each material line item on the financial statement. 
h. Ensure that AlA Insurance is operated as efficiently as possible, while 
providing the best service possible to AlA Insurance's customers, agents, 
and sponsoring associations. 
1. Ensure that AlA Insurance is operated with the proper number of 
employees without consideration for the needs of CropUSA or any other 
entity in which AlA Insurance holds no ownership interest. 
J. Re-evaluate any purported contracts with CropUSA to ensure that they are 
arm-length transactions and in the best interests of AlA Insurance. 
k. Assist in re-establishing AlA Insurance's relationships with sponsoring 
associations. 
1. Verify that all of AlA Insurance's state licenses are in force and are kept 
in force and in good standing. 
m. Assist in re-establishing AlA Insurance's agency force, obtaining viable 
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products to sell and implementing and marketing the selling of new 
products. 
n. Ascertain the location and approximate value of any assets of AlA 
Insurance that have been misappropriated or transferred to others 
(including, transactions lacking consideration or fair consideration and 
transactions that were not arms-length). 
o. Establish a value of AlA Insurance as an agency and the value of its 
contracts with sponsoring associations. 
p. To the extent that time permits, review the books of AlA Insurance 
pertaining to certain past allocations, expenses, receipts (i.e., payments 
received from Trustmark) and payments made to other or received by AlA 
Insurance. 
q. Ensure that all related party transactions involving AlA Insurance are 
arms-length transactions and in the best interests of AlA Insurance. 
r. Ensure that full and complete transparency is provided for all transactions 
and the operations of AlA Insurance to those parties entitled to such 
information or as ordered by the Court (except to the extent that 
information is a trade secret or is otherwise confidential information). 
If, for any reason, Paul Durant is unable or unwilling to act as President of AlA Insurance 
until such time as the Court determines otherwise or this case is tried, I will find and hire 
a different executive with experience in the insurance industry to act as President of AlA 
Insurance with the same or substantially the same instructions as set forth above, i.e., to 
operate AlA Insurance in the best interests of the corporation. 
5. I am agreeing to do the above without waiving any of my rights to the 
collateral, rights to commissions, rights for reasonable compensation of my time and 
efforts, rights for reimbursement, and any other legal right or remedy. I am reserving all 
rights, but am agreeing to the above in an effort to preserve the value of AlA Insurance. 
6. I am requesting that the Court permit me to deposit all funds that exceed 
the funds needed to operate AlA Insurance in the Court registry to protect me, Donna 
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Taylor, and AlA Insurance. Although I believe that I have a right to all funds of AlA 
Insurance and the control of the company, I am agreeing to deposit funds with the Court 
because at least the money is not going to the Defendants or to fund the operation of 
other businesses and entities. Again, I am reserving all rights to the funds. I am not 
waiving any of my contractual rights, any of my rights under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, or my rights under Idaho law. I am also reserving all rights with regard to pending 
motions that I have filed and the right to seek other relief from the Court. 
7. Time should be shortened to hear my Emergency Motions because the 
Defendants have failed to post the $600,000 security and they are not operating AlA 
Insurance properly. My ex-wife Donna Taylor also supports my Emergency Motions and 
having Paul Durant operate AlA Insurance. After two years, I believe that it is time to 
allow me to protect AlA Insurance and its assets. The Defendants have had the use of 
AlA Insurance for over two years and have yet to provide an accurate accounting or 
ensure that expenses are properly and fairly allocated between AlA Insurance and 
CropUSA. 
DATED: This 9th day of March, 2009. 
Reed 1. TayMr /?/' ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of March, 2009. 
Notary Public tor Idaho . 
Residing at: -;:A.J lei }f.sjOr1 
My commission expires: I" II! / 2blL/ 
'"' I I 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
FILED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TA YLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE 
TAYLOR, individually and the community 
property comprised thereof; BRYAN 
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, 
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and 
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; 
Defendants. 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME-1 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO 
SHORTEN TIME FOR HEARING 
REED TAYLOR'S EMERGENCY 
MOTION TO DISSOLVE 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, 
EMERGENCY MOTION TO 
RELINQUISH POSSESSION AND 
CONTROL OF AlA INSURANCE TO 
REED TAYLOR, AND EMERGENCY 
MOTION FOR RULE 67 DEPOSIT 
Reed Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court as follows: 
I. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
The trial court has the authority to enter an order shortening time upon a showing of good 
cause. LR.C.P. 7(b)(3); see also Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 601, 21 P.3d 918 
(2001)(Court has discretion to shorten the time for a motion for a divorce). 
Here, Reed Taylor is requesting an Order Shortening Time to hear his Emergency Motion 
to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, Emergency Motion to Relinquish Possession of AlA 
Insurance to Reed Taylor, and Emergency Motion for Rule 67 Deposit (collectively "Emergency 
Motions"). The Defendants and the Plan were all served with the Emergency Motions on March 
9, 2009. This Motion and the Emergency Motions are particularly warranted because the 
Defendants have failed to post the $600,000 security ordered by the Court. See Affidavit of 
Reed Taylor dated March 9,2009. 
The Court should grant Reed's Motion to Shorten Time and enter an order setting Reed 
Taylor's Emergency Motions to be heard at 1 :30 p.m. on March 12, 2009, or soon as possible 
before or after the foregoing date and time. 
DATED: This 9th day of March, 2009. 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY LLC 
Michael S. Bissell 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 2 
NED A. CANNON, ISBA No. 2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite416 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor 
FI LED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; ALA INSURANCE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN 
TA YLOR and CONNIE TA YLOR, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, 
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single 
person; CROP USA INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and 
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S REQUEST 
FOR HEARINGS TO BE SET FOR REED 
TAYLOR'S EMERGENCY MOTIONS 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR HEARINGS ON EMERGENCY MOTIONS - 1 
7r.,Cj() 
ORiGIN l 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves the Court as 
follows: 
A. Request for Hearings 
Reed Taylor requests that the Court schedule for hearing the following motions to be 
heard at 1 :30 p.m. on March 12,2009 (unless indicated otherwise): 
1. Reed Taylor's Emergency Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction. 
2. Reed Taylor's Emergency Motion to Relinquish Possession and Control of AlA 
Insurance. 
3. Reed Taylor's Emergency Motion for Rule 67 Deposit (to be heard as soon as 
possible and a proposed order has been copied to all counsel and provided to the Court). 
DATED: This 9th day of March, 2009. 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PPLC 
e A. Cannon 
Michael S. Bissell 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR HEARINGS ON EMERGENCY MOTIONS - 2 
FILED 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (fax) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cableone.net 
Attorney for Intervenor, 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan 
of the AlA Services Corporation. 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 









AlA SERVICES CORP., an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE INC., an Idaho) 
corporation, R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE) 
TAYLOR, individually and the community ) 
property comprised thereof; BRYAN ) 
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,) 
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE ) 
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and ) 
JAMES BECK and CORRlNE BECK, ) 
individually and the community property ) 
comprised thereof; ) 
Defendants. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; and AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Counter-Claimants, 









Case No. CV 2007-00208 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 1225/324 Main St. 



















401 (K) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR ) 




COMES NOW the Intervenor, the 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan of the AIA Services 
Corporation, by and through its attorney of record, Charles A. Brown, and requests this Court to take 
judicial notice of the following matters, Reed J Taylor v. Michael E. McNichols, Clements, Brown & 
McNichols, P.A., et al., Nez Perce County, Case No. CV 08-01763, and Reed J Taylor v. Gary D. 
Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V Collins, Richard A. Riley, Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley LLP, 
et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CV 08-01765. This request is made pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 201(d). 
In regard to those two judicial matters, the Intervenor sets forth which documents it 
would like the Court to take judicial notice of as follows: 
Reed J Taylor v. Michael E. McNichols, Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., et al.: 
1. Complaint for Damages/Jury Trial Demanded 
2. Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
3. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion and Memorandum of Law to Amend 
Complaint with Proposed Amended Complaint 
4. Notice of Appeal 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - 2 
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Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 1225/324 Main St 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax) 
Reed J Taylor v. Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. 
Riley, Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley LLP, et al.: 
numbers. 
5. Complaint for Damages/Jury Trial Demanded 
6. Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
7. Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum of Law to Amend Complaint with 
Proposed Amended Complaint 
8. Notice of Appeal 
Copies of the above-referenced documents are attached hereto under those respective 
Plaintiff is fully aware of said documents due to the fact that he is the "author" of all 
said documents. This request is being made in conjunction with the Intervenor's use in the 
proceedings in the above-referenced case as scheduled for March 12, 2009, in regard to 
(1) Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions of the Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson filed 
by Plaintiff on 2126/09 and 3/3/09; (2) Intervenor's Response to Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel 
Discovery, Motion to Sequence the Hearing of Motions, Motion for LR.C.P. 56(f) Continuance for 
Hearing Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, and Objection to Hearing the Plan's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on March 12,2009; (3) Intervenor's Reply to Reed Taylor's Objection 
to Connie Taylor and James Becks' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' and 
40 1 (k) Plan's Joinders and Reed Taylor's ObjectionslMotion Strike and/or in Limine of Affidavits 
of Hooper and Voth; 4) Reed Taylor's Motion to Strikelin Limine Expert Witness Affidavits of 
Kenneth Hooper and Drew Voth; (5) Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel Discovery, Sequence the 
Hearing of Motions, Motion for LR.C.P. 56(f) Continuance for Hearing Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment, and the Objection to Hearing the Plan's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on March 12,2009; and (6) Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel Discovery, Sequence the Hearing of 
Motions, Motion for LR.C.P. 56(f) Continuance for Hearing Connie Taylor and James Becks' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Intervenor also requests to use this information in any matters to be scheduled by the 
Court on any future dates in regard to the Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
the Intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order on Plaintiff s Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
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Charles A. Browll, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St 
Lewistoll, Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax) 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED on this 10th day of Marclyf099. 
( , I V 
, ?!~ 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney for Intervenor, 40 1 (k) Profit Sharing 
Plan of AlA Services Corporation 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
0 mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and deposited 
in the United States Post OffIce to: 
0 sent by facsimile to: 
0 sent by facsimile and mailed by regular fIrst 
class mail, deposited in the United States Post 
OffIce to: 
0 sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery 
0 hand delivered to: 
"'fit Emailed to: rod@scblegal.com and 
ned@scblegal.com 
0 mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and 
deposited in the United States Post OffIce to: 
0 sent by facsimile to: 
0 sent by facsimile and mailed by regular fIrst 
class mail, deposited in the United States Post 
OffIce to: 
D sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery 
D hand delivered to: 
.~ Emailed to: mbissell@cbklawyers.com 
D mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and deposited 
in the United States Post OffIce to: 
D sent by facsimile to: 
D sent by facsimile and mailed by regular fIrst 
class mail, deposited in the United States Post 
OffIce to: 
D sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery to: 
D hand delivered to: 
)t Emailed to: mmcnichols@clbrmc.com 
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Roderick C. Bond, Esq. @ 746-8421 
Ned A. Cannon, Esq. 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael S. Bissell, Esq. @ 509-455-7111 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
416 Symons Building 
7 South Howard Street 
Spokane, \VA 99201 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael E. McNichols, Esq. @ 746-0753 
Bentley G. Stromberg, Esq. 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P .A. 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R John Taylor] 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box } 225/324 Main St 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
208-746-9947/208-746-5886 (fax) 
0 mailed by regular first class mail, and deposited 
in the United States Post Office to: 
0 sent by facsimile to: 
0 sent by facsimile and mailed by regular first 
class mail, deposited in the United States Post 
Office to: 
0 sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery 
0 hand delivered to: 
'tA Emailed to: GBabbitt@hawleytroxell.com & 
( 
jash@hteh.com 
0 mailed by regnlar first class mail, and deposited 
in the United States Post Office to: 
0 sent by facsimile to: 
0 sent by facsimile and mailed by regular first 
class mail, deposited in the United States Post 
Office to: 
0 sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery 
0 hand delivered to: 
1& Emailed to: jjg@quarles.com & 
charper@quarles.com 
0 mailed by regular first class mail, and deposited 
in the United States Post Office to: 
0 sent by facsimile to: 
0 sent by facsimile and mailed by regular frrst 
class mail, deposited in the Uluted States Post 
Office to: 
0 sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery 
0 hand delivered to: 
~ Emailed to: david@gittinslaw.com 
0 mailed by regular first class mail, and deposited 
in the United States Post Office to: 
0 sent by facsimile to: 
0 sent by facsimile and mailed by regular first 
class mail, deposited in the United States Post 
Office to: 
0 sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery 
0 hand delivered to: 
~ Emailed to: David@rbcox.com 
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Gary D. Babbitt, Esq. @ 208-342-3829 
D. John Ashby, Esq. 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
[Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services 
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA 
Insurance Agency] 
James J. Gatziolis, Esq. @312-715-5155 
Charles E. Harper, Esq. 
Quarles & Brady LLP 
Citigroup Center, Suite 3700 
500 West Madison Street 
Chicago, IL 60661-2511 
[Attorneys for Defendant CropUSA Insurance 
Agency] 
David A. Gittins, Esq, @ 758-3576 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
843 Seventh Street 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos & Freeman] 
David R. Risley, Esq. @ 743-1266 
Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC 
1106 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorney for Defendants Connie Taylor & James 
and Corrine Beck] 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax) 
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAIvlPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Case No.: C V \j 8 -0 1 7 6 3 
Plaintiff, 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
v. 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
MICHAEL E. MCN1CHOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS, BRO\VN & MCNICHOLS, Category: A.l. 
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANEl Fee: $88.00 
~::SI:~::::::_l::~::;~______j______ ______ ~_'N"'" 
Reed J. Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAJ"IPBELL, BrSSELL &. 
KIRBY, PLLe, alleges as follows (aU applicable tacts alleged below arc incorporated by 
reference into each cause of action as necessary to support each such cause of actIon): 
1. PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is a resident of Lewi.~.,ton, Nez Perce CQunty, 
Idaho. Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor is an elderly person as defined in I.e. § 48-608. 
2. Defendant Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. ("Clements Bro\.vn") is 
an Idaho professional col1)oration in the business of practicing law. Clements Brown is 
COMPLAINT - J 
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vicariously liable for the acts cfthe individual Defendants. 
3. Defendant Michael E. McNichols is an individual residing in the ~tate of 
Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idabo with and for Clements 
Brown. 
4 Jane Does I-V are unkno\!"rn individuals who are andlor "vere attorneys that 
participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above kno'vvTI defendants. 
II. JURISDICTION. VENUE AND CLAIMS 
5. The Defendants transacted business through the practice of le!'N in Nez 
Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as detendants in J.Jez Perce 
County, Idaho. The Defendants committed toriious acts and/or assisted in the 
commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The Defendants' tortious act') 
andior assistance have inflicted darnages upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
6. Damages in this action exceed $10,000, Jurisdiction and venue are, 
therefore, appropriate in Nez Perc:e County District Cou.rt. 
7. PlaintitI Reed J. Taylor's Complaint is not a derivative action, Plaintiff 
Reed 1. Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AlA Insurance, fne., the only 
shareholder of ALA Insurance, Inc, by way of holding all of its shares as coHaterai, and 
the largest creditor of AlA Services Corporation (Reed J. Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 
and AlA Services Corporation is insolvent). AlA Services Corporation and AlA 
Insurance, Inc.'s value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over $8,500,000, phlS 
interest and attorneys' fees and costs, ovved to Reed J Taylor. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is 
entitled to bring certain claims directly against the Defe~ldants for certain damages. 
COMPLAINT - 2 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
HI. FACTS 
8. At all material times, Plaintiff Reed J, Taylor was owed over $6,000.000 
by AlA Services Corporation through a promissory not.e dated August 1, 1995, Plaintiff 
Reed J. Taylor is presently owed over $8,500,000 by AlA Services Corporation. At all 
material times, the Defendants had niH knowledge of AlA Services Corporation's debt 
and contractual obligations owed to Reed J. Taylor. 
9. AlA Services Corporation was in default of the $6,000.000 promissory 
note when it failed to pay the note when it matured on August 1, 2005. Although 
unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note: matured on August 1, 2005, demand 
for payment was properly served upon AlA Services Corporation by Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor on December 12,2006. AlA Services Corporation was insolvent in 2001, and has 
continued to be insolvent from said date. 
10. Since 1996, as security fbr the over $8,500,000 o,Ned by All'. Services 
Corporation, Plaintiff Reed .T. Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all 
of the stock of AlA Insurance, Inc. and all of the commissions and related receivables of 
AIA Insurance, Inc. and AlA Services Corporation. Pursuant (0 the Amended alld 
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1, 1996, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor had the 
contraclual right upon default of AlA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and take operational control of ATA Insurance, Inc. Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor's right to vote the stock of AlA fnsUr3.nce was also perfected through A fA. 
Set-vices Corporation's irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed 1. Taylor that was 
coupled with an interest as required by r. C § 30-1-722. 
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11. On Febmary 22, 2007, Reed J. Taylor voted the stock of AlA Insurance, 
Inc. and attempted to take control of it pmsuant to his contractual rights as provided 
under the law, the contract documents, and I.e. § 30-1-722. Ho\vevcr, the interested 
directors of ALA Insurance, Inc. (including R. John Taylor) by and through the 
Defenda.'1L.<; intentionaHy assisted in breaching tbe tenus of the Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement and refbsed to acknowledge Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor's valid vote 
of the stock of ALA Insurance, Inc. and refused to surrender control as required. The 
Defendants further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties 
(including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order aw:! 
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor, when the Defendants knew there 
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so Vias an intentional violation and 
tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets ilnd 
11.mds of AlA Insurance, Inc. were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded. 
12. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has a pending civil action against AlA Services 
C0I110ration, ALA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and 
others ttX claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, conversion, brenches 
of fiduciary duties and other claims under Ncz Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208 
(,Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et al. "), and therein Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AlA Services Corporation's ddi:mft of 
the $6,000,000 promissorj note and corresponding default of the }\mended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote 
ofthe stock, Reed J. Taylor would find should be in actual control of ALA Insurance, Inc. 
but for the actions and R. John Taylor, which Defendants, with full knowledge of Reed J. 
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Taylor's rights, facHitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of A1\ Sel~"lces 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor. 
U. In 2007, Defendants appeared in the civil action, '{~lylor v. AlA Services 
Corporation, et aI., and assumed the direct legal representation of three distinct dients, 
AIA Services Corporation, a corporation, AlA insurance, Inc., a corporation, and John 
Taylor, an individual, and indirect legal representation of other interested parties 
(including Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). At all material times R. 
John Taylor ,"'as an interested CEO and director of A1./\ Scr;ices Corporation and AlA 
Insurance, Inc. and an interested majority shareholder of AlA Services CorporatlOr:.. The 
civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil conspirac)() conversion, and breaches of 
fiduciary duty perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others against ALA Service;,; 
Corporation and ALA Insurance, Inc., and such acts having damaged and continuing to 
cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In violaiion of the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and Defendants' duty of care, the Defendants 
undertook to represent the three named clients, each having irreconcilable conflicts of 
interest with the others. 
14. Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor'S aitorney, Roderick C. Bond, advised the 
Defendants in early 2007, that it \vas a violatioTl of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct and duty of care to represent AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., 
and R. John Taylor because of various conflicts of interest. On l\'farch 28, 2007, the 
Defendants finally recognized the violation and withdrew rrom representing AT A 
Services Corporation and A fA Insurance, lne. Although the Defendants should have 
withdravm from representing R. John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation and ALA 
COtvlPLAINT - 5 
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Insurance, Inc. in Tc~vlor v. AL4 Services Corporation. e/ ai., the Defendants committed <l 
further violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care by 
lerrninating the representation of the corporations and continuing to represent R John 
Taylor, which was a breach of their duty of loyalty to the corporations. Defendants' 
actions constitute a violation of the "hot potato" doctrine. 
15. The Defendants inappropriately entered into rind/or participated in a Joint 
Defense Agreement(s) knov..~ng that AfA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Tnc., 
Crop USA Insurance, Inc., R. John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in 
Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et al. had dear irreconcilable conflicting and 
diverging interests in vioLation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Defendants' 
duty of care, and to the detriment AV\ Services Corporation, ArA Insurance, Inc. and 
Reed J. Taylor. In Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation et aL a Joint Defense Agreement 
was not pennissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding 
and abetling, and otr,er causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed 
consent from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense 
Agreement was also independently not appropriate or permitted vv'hen certain parties to a 
joint defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement. 
The Joint Defense Agreement(s) in question have assisted in others (including R. John 
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fnmd, 
fraudulent conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and 
other claims, while also assisting the Defendants in inappropriately obtaining payment of 
fees and costs in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care. 
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16. The Defendants assisted AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and others in taking action that was 
not in the best interests of the corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties, andior 
done so without requiring AlA Services Corporation, ALA insurance, Inc. and/or Crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to retain separate independent counsel that ,,,,,ere retained by 
separate independent uninterested parties. 
17. As attorneys for AlA Services Corporation. ,m entity, the Defendants 
owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty nf care, 
and the law to the COJ1)Oration and its shareholders to preserve and protect the assets and 
businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services Corpuration was insolvent, to its 
creditors including Reed J. Taylor. As attorney for AlA Services Corporation, and in 
light of the claims made against R. Jo.b..n Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, 
the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume representation of the 
interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement, or 
\.villi any other interested parties. 
18. As attorneys for AlA Insurance, Inc.., the corporation, the Defendants 
owed duties as provided by the fdaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, 
and the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the 
corporation's stock, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, with contractuai rights to vote the shares and 
assume control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares hut 
whose rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who vv'ere in 
control ofthe corporation including R. John Taylor. As attorneys t()f ATA Insurance, Inc. 
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and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporate client not to assume representa.tion 
of the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense 
Agreement, and/or of other interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc.). 
19. As attorneys tt)r R. John Taylor, individually and tlu'ough any Joint 
Defense Agreement, the Defendants owed their duties first and foremost to AlA Services 
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct and their duty of care. As attomeys for R. John Taylor by and through taking 
directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knovv1ng that he was interested and 
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against R. John Taylor 
by the Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporation clients 
not to assume representation of any party other than that of the interests of AlA Sen'ices 
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. The Defendants failed to notify or obtain 
appropriate infoTIlled consents or approvals fi'om appropriate parties or disinterested 
shareholders in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and the 
Bylaws and Articles of Fonnation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed J. 
Tayl.or. The Defendants inappropriately participated in the .f;)int Defense A.greement. 
20. As former attorneys' fl)r AlA Services Corporation and./or AlA Insurance, 
Inc., the Defendants owed duties ofloyaJty to the corporations and could not represent R. 
John Taylor in Taylor v, AlA Services Corporation, et aI., represent the interests of other 
interested parties because the Defendants' loyalty belongs also with A rA Services 
Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc, Furthermore, the Defendants could in no \-vay 
CO.tv1PLAINl - 8 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
771J1./ 
represent the interests of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. or participate in any je·int 
defense of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. or other interested parties (such as R. John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as ArA Services 
Corporation and/or AIA Insuranc.e, Inc. should have been asserting claims against Crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each other, and other interested parties. 
21. Defendants represented, and continues to represent, R. John Taylor 
(individually and through any Joint Defense Agreement) ilnd with full knowledge that R. 
John Taylor is an interested party and director of AlA Services Corporation and AlA. 
Insurance, Inc. and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the course of 
litigation involving the Defendants' fonner clients, AlA Sen:ices Corporation and A fA 
Insurance, Inc., tD the detriment of Defendants' former clients, AJA Services Corporation 
and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
22. During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, the Defendants 
have coordinated and panicipaled with Quarle$ & Brady LLP, the la'll finn that ha.;;; 
represented AlA Sen-ices and AlA Services Corporation before and throughout litigation, 
and Hawley Troxell, the law firm that asswned the representation of ALA. Service 
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. from the Defendants (and later the inappropriate 
representation of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.). During the course of the civil 
action after March 28, 2007, R. John Taylor and others have further engaged in 
inappropriate and/or \'vTcmgful transactions i.nvolving themselves, AlA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., \vhich 
transactions have occurred v,rjth Defendants knowledge and/or assistance, and to the 
detriment of AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
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as creditor and stock pledgee. 
23. Defendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor fbr an amount to be proven at trial 
because the Defendants have provided substantial a..<;sistancc andJor aided and abetted R. 
John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc., and other interested parties in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, 
conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of :fiduciary dulies. The acts of fraud, 
fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of tlduciary duties 
include, but are not limited to: 1) While puq")orting to represent AlA Insurance, Inc. and 
AlA Services Corporation, the Defendants assisted andior aided and abetted R. John 
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's 
contractual rights to contrd and operate AlA Insurance, Inc., which has proximately 
caused damages to Reed J. Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AlA Services 
Corporation and AlA insurance, Inc., the Defendants inappropriately assisted and/or 
aided and abetted R. Jo1m Taylor and ot..l-Jer interested parties to engage in tortious 
transactions involving R. John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., 
and/or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which such transactions have been to the 
detriment of .AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Reed 1. Taylor, and 
proximately caused damages to Reed 1. Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) 
While representing R. John Taylor, individually and through a Joint Defense Agreement. 
the Defendants have had fut! knowledge that their client is an interested party and 
director of AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA lnsurance 
Agency, Inc., and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation 
involving the Defendants' fonner clients, AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, 
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Inc., and Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. Jnhn Taylor and others 
(including, Crop USA Insuranc.e Agency, Inc.) and has coordinated and participated with 
the Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in R.. John Taylor's engaging in tortious 
transactions involving himself, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc, which transactions have been to the detriment of AlA 
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. and proximately caused damages to Reed 
J. Taylor as a creditor and stock pledgee. 
24. In connection with the Defendants' inappropriate representation and/or 
joint defense of R. John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., Crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties, the Defendants accepted 
payments of attorneys fees and costs believed to exceed $100,000 in violation of the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and as participating andlor 
assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of otbers. 
25. Over the course of the litigation in Reed J Taylor i>. AlA Services 
Corporation, ef al., Reed J. Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith, 
Cannon & Bond PLLC, advised the Defendants on numerous occ:asions ,hat their conduct 
violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of cure, was inappropriate, 
and constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested panies 
(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insural1ce Agency, Inc.), among other potential 
legal claims against them. In early 2007, Mr. Bond advised the Defendants that their 
inappropriate actions would result in claims being filed against them by Reed J. Taylor. 
iYfr. Bond reiterated these warnings orally and in 1.vriting on numerous occasions. Despite 
M.r. Bond's warnings, the Defendants conduct persisted thereby fhrther damaging Reed J. 
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Taylor. The Defendants disregard of Mr. Bond's \-vammgs can only be construed as 
intentional improper acts to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties to the 
detriment of Plaint itT Reed J. Taylor and others. 
26. The Defendants wrongfully assisted R. John Taylor and other interested 
parties in operating Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. with the funds, assets, employees, 
trade secrets and other things of value inappropriately obtained from idA Services 
Corporation and/or AlA InsW'ance, Tnc., and by assisting R. John Taylor and other 
interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc) in preventing claims 
from being asserted and prosecuted against them. The Defendants wrongfully assisted 
andlor failed to prevent interested parties (including R. John Taylor) in transferring the 
long~term employees of AlA TnsW'anee, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc:., while 
at the same time representing to the Couti in Taylor v. AL4 Services Corporation that the 
corporations were being operated properly and/or failing to advise the Court o( the 
inappropriate acts and transactions. All the while the Defendants ',',,'ere aV,,'are of and/or 
assisted in the inappropriate payment of saiaries, bendits, compensation, and director 
fees of $20,000 per year when AlA Services Corporation was insolvent. 
27. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made personally and lhrough his 
attorney Roderick C. Bond) that the Defendants take action to protect the assets and 
funds of AlA Services Corporation and AlA fnsurance, Inc. and recover funds and assets 
from R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and oiher interested and 
uninterested parties for the benefit of the corporations and Reed J. TaYlor, the Defendants 
refused to act in accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, their duty of core, and 
the law. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C. 
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Bond) that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or 
protected because of the v,'rongftll acts of R. John Taylor and other interested partics, the 
Defendants renlsed to act and failed to fully and properly disclose ali pertinent facts tl) 
the disinterested shareholders and request t.heir votes. 
28. In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in 
Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et ai., the Defendants made arguments that did not 
benefit AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., or Reed 1. Taylor, 
inappropriately made other arguments preventing valid claims from being asserted 
against R. John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other 
interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take acton against responsible parties 
(including R. JOt-ill Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc .. CO~'1ic Taylor, James 
Beck, Michael Cash..'1lan, Lancelot Investors Flmd, and others). In the instance (if 
Michael Cashman, the DefcndaI1Ls successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. A fA 
Services Corporation, et al. that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual 
when the Defendants should have been taking action against ~Y1r. Cashman and others. 
29. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C. 
Bond) that disinterested directors andior parties must direct the litigation on behalfof the 
corporations, the Defendants refused and permitted and/or assisted R. Jolill Taylor and 
other interested parties to direct the litigation to the detriment of the corporations and 
Reed J. Taylor. Despite Reed 1. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick 
C. Bond) that action be taken to terminate AfA Insurance, Inc.'s improper !:,'1larantee of a 
$15,000,000 line-of-credit fix Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., the Detendant~ refused 
to act, failed to infcxm or fully disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the 
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30. The Defendants' conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct and their duty of care, which require the Defendants to disgorge all attorneys' 
fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, e! al. and other related 
and unrelated legal representations, Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his 
attorney Roderick C. Bond) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and their 
duty of care, the Defendants refused to do so. 
31. Through the acts of the Defendants, lhe value of AlA Insurance, Inc. and 
the assets of ALA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. have plummeted in 
value, the cOlporations' value and assets have been impaired, andkr the assets and f';.mds 
have been transferred to Crop USA insurance Agency, Inc. Through the acts of the 
Defendants, ownership of Crop USA Insurance Agency. Inc. has remained vested in 
interested parties (including R. John Taylor), 'Nhile the major creditor Reed J. Taylor and 
minority shareholders have been left with nothing. Despite Red J. Taylor's demands 
(through his attorney Roderick C:. Bond) that action should also be taken for the interests 
of the iIllocent minority shareholders and creditors, the Defendants have refused to take 
action and inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including R. John Tayior, 
Corillie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). 
32. Despite the Defendants having made several legal arguments that lacked 
merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, the Defendants provided a 
settlement offer to Reed J. Taylor in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et 0/. which 
included a provision that he release all claims against the Defendants as a condition of the 
settlement The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional 
COMPLAINT - 14 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
77/{) 
Conduct and Defendants' duty of care. The Defendant::; also refused to make any 
provIsIons for disinterested minority shareholders of AlA Services Corporation as 
requested by Reed J. Taylor. 
33. The Defendants have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor 
and other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed J. Taylor and Donna 1. 
Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares 
of AlA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, Donna 1. Taylor is required to be a 
member of the board of directors of AlA Services Corporation. Like Reed j. Taylor, the 
Defendants have assisted R. John Taylor and other interested parties in preventing Reed 
J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor from being members of the board of directors of AlA 
Services Corporation, which hus further far reaching ramifications and results in 
additional damflges against the Defcndili'1ts, 
34. With full knowledge of AlA Services Corporation's obHgations to ensure 
that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor are members of irs board until they were paid in 
full, the Defendants proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings 
und take inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by interested directors 
without Reed J. Taylor or Donna J. Taylor being present \vhich results in all such 
meetings and decisions being nuii and void, and the Defendants being liable for the 
associated damages. 
35. The Defendants assisted andlor failed to prevent andior notify 
disinterested parties that AfA Services Corporation had inappropriately pledged its sole 
remaining other significant asset, lhe $i ,200,000 mortgage, to Crop lJSA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of the Defendants' services in violation of the 
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Rules of Professional Conduct and the law, 
36. The Defendants omitted anc1!or misrepresented material facts to the Court 
in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation. et al. to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. In 
several instances, the Defendants persuaded the Court to take action that \vas not in thc 
best interests of the corporations or Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations 
and Reed J. Taylor (including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when 
the Defendants knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their 
assets safeguarded), 
37. The Defendants have inappropriately assisted R . .fohn Taylor and other 
interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses andlor services provided 
and borne by AlA Insurance, Inc. andior AlA Services Corporation for Lhe benefit of 
Crop USA fnsurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor a.."ld ether interested parties. 
38. The Defendants had full l<.nowledge of R. John Taylor's Executive 
Officer's Agreement. Even though R. John Taylor has breached the temlS of his 
employment contract with AlA Services Corporation by competing against AlA Services 
Corporation through Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (and violating the corporate 
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of ALA Insurance, lnc., and other 
inappropriate actions, the Defendants intentionally refused to act in the best interests of 
AlA Services Corporatlon, AlA Insurance, Inc., their shareholders. and/or Reed J. Taylor. 
39. The Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining 
funds, assets a..'1d property to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to defraud AlA Services 
Corporation's creditor Reed J. Taylor (including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed 
by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to AIA Insurance, Inc" assist<ltlce in transfeJTing 
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shares of the Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to R. John Taylor, and failing to coneet 
the over $300,000 owed by R. JOhl1 Taylor) by not rep01ting such acts to disinterested 
parties or other appropriate parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
40. In April 2007, the Defendants permitted and/or assisted interested parties 
in holding a joint board meeting of AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
with 11.111 knowledge that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor were being intentionally 
denied their right to be on the board of AlA Services Corporation find participating in 
such meetings (Donna Taylor has subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed J. 
Taylor). At the meeting held in April 2007, the Defendants permit1ed and/or assisted R. 
John Taylor to appoint COIh'1ie Taylor and James Beck to the boa.rds of AlA Service::: 
Corporation and ALA Insurance, Inc. knowing that they were interested parties who AlA 
Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. should be pursuing claims flgai.nst, that 
they inappropriately held shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., that they ~vere 
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent 
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of 
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. The Defendants inappropriately 
permitted and/or assisted two interested parties, Cormie Taylor and James Beck, to 
approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and Joint Defense Agreement \vith Hav/ley 
Troxell and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate joint legal representations of 
interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys' 
fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
their duty of care. 
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41, Despite demands to the contrary, the Dciendants continued to tah~ 
instluctions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or R. John Taylor) of AlA 
Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. k,)O\ll,1ng that tbe boards arc not properly 
seated and are comprised of interested parties (including R. John Taylor) with significant 
claims that should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professiona.l 
Conduct and the law. 
IV. f:JRST CAUSES OF ACTJOlJ§. 
42. The Defendants have damaged Reed J. Taylor by aiding and ahetting 
and/or assisting others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) 
in the commission oftOrhOll'3 acts. 
The DefendanL<; committed tOltlOUS acts in concert with others (including 
R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or pursuant lo a common 
design or civil conspiracy with others (including R: John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc.). The Defendants' conduct also constitutes the assistance of interested 
parties (including R. John Taylor) with the tortious interference of AlA Servic.e:s 
Corporation and Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, which such contractual rights the 
Defendants had intimate knowledge. 
44. The Defendants knew ihat the conduct of olhers (including R. John Taylor 
and Crop USA Insuranc.e Agency, Inc.) constituted breach of duties and gave substantial 
assistance andior encouragement to others (including R. Jo1m Taylor and Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc.) in breaching said duties. 
45. 1bc Defendants gave substantial assistance to Others (including R. John 
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in comrnitting and/or accomplishing 
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tortious conduct andfor acts, and the Defendants' conduct, separately considered, 
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to the corporations and/or Reed J. Taylor. 
46. The Defendants conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of others 
(induding R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insuranc·e Agency, Inc.) andior constitute!:; the 
conduct of a contributing tortfeasors, and such conduct has damaged Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
V. SECOND CATLSES OF ACTIONS 
47. Reed 1. Taylor holds and has held a valid and perfected security interest in 
all of the commissions and related receivables of ArA Services Corporation and .fdA 
rnsurance, Inc. 
48. At! of the shares of AlA Insurance, Jnc.were pledged to Reed J. Taylor as 
coEateral for the over $8,500,000 owed to him by ALA Services Corporation. By 'Nay of 
this pledge and his prior vote of the stock in February 2007, Reed .l. Taylor is entitled to 
possession and control of all of the a..c;scts of AIA Insurance, Inc. 
49. The Defendants were fully aware of Reed .J. Taylor's rights to property in 
which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateraL 
50. The Defendants have received substantial payments believed to exceed 
$100,000 for the payment of attomeys' fees and COSts. vihich were payments the 
Defendants had no lawful right 1:.) possess or retain and \vere received in violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
5) The Defendants also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of 
ALA Sen1ices Corporation (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant 
claims against the interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance 
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Agency, Tnc.) and the significant misappropriation :of the corporations' assets, but 
provided legal services on behalf of the interested parties and accepted payment hom 
AlA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. In connection with the payment of 
attorneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor v. AlA Ser.'ices Corporafion, et 
al., the Defendants failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed J. Taylor or other 
disinterested panies to the detriment of the corporations and Reed.L Taylor. 
53. The Defendants' conduct constitutes the \villful interterence with property 
and money belonging to ATA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and/or Reed J. 
Taylor andior \Nhich such property and money should be under the posse:.;sion anJior 
control of Reed J. Taylor, as the person entitled to such money and property as a creditor 
and pledgee. The Defendants deprived Reed J. Taylor possession of such property and 
money. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands, the Defendants have refi.lsed to return such 
property and money. 
54. The Defendants' conduct constitutes conversion and such conduct has 
damaged Reed J. Taylor in an amount to proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
VI. THIRD CAUSES O.F ACnONS 
55. The Defendants' conduct has been unconscionable. The have engaged in 
acts, conduct, and representations that were false, misleading, deceptive andior a 
violation of I.e. § 48-601, el seq. The Defendants' acts, omission, repre~entations and 
conduct constitute uoJair and/or deceptive act.;; andlor practices in trade pertaining to the 
practice oflaw pursuant to I.e. § 48-601, et seq. 
56. The Defendant.s' actions have resulted in the loss of over 25'% of Reed J. 
Taylor's retirement funds and/or such other harm as set tlxth lmder I.e. § 48-60H(2)(al. 
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As such, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is entitled damages, which such amount is also subject 
to treble carnages pursuant to I.C. § 48-608. 
VII. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
57. AIA Services Corporation is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor in light of its 
insolvency and the fact that it owes Reed J. Taylor over $8,500,000. At the very least, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor because all of its shares are pkdged to 
Reed J. Taylor and he voted the shares in Febmary 2007 naming himself the sole director 
and officer of AlA fnsuranc.e, inc. 
58. The Defendants' clients were trustees and/or fiduci,wie..; performing 
similar functions for a non-client, Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants knew that their 
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of A fA Services 
Corporation and/or AlA Insurance:, Inc. to take action to prevent and/or rec.ti(,' the 
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by ALA Services Corpomtion and/or /IJA Insurance, 
inc. to Reed .T. Taylor when such breaches were CTime:; andlor fraud and/or the 
Defendants assisted andJor are assisting in the: breaches. Reed J. Taylor was nei able to 
protect his rights because of the Defendants' actions and the Defendants' obligations to 
ALA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. would not be significantly 
impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect sums owed by others 
and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others (including K. John 
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.). 
59. The Defendants owed ALA Services Corporation, A fA fnsurance, Inc. 
and/or Reed J. Taylor a duty of care to provide, including but not limited to, reasonable, 
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation 
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m keeping with the standard of care in the Jegal profession and as ov-led to the 
corporations (referred to herein ;:lUG above as "duty of care"). The Defendants breached 
their duty of care as a result of their acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the 
corporations and Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed j. Taylor. 
60. The Defendants breached their fiduciary dutie8 owed to AlA Services 
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., andlor Plaintiff Reed f. Taylor, including,lvithout 
limitation, the duties of care and loyalty. 
61. The Defendants' acts constitute professional negl igencc and/or bre3.ch of 
the Defendants' fiduciary duties, and such conduGt has damaged Reed .1. Taylor in aD 
amotmt to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
YIn. DEMAND .. :f9R JURY TRIAL 
i. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than t\velvc 
(12) on aU claims and damages so triable. 
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor prays for the following relief: 
1. For a judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, ii:n' $6,000,000 
in damages ($2,000,000 in actual damages and $4,000,000 in treble damages), the exa.;t 
amount of which will be proven at trial and/or OIl summary jUdgment, plus an award of 
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; 
2. For a judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, i'()f treble 
damages of $4,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.e. :~ 48-
608(2); 
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3. For a judgment requiring the disgorgernent of the payments of all 
attorneys' fees and costs paid to the Defendants by AlA Services COl])oration and/m AJA 
Insurance, Inc.; 
4. For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for additional 
damages as provided under I.e. § 48-608; 
5. For such ot.l,er relief as may be available to Reed J. Taylor pursuant to I.e. 
§ 48-601, et seq. or the law, induding, without limitation, ohtaining a prciiminary 
injunction to restrain the Defendants from undertaking further representation.; 
6. For an award of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorneys fees and costs 
incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Law, including, without limiJ::l.tiol1, LC. § 48-
608, I.e. § 12-120 andior I.e. § 12-121; and 
7. For such ot.her relidas the Court dcernsjust and equllable. 
DATED this /81ay of August, 2008. 
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:MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, VVA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attomeys for PIaintiffReed 1. Taylor 
J ... . . 
IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE SECOND ruDICIAL DISTRICf OF TIlE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIffi COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Ptamtiff, 
. v. 
MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS, BROVVN & MCNICHOLS, 
P.A, an Idaho professional corporation; JANE 
DOES I-V, unknown individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV08-01763 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor''), by and through his attorneys. Campbell, 
Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, hereby responds to Defendants' (collectively "Clements Brown") 
Motion to Dismiss. 
L INTRODUCTION 
Clements Brown attempts to portray this action as being simple and that, contrary 
to the facts and evidence, the attorneys were merely "representing their clients." 
However, Clements Brown's arguments fail. Reed Taylor's claims involve factual and 
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legal claims that entitle him to damages at trial and that cannot be resolved through an 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion. 
Moreover. Reed Taylor's appropriate and warranted direct claims against 
Clements Brown defeat the: Motion to Dismiss for such independent and personal claims 
as conversion, frau~ conspiracy and aiding and abetting, all of which are independent of 
any derivative claims alleged directly against Clements Brown. Moreover, and 
notwithstanding Clements Brown's lack of authority to act on behalf of AlA Insurance 
and AlA Services. it exceeded the scope of any purported legal representation while 
pmported1y representing the corporations. As such, Clements Brown is liable for the 
claims and corresponding damages requested in Reed Taylors Complaint, which are 
more than adequately pled under Idaho notice pleading standard. I 
n. FAcruAL BACKGROUND 
Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AlA Insurance, Inc. (" AIA 
Insurance''), the only shareholder of AlA Insurance holding all of its shares, a secured 
creditor, and the largest creditor of AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services"). See 
Complaint, p. 2. ,7. AlA Services is significantly insolvent and its assets are insufficient 
to pay the over $8,500,000 owed to Reed Taylor. Id Consequently, Reed Taylor is 
bringing claims personal to him and claims derivatively held by him, all directly against 
Clements Brown for certain damages, i.e, he is pursuing all claims directly against 
Clements Brown. See e.g., Jd. 
lit 
I Even if the Court finds that Reed Taylor should not be permitted to bring certain claims directly against 
Clements Brown, the issue is effectively moot as Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor win also bring the same 
claims against Clements Brown derivatively on behalf of AIA Services and AlA Insurance to ensure every 
possible claim is brought In a slngleaction. 
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Since 1996, Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a secwity interest in all of 
the stock of AIA Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA. 
Insurance. See Complaint, p. 3. ,. 10. With full knowledge of the security interests held 
by Reed Taylor, Clements Brown accepted payments from funds subject to such security 
interests. See Complaint, pp. 19-20. n 47-54. 
In violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Clements Brown undertook the 
representation of AlA Services, AlA Insurance and R. John Taylor (,'lohn Taylorj, each 
having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other. See Complaint, p. 5, ,. 13. 
Clements Brown's representation of 10hn Taylor resulted in a breach of its fiduciary 
duties owed to AlA Services and AIA Insurance. See Complaint, pp. 5-6, ,,. 13-14; pp. 
8-9,,, 20. 
On February 22, 2007. Reed Taylor voted the shares of AlA Insurance pursuant to 
his contractual rights and as authorized under Idaho law. See Complaint, p. 4, ,. 11. On 
March 28. 2007, Clements Brown moved to withdraw as purported counsel for AlA 
Insurance and AlA Services. See Complaint, pp. 5-6, ,. 14. However, Clements Brown 
continued to represent John Taylor, thereby breaching duties owed to its former 
purported clients, AIA Services and AlA Insurance, to the detriment of Reed Taylor and 
proximately causing damages to him. See Complaint, pp. 10-11, ,. 23. 
Clements Brown owed duties to Reed Taylor as a creditor and pledgee of AlA 
Insurance. who voted the shares of AIA Insurance. See Complaint, pp. 7-8~ , 18. 
Clements Brown failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals 
from appropriate parties in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See 
CompJaint, p. 8, 1 19. Clements Brown was advised on numerous occasions that its 
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conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and constituted the aiding and 
abetting of others. See e.g., Complaint, p. 11-12. 125. Clements Brown's disregard of 
warnings can only be construed as intentional improper acts, all of which were to the 
detriment of Reed Taylor. Id. 
Clements Brown has assisted R. John Taylor and others in preventing Reed 
Taylor from being a member of the board of directors of AIA Services. See Complaint, 
p. 15. ,. 34. Moreover, and with knowledge of Reed Taylor's right to be on the board of 
AIA Services, Clements Brown participated and/or assisted in board meetings, with such 
meetings and board decisions being null and void. See Complaint, p. 15, ,34; p. 17, ,. 
40. 
Clements Brown assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining funds, 
assets, and property to defraud Reed Taylor. See Complaint, pp. 16-17, 1 39. Clements 
Brown owed duties under the law to Reed Taylor to preserve and protect the assets and 
businesses of AIA Services since it was insolvent. See Complaint, p. 7,117. 
Clements Brown has assisted in the inappropriate acts of John Taylor and others 
in stopping all payments to Reed and Donna Taylor. See Complaint, p. 15, , 33. 
Clements Brown took instructions and/or directives from unauthorized boards of AIA 
Services and AlA Insurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated in violation 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Complaint, p. 18, ,. 41. 
Clements Brown inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint 
Defense Agreement knowing that AlA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, R. 10hn 
Taylor, and the other individual defendants had irreconcilable conflicts of interest and 
that the agreement assisted others to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent 
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conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims. 
See Complaint, p. 6, 'i15. 
Clements Brown has assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others 
(including CropUSA) in acts of fraud. fraudulent conveyances. conversion, civil 
conspiracy, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties and inappropriate 
transactions, thereby proximately causing damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock 
pledgee. See Complaint, p. 10-11,123. Finally, Clements Brown assisted John Taylor 
in obtaining a court order enjoining Reed Taylor when it knew that the corporations were 
not being operated properly. See e.g., Complaint, p. 4.111; p. 16,136 
IIL LEGAL AUTHORITY .AND ARGUMENT 
A. Clements Brown Cannot Meet Idaho's Stringent ll(bX6) Standard. 
- 1. The Complaint Properly AUeges Valid Causes Of Action. 
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court looks only at the 
pleadings, and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City 
of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). "The issue is not whether the 
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to 
support the claims." Id at 104. "Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a 
complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Idaho Comm'n on 
Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215. 217, 506 P 2d 112 (1973). Idaho has adopted 
a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857 
(2000). A pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .... Id. (quoting Dw-stler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 
697 P2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985». Under a notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly 
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bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings." Cook, 135 Idaho at 33 .. All 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. LRC.P. S(f). 
Motions to dismiss under LRC.P. 12(bX6) are viewed with disfavor because of 
the waste of time in· case of reversal, and because the primary objective of the law is to 
obtain a determination of claims on the merits. Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 
404, 353 P.2d 782 (1960). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. ld 
Reed Taylor's claims are two-fold: (1) claims owned by him and which are 
independent of any claims owned by or affecting AIA Services or AlA Insurance; and (2) 
claims owned by AlA Insurance and AlA Services that he is entitled to bring directly 
against Clements Brown in lieu of bringing such claims derivatively on behalf of the 
corpomtions? Reed Taylor has alleged valid causes of action and none of his claims 
should be dismissed pursuant to I.RC.P. 12(bX6). 
In a nutshell, Reed Taylor claims that Clements Brown conspired and aided and 
abetted in the coIlllllission of breaches of fiduciary duties, conspiracy, fraud, and tortious 
interference. Reed Taylor claims that Clements Brown conspired with and aided and 
abetted John Taylor andlor CropUSA in protecting John Taylor's interests to the 
detriment of the interests of Clements Brown's other clients and former clients (AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance), thereby damaging Reed Taylor. In addition, Clements 
Brown directly interfered with Reed. Taylor's contractual rights in assuming to represent 
AJA Insurance without authority as well as conspiring with and aiding and abetting John 
1 Reed Taylor will claritY the various claims and relief in his amended complaint that will be attached to 
his Motion to Amond. all of whjch will be rued before the bearing on Clements Brown's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
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Taylor in the interfering with Reed Taylor's contractual rights. In addition, Clements 
Brown is directly liable for the conversion of property in which Reed Taylor possessed a 
valid interest for the payment of its fees and costs, as well as conspiring with and aiding 
and abetting John Taylor and other parties to do the same. The claims are substantial and 
numerous and have damaged Reed Taylor. AlA Insurance and AlA Services, all of which 
such damages Reed Taylor is entitled to pursue and collect 
Clements Brown has failed to meet the heavy burden required to obtain a 
dismissal of claims pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), and its Monon to Dismiss should be 
deoied in full.] 
l. Regardless Of How Novel One Or More Of Reed Taylor's Causes Of 
Action May Be Under Idaho Law, They Are Valid Causes or Actions. 
"The Cotnt should be especially reluctant to dismiss on the pleading where the 
asserted theory of liability is novel or tnlusual since it is important that such legal theories 
be explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader's supposition." Stewart 
v. Arrington Canst. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 531, 446 P .2d 895 (l968). citing Shull v. Pilot Life 
Ins. Co., 313 F.2d 445,447 (5th Cir. 1963) (emphasis added). 
Regardless of whether Idaho law has adopted the legal authority of any of the 
claims being pursued by Reed Taylor, he should be permitted to plead and pursue all of 
his valid and warranted claims. All of Reed Taylor's claims are sufficiently pled and all 
supported by Idaho law or law in other jurisdictions. 
III 
III 
J Although Idaho law only requires notice pleading. the Court should permit Reed Taylor to file an 
amended complaint to the extent that the Court may believe that the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead a 
cause of action. 
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3. The Proper Teat Of The VaJidity Of Reed Taylor's Complaint Is 
Through A Motion For Summary Judgment After Discovery Has 
Been Conducted. 
''The motion to dismiss serves its most useful purpose where from the pleadings 
and documented proof available no controverted fact issue remains and only questions of 
law are to be decided." Stewart v. Arrington Canst. Co. t 92 Idaho 526, 531, 446 P.2d 895 
(1968) (citing Shull v. Pilot Lifo Ins. Co., 313 F.2d 445, 447 (5 th Cir. 1963». "The 
validity of a complaint is more properly tested by the summary judgment procedure of 
I.R.C.P.56." Stewart, 92 Idaho at 531; Duffin v. Idaho Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 
1002, 1013,895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995). 
To the extent that any of Reed Taylor's claims involve factual issues (which they 
all do. to the extent Clements Brown wants the clallns dismissed). such claims should be 
resolved at trial or on summary judgment. All of Reed Taylor's claims survive an attack 
based upon I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
4. If The Court Finds That Reed Tay)or's CompJaint Is Deficient In Any 
Reaped, Reed Taylor Should Be Permitted To File An Amended 
Complaint. 
If a court :finds that a complaint fails to state a claim, then the court can permit the 
party to file an amended complaint to cure any defects. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 
609, 611, 533 P.2d 730 (1975) (the Court dismissed plaintiffs complaint, but allowed 
him 15 days leave to file an amended complaint). Thus, to the extent that the Court may 
find that Reed Taylor's Complaint contains any defects, Reed Taylor should be permitted 
to file an amended complaint curing such defects. 
//11/ 
1111/ 
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B. Reed Taylor Hal Standing To Pp.nue Claims Against Clements Brown. 
And Such Claims Are Not Subject To Any Scope Of Representation 
Defenses Or Litigation PrivDege 
The issue of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the 
party wishes to "have adjudicated, which may be based upon threatened hann as well as 
past injury. Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P 3d 1232 (2006). "An attorney 
can be liable to a nonclient, even an adversary in litigation. for fraud or deceit. Duty is 
not at issue, because wrong is intentional conduct" 1 Legal Malpractice § 6:7 (2008) 
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also e.g., Banco Popular North 
America v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing there could be a valid cause of 
action for a conspiracy to defraud a creditor by helping a client transfer assets). 
"[A] lawyer is subject to liability to a ... nonclient when a nonlawyer would be in 
similar circumstances." See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 56 (2008). 
This basis concept oflawyer liability is discussed in numerous Comments in § 56: 
If activities of a nonlawyer in the same circumstances would render the 
nonlawyer civilly liable or afford the nonlawyer a defense to liability, the 
same activities by a lawyer in the same circumstances generally render the 
lawyer liable ... 
See Restatement (fhird) of Law Governing Law. § 56 (2008). Comment b. 
When a lawyer advises or assists a client in acts that subject the client to 
civil liability to others, those others may seek to hold the lawyer liable 
along with or instead of the client Whether a lawyer is liable depends on 
the elements of liability under the law upon which the claim of liability is 
predicated and may therefore tum on such facts as how the lawyer's acts 
contributed to the plaintiff's harm. what the lawyer knew or believed as to 
the relevant facts and law, the lawyer's intent, and how culpable the 
client's conduct is under the law. 
See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 56 (2008). Comment c. "A law firm 
is subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by any wrongful act or 
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omission of any principal or employee of the firm ... " See Restatement (Third) of Law 
Governing Law § 58 (2008) ("When finn principals are personally liable vicariously, 
they are jointly and sevemlly liable. to See Comment g.) 
Here. Reed Taylor's Complaint asserts valid causes of action against Clements 
Brown for conversion, frau~ breaches of fiduciary duties, tortious interference, 
malpractice for duties owed to Reed Taylor, and unfair and deceptive acts in trade (and 
aiding and abetting andlor conspiracy of the foregoing). As discussed in further detail 
below, these claims are all independent of Reed Taylor's rights to bring derivative claims 
directly against Clements Brown (i.e .. Reed Taylor is Dot required to sue derivatively on 
behalf of AlA Insurance and AlA Services, but may bring direct claims because of the 
significant factua1and legal circumstances discussed in this Response). These collective 
claims are all excluded from the any assertion of litigation privilege because all of these 
claims involve acts not protected by litigation privilege or acts for which the litigation 
privilege may not be asserted (i.e., Clements Brown may not assert the litigation privilege 
for claims owned by AIA Services and AIA Insurance that are brought directly by Reed 
Taylor). 
C. In Addition To Having Standing To Punne His Penona] Claims, Reed 
Taylor Has Standing To Directly Bring Certain Derivative Claims 
AgainBt Clements Brown. 
1. Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Stock Pledgee. 
A stock pledgee bas standing to bring direct claims against third parties. See e.g., 
Gustafton v. Gustafson. 47 Wn. App. 272. 278, 734 P.2d 949, 953 (Wn. App. 1987); 
Empire Life Ins. Co. of America v. Valdak Corp., 468 F2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972); Ritchie v. 
McMullen, 79 F. 522 (6th Cir. 1897); see a/so 19 Am. Jur. 2d CorpomtioDB § 2032 (2008) 
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("A pledgee of corporate stock has an interest therein that entitles him or her to be heard 
in court of equity concerning the preservation and protection of the assets and property of 
the corporation."). "The pledgee may file suit in equity to preserve the stock and to 
protect his or her interests, to the same extent. at least. as the pledgor ... The pledgee is 
also interested in the preservation of the corporate property and in preventing it from 
passing out of the hands of the corporation ... " See 12A Fletcher Cye. Corp. § 5651 
(2008) (emphasis added). 
Here, Reed. Taylor has standing to pursue claims directly against Clements Brown 
because he is the sole pledgee of all of the shares in AIA Insurance. Clements Brown's 
actions are and were damaging AlA Insurance, impairing the value of AlA. Insurance, 
diverting AIA Insurance·s assets, and inappropriately assisting and aiding and abetting 
John Taylor and others in the commission of torts and to loot AlA Insurance. All of the 
foregoing acts have resulted in money and assets being inappropriately diverted out of 
AlA Insurance and claims not being pursued against Clements Brown, John Taylor and 
others for the recovery of AlA Insurance's funds, assets and damages. As the sale 
pledgee of all of AlA Insurance's shares. Reed Taylor has standing to pursue the claims 
directly against Clements Brown. 
2. In Addition To His RightJ As A Pledgee, Reed Taylor Has Standing 
Became He Stands In The Shoes Of AlA lnBurance's Sole 
Shareholder. 
"The pledgee may file suit ... to protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at 
lomas the pledgor ... " See 12A Fletcher Cye. Corp. § 5651 (2008) (emphasis added). 
Generally. shareholders must pursue claims derivatively, Le., on behalf of the 
corporation. However, a well-recognized exception to this general rule is that a 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 11 




shareholder in a closely held corporation may file a direct action without bringing the 
claims derivatively in the name of the corporation. See e.g .• Steelman v. Mallory, 11 0 
Idaho 510, 512-13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986) ("Since ... directors in this small closely held 
corporation, had a fiduciary duty to Steelman, as minority shareholder, we cannot agree 
with appellants' contention that this case should have been dismissed because it is a 
'direct action' rather than a shareholder's derivative suit.") (emphasis added); see also 
Aurora Credit Services. Inc. v. Liberty West Development. Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 
(Utah 1998) (a direct action may be brought when based upon a "contract to which 
[Plaintiff] is a party, or on a right belonging severally to [Plaintifl], or on a fraud affecting 
[Plaintiff] directly ... j (quoting 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 5911 (1970»); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W. 2d 793 (N.D. 1991); 
Johnson .v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410, 412, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. App. 1980) overruled 
on other grounds (" ... plaintiffhad standing. both derivatively and directly, to sue on the 
alleged contract and for an-accounting."); Schumaker v. Schumaker. 469 N.W 2d 793, 
798 (N.D. 1991). 
Since a pledgee has the rights of a shareholder, the pledgee has the shareholder's 
standing to pursue direct claims: 
A shareholder may sue directly for hann to himself or herself that is 
separate and distinct from that suffered by the corporation . 
... Under some authority. the analysis for determining whether a 
stockholder's action should be classified as direct or derivative tmns on 
the determination of who suffered the alleged harm, the corporation or the 
suing stockholder individually, and who would receive the benefit of 
recovery or other remedy. Most courts hold, however, that a shareholder 
may have standing to bring an action arising from an injmy to the 
corporation if the injmy is the result of the violation of duty owed directly 
to the shareholder, or if the shareholder sustains an injury that is peculiar 
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to him or her alone, and does not fall alike upon other stockholders, even 
if the corporation was similarly harmed. 
.•. When a shareholder's complaint states a cause of action that is both 
direct and derivative, the shareholder may proceed with the direct action . 
... Some jurisdictions, however, permit a shareholder in a close 
corporation to proceed directly rather than derivatively under some 
circumstances. In such a jurisdiction, the decision whether to allow a 
party to proceed with a direct suit in lieu of a derivative action is entrusted 
to the court's discretion. 
In determining when a shareholder of a close corporation may proceed 
with a direct action, rather than a derivative action, comts consider 
whether a direct action will: (1) unfairly expose the corpomtion or the 
defendants to a multiplicity of actions; (2) materially prejudice the 
interests of the corporation's creditors; or (3) interfere with the fair 
distribution of recovery among all interested persons. 
See 18 C.J.S. COIpOrations § 485 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
The distinction between individual and derivative actions has been explained as 
follows: 
[1]t is generally held that a stockholder may maintain an action in his own 
right for an injury directly affecting him, although the corporation also 
may have a cause of action growing out of the same wrong, where it 
appears that the injury to the stockholder resulted from the violation of 
some special duty owed to the stockholder by the wrongdoer and having 
its origin in circumstances independent of the plaintiff's status as a 
shareholder. 
McCann v. McCann. 138 Idaho 228, 233. 61 P.3d 585 (2002) quoting 19 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corpomtions § 2249 (1986). In other words: 
An action brought by a shareholder is derivative if the gravamen of the 
complaint is the injury to the corporation or to the whole body of its stock 
or property and not injury to the plaintiff's individual interest as a 
shareholder. 
McCann, 138 Idaho at 233 quoting 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2250 (1986); see also 
Steelman v. Mallory, llO Idaho 510, 512-13, 716 P2d 1282 (1986), The definition of 
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"gravamen" is "[t]he substantial point or essence of a claim. grievance, or complaint" 
Black's (Seventh Edition) Law Dictionary. p. 708 (1999). 
Here, Reed Taylor's claims are based upon the fact that the money and assets of 
AlA Insurance are being tortiously misappropriated, converted and looted to his 
detriment He is the only shareholder of AIA Insurance as the pledgee of all of its 
outstanding shares, he holds a security interest in all of the commissions of AIA 
Insurance, he is a creditor owed over $8,500,000, and he is the only bona-fide party 
entitled to recover and possess all of the moneys recovered through his direct claims. In 
short he is entitled to all of the assets and funds of AIA Services and AlA Insurance. 
Moreover, AIA Insurance is not bringing any claims against the responsible parties, 
including Clements Brown. There is no better example of a case warranting direct 
claims. ,These reasons, along with the others set forth in this Response. makes Reed 
Taylor essentially the only person entitled to bring the claims against Clements Brown. 
3. Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Secured Creditor Of AlA Services. 
When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has 
standing to bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g., 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Absco Wa:ehouse. Inc .• 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664 
P.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1983); US. v. McC/esuy Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (Ga 1969). The 
rights of a secured creditor are extensive: 
In some circumstances, however, an unauthorized sale or other disposition 
of collateral may constitute conversion as to the secured party. In most 
cases when a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral. the 
security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the 
secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an 
appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured party 
may claim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course, 
may only have one satisfaction. '" 
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Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a 
conversion of the collateral. there is a conversion on the part of the one 
who sells, as well as on the part of the one who purchases, or to whom 
property is transferred. or a third party who exercises dominion over the 
collateral or its proceeds ... 
See 79 CJ.S.·Secured Transactions § 157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
Here, Reed Taylor holds a perfected security interests in AIA Services and AlA 
Insurance's commissions and related receivables and all of the stock of AlA Insurance. 
Reed Taylor also holds a secmity interest in the $1.2 Million Mortgage held by AlA 
Services. In holding a security interest in all of AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor's security 
interest and corresponding rights are paramount to all others, and his security interest in 
all of the commissions of AlA Services is no less significant as they are the company's 
sole SOUIGC of revenue. 
4. Reed Taylor HaB Standing To Punue His Claims As The Creditor Of 
AlA Services. 
A creditor of an insolvent corporation has standing to bring direct claims. See 
e.g., Board of Trustees of Teamsters v. Foodtown. Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 170 (3rd Crr. 
2002); karco LLC v. Americas Min. Corp., 382 B.R. 49 (S.D. Tex 2007) (making claim 
against directors for breach of fiduciary duty). 
Here, Reed Taylor's position as a crectitor owed over $8,500,000 and who has a 
partial summary judgment against AlA Services gives him standing to pursue direct 
claims, and even more entitled to standing in light of the fact that he is also a secured 
creditor and pledgee. Nevertheless, Clements Brown argues that Reed Taylor has no 
standing. as a creditor, to pursue claims against Clements Brown or AlA Services" 
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directors for breach of fiduciary duties.4 See North American Catholic Educational 
Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla. 930 A.2d 92 (De1.Supr. 2007) (creditor 
may not pursue direct claims for breaches of fiduciary duties when a corporation is in the 
zone of insolvency); Production Resources Group, L.L. C. v. NCT Group, Inc. 863 A.2d 
772 (Del. Ch. 2004) (recognizing that a creditor is owed fiduciary duties when a 
corporation is in the zone of insolvency). However, Gheewalla and Production 
Resources are not applicable to the facts and legal issues in this case.s 
First. it should be noted that AIA Services is not in the zone of insolvency. AIA 
Services is beyond insolvent and its assets are estimated to be over $6 Million less than 
the over $9,000,000 owed to Reed Taylor. AlA Services does not even have sufficient 
assets to pay Reed Taylor's attorneys' fees in Taylor v. AIA Services. el al. Second, Reed 
Taylor is a secured creditor, unlike the apparent general creditors in Gheewalla and 
Production Resources. ThircL Reed Taylor is entitled to be on the board of AIA Services, 
and this contractual right has been thwarted with the assistance of Clements Brown. 
Fourth, Neither Clements Brown, John Taylor or the other interested individuals have 
pursued any claims on behalf of AlA Services because they all know the roads to claims 
lead directly back to John Taylor, Clements Brown, CropUSA, and the others. Fifth, the 
past and present defense of AlA Services is obviously being conducted for no legitimate 
basis other than to protect John Taylor and others in assisting in unlawfully transferring 
millions of dollars of assets and other things of value from AlA Insurance. 
• However, even If accepted as true and found to be fully applicable to this case, Clements Brown's 
argument does not apply to the rights Reed Taylor bas as a pledgee (shllltlboider) of AlA Insurance and 
securt!d creditor, the issues raised WIll be moot when Reed Taylor also files derivative claims against 
Clements Brown. For this reason alone, Reed Taylor should be permitted to bring the claims directly to 
conserve resources, particularly since he is the only person entitled to any funds recov~. 
S Clements Brown does not challenge Reed Taylor's standing to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims 
directly against Clements Brown and the others as the pledgee/sbarebolder of AIA Insurance. 
Nevertheless, Rced Taylor provides authority supporting such direct claims in this Response. 
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5. Reed Taylor Has Standing As The Only Authorized Director And 
Ofi:lcer Of AlA Insurance. 
A director or officer may bring claims against other parties in a quasi-derivative 
action. Law of Corp. om. & Dits.: Rts., Duties & Liabs. § 9:27 (2008) (citing New 
York law); see also Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 512-13, 716 P2d 1282 (1986) 
(recognizing a director's rights to bring a direct action in lieu of a derivative action 
(although the director was also a shareholder». Reed Taylor is the only authorized 
officer and director of AlA Insurance, and, consequently, he has standing to pursue 
claims directly as he is the only party entitled to the any recovered funds or damages. 
6. .As Both The Director And Sole Shareholder Of AlA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor Bas Standing To Make Direct Claims Against Clements 
Brown. 
Under Idaho law, a shareholder and director of a closely held corporation has 
standing to bring direct claims. Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 
(1986); see also 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5651 (2008) ("The pledgee may file suit in 
equity to preserve the stock and to protect his or her interests, to the same extent. at least. 
as the pledgor ... The pledgee is also interested in the preservation of the corporate 
property and in preventing it from passing out of the hands of the corporation ... ") 
(emphasis added). Here, Reed Taylor is the only authorized officer and director of AIA 
Insurcmce and its only shareholder as the pledgee of all its outstanding shares. 
Consequently, he is entitled to bring direct claims against Clements Brown for claims and 
damages inflicted upon AlA Insurance. 
7. Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Third party Beneficiary. 
A party has standing to bring direct claims when he or she is a third party 
beneficiary: 
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Thus. a shareholder may have a personal cause of action against a third 
person to recover damages for breach of contract, even though a corporate 
cause of action and the shareholder's cause of action result from the same 
wrongful acts, such as for mismanagement of the corporate business and 
diversion of assets in breach of an express contract with the shareholder ... 
... The shareholder's individual claim based upon a contract between the 
corporation and another may be brought as a third-party beneficiary 
action, despite lack of privity between the plaintiff shareholder and the 
defendant, provided the shareholder as an intended beneficiary of the 
contract ... 
12B Fletcher Cye. Corp. § 5921 (2008) (internal citations omitted) citing Vogel v. Reed 
Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 126, 177 S.E. 2d 273. 278 (N.C. 1970) (third-party 
beneficiaries not in privy of contract may bring an action in their own name to "enforce a 
contract made for their benefit .. j (other citations omitted). There are other instances in 
which a third-party has standing to pursue claims against an attorney: 
... [A]n attorney may owe a duty to a party who is not his or her client, but 
who is a third-party beneficiary to f!I1 agreement between the attorney and 
his or her client. Accorctingly, third party liability of an attorney arising 
from representation of a client may be found to exist where the attorney is 
responsible for damage caused by his or her negligence to a person 
intended to be benefited by his or her performance irrespective of any lack 
of privity. Privity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary 
for a duty to attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific 
hann which occurred ... 
... Thus, although a legal malpmctice claim may accrue only to the 
attorney's client, an attorney may be liable for damages to a third party 
because of events arising out of his or her representation of a client if the 
attorney's acts are fraudulent or tortious and result in injury to that third 
person. 
An attorney for a trustee is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the third-
party beneficiaries of the trust when the attorney has placed his or her self~ 
interest about that of the trustee. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 234 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
Here, AIA Services promised Reed Taylor to not impair the value of AlA 
Insurance and to vest the voting rights to its shares in AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor upon 
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a default, with the full knowledge of Clements Brown. AIA Services is insolvent and 
Reed Taylor is the only beneficiary entitled to its remaining assets. As suoht Reed Taylor 
is a third-party beneficiary of any services purportedly provided by Clements Brown. 
who in turn was required to represent the best interests of AIA Insurance and AIA 
Services-but failed to do so. Finally, Clements Brown also owed special duties to Reed 
Taylor by way of him being the pledgee of AlA Insurance's shares and the sole officer 
and director of the company. When it knew that Reed Taylor has voted the shares of AIA 
Insurance, Clements Brown knew that it owed special duties to protect the corporation' s 
interests and assets. The cumulative effect of all of the above establishes that Clements 
Brown owed Reed Taylor duties.' 
8. Assuming Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing Under Any One Of 
The Above Reasons, He Should Have Standing As A Result Of An Of 
The Above Conective Rea80~ 
The gravamen of Reed Taylor's Complaint is that Clements Brown bas been 
aiding and abetting John Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and 
depriving him of money and property to which he is rightfully entitled. Clements 
Brown's actions have occurred knowing that duties are owed to Reed Taylor, as a 
pledgee, director, officer. creditor and secured party. There is no other bona-fide 
shareholder or creditor entitled to the remaining assets, funds. and claims owned by AIA 
Services and AJA Insurance. The little remaining assets are being unlawfully utilized to 
cover up the acts of John Taylor. Clements Brown, CropUSA and other individuals. 
Moreover, Reed Taylor is 8. creditor owed over $9,000,000, he has 8. security interest in 
6 Even if none of the single factual issues creates a third-party beneficiary entitlement for Reed Taylor, a 
special exception should apply based upon Reed Taylor being a sccu:rcd creditor of AIA Services and AlA 
Insurance. a creditor owed over $8,500,000 by an insolvent AIA Services incapable of ever satisfYing the 
debt:, the pledgee of AIA Insurance, the sole officer and director of AJA Insurance, and the only 
shareholder of AlA Insurance by way ofhelng the pledgee of all ofits outstanding shares. 
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the commissions of AlA Services and AIA Insurance. be is the only authorized 
representative of AIA Insurance. he is required to be on the board of AIA Services, he 
bas priority over all of the assets of AlA Services and AIA Insurance, he has a security 
interest in all of the AIA Insurance's shares, and AlA Services is insolvent. 
9. The Cases Relied Upon By Clements Brown Have No Application To 
The Facts And Claims Alleged By Reed Taylor. 
Clements Brown expends significant effort in mistakenly relying upon Taylor v. 
Maile, 142 Idaho 253. 127 P .3d 156 (2005) for the misplaced argument that Reed Taylor 
lacks standing to pursue malpractice claims. See Clements Brown's Motion, pp. 34-35. 
Reed Taylor's malpractice claims are two- fold: (1) for damages from claims and duties 
owed to Reed Taylor as descnoed in this Response and the Complaint; and (2) for 
damages from claims and duties owed to AIA Services and AIA Insurance, which Reed 
Taylor. is directly bringing against Clements Brown. Taylor v. Maile has no application 
to the facts and claims alleged by Reed Taylor. 
D. Clement8 Brown's AcU, Omissions, And Torts Are Outside Of Any 
Scope Of Purported Legal Representation Because It Was Never 
Authorized To Undertake The Purported Representations. 
"A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization 
acting through its duIy authorized constituents." RPC 1.13( a). 
When a managing officer has been validly removed, he has no authority to 
institute legal proceedings in the name of the corporation. American Center for 
Education, Inc. v. Cavnar, 145 Cal.Rptr. 736. (1978) (citing Templeman v. Grant, 75 
Colo. 519. 534-35. 727 P. 555 (Colo. 1924) ("It is also true that neither the plaintiff 
Templeman nor the former directors ... had any right or authority to assume to be officers 
of the ... corporation, or to institute legal proceedings in the court ... in the Dame of the 
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corporation."»); u.s. v. Wolf, 352 F.Supp.2d 1195 (W.D. Okla.. 2004) (the court is not 
bound to defer to the parties' representations as to their authority to hire counsel); 
Sa/eway Ins. Co. v. Spfnak, 641 N.E.2d 834 (lll.App. 1994) (holding that the 
unauthorized filing of a lawsuit constituted a cause of action and subjected the attorneys 
to exemplary damages). No person has the right to appear as another's attorney without 
the other's authority. Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 159 (1997); Colma, Inc. v. Harris, 
WL 2487991 CWo.. App. 2008). An attorney who enters an unauthorized appearance for 
a party is liable to the party for any damage sustained. 7 AmJur.2d Attorneys at Law § 
219 (1997). Absent authority to retain an attorney. no attorney-client relationship can be 
established. In re Conservatorship of Nelson. 587 N. W 2d 649 (Minn.App.1999). 
Here, all of Clements Brown's acts exceeded the scope of any purported 
representation because they were never authorized to represent AIA Insurance, never 
properly authorized to represent AIA Services, and because of the irreconcilable and 
unwaivable conflicts of interest they intentionally manufactured in simultaneously 
purportedly representing AlA Insurance, AIA Services, John Taylor. and others. 
1. Clements Brown Never Had Authority To Represent AlA Insurance, 
And, Therefore, Clements Brown Had No Scope Of Representation. 
Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AIA Insurance. Under 
the legal authority cited above, Clements Brown is not authorized to represent AIA 
Insurance, and is, therefore, liable to Reed for the same reasons and to the same extent as 
any other person or entity for Reed Taylor's claims. 
On December 12, 2006, AIA Services received a notice of default from Reed 
Taylor. See Complaint, p. 3,19. On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of 
AIA Insurance. See Complaint, p. 4. , II, p. 7. 1 18. Reed Taylor should be in control 
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of AIA Insurance, and would be but for the tortious acts of Clements Brown and others, 
along with the acts of Clements Brown to unlawfully enjoin Reed Taylor. See 
Complaint, pp. 4-5, n 12~13. Notwithstanding Clements Brown's unauthorized 
representation, it took instructions and/or directives from the unauthorized board of AIA 
Insurance, namely John Taylor. See Complaint, p. 18,141. 
John Taylor purports to control AIA Insurance and Clements Brown purports to 
have represented AlA Insurance. however, neither was authorized to do so. Reed Taylor 
is the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance and the only person entitled 
and authorized. to control it Significantly. AlA Insurance, by way of Reed Taylor being 
the only authorized director or officer of the company, may not have John Taylor or 
others retain .and direct cOlmse1.7 Therefore, Clements Brown's representation of AlA 
Insurance is not authorized and is not protected under the law. Consequently, the acts of 
Clements Brown on behalf of AIA Insurance are as individuals and not as attorneys 
within the scope of an attomey-client relationship. They have no protections under the 
law. 
Clements Brown has directly interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights to 
control AIA Insurance, his right to be a member of the board of AlA Services, his rights 
to commissions and the SI.2 Million Mortgage collateral to which he is entitled to 
possess, and his rights to realize upon his collateral by and through its unauthorized 
representation of 10hn Taylor. 
Clements Brown is also directly aiding and abetting John Taylor and other 
interested individuals in breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, conspiracy, fraud and 
tortious interference. Significant damages to Reed Taylor are being caused by these 
7 See Sections C-I and C-2 above, which are incorporated by reference into this section. 
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actions, including impairing the value of AIA Insurance, the company that he is 
contractually entitled. to control. In sum, the commission revenues of AIA Insurance and 
S 1.2 Million Mortgage in which Reed Taylor has a direct security interest or a security 
interest by way of the property being proceeds of collateral securing his debt are being 
directly converted to unlawfully benefit John Taylor. Clements Brown. and others. 
Because Clements Brown bad no authority to represent AIA Insurance. its 
assertions that it merely rendered advice within the scope of an attomey-client 
relationship relative to AlA Insurance cannot be used as basis to assert that Reed Taylor's 
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At a minimum. the 
issues of whether Clements Brown had authority to represent AIA Insurance and whether 
Clements Brown has a legal privilege predicated upon an attorney-client relationship 
. present factual issues which (it is respectfully submitted) cannot be decided by the Court 
on an LRe.p. 12(b)(6) motion, which is addressed solely to the sufficiency of Reed 
Taylor's Complaint. 
2. Clements Brown Had No Authority To Represent AlA Services 
Beca1lJe It Was Never Retained By The Duly Authorized 
Representative Of AlA Services. 
Under the legal authority cited -above, Clements Brown is not authorized to 
represent AlA Services and is, therefore, liable in the same manner and to the same 
extent as any other person or entity for Reed Taylor'S claims. Reed Taylor and Donna 
Taylor are required to be members of the board of AlA Services. See Complaint, p. 15, ,. 
34. Moreover. Clements Brown has unlawfully taken instructions and/or directives from 
the unauthorized board of AIA Services and without obtaining the necessary approvals. 
See Complaint, p. 18, 1 41. 
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3. Becanse Of The Irreconeilab1e And Uuwaivable Contllcts Of Interest, 
Clementi Brown'lI Purported Representation Exceeded The Scope Of 
Representation. 
A consent to dual representation required by RPC 1.7 lllBllciates that "the consent 
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who 
is to be represented, or by the shareholders.'· RPC ·1.13(g). Any conflict of interest in 
representing a majority shareholder and corporation in litigation brought by a minority 
shareholder was not waived. where only the majority shareholder approved the conflict 
waiver. Williams v. Stanford, 977 So.2d 722, 7~0 (Fla 2008). "[SJome conflicts are 
nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such an 
agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent When 
representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to 
each client n RPC 1.7, Comment 14. 
Reed Taylor would have been required to give any consent to represent AIA 
Insurance. Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, and/or disinterested innocent shareholders 
would have similarly been required to provide consent for AIA Services. By undertaking 
to represent multiple clients with conflicting interests and by receiving and accepting 
directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted with their clients' conflicting 
interests. Clements Brown inevitably implicated itself in the claims for damages made by 
Reed Taylor. 
The basic allegations in Reed Taylor's Complaint encompass the following facts: 
It is claimed (and the com! has found) that AlA Services is indebted to Reed Taylor for 
over $8,500,000 by contract. The relationship between Reed Taylor and AIA Services is 
not merely creditor and debtor. AlA Services is insolvent and therefore owes fiduciary 
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duties to its creditors under Idaho law (which means that AlA Services should be 
operated exclusively for the benefit of creditors). Furthermore, Reed Taylor is a secured 
creditor (which is one of the most pertinent facts of this case relative to the liabilities for 
interference with Reed Taylor's contractual relationship and for conversion). Reed 
Taylor has a security interest in all of the stock of AIA Insurance and all of the 
commission revenue and related proceeds of AIA Insurance and AlA Services. Reed 
Taylor has the right to control AlA Insurance and bas in fact voted the shares of AIA 
Insurance as he is contractually entitled to do. Furthermore, the Court has granted partial 
smnmary judgment to plaintiff finding AIA Services in default Reed Taylor has the 
right to control AIA Insurance and should be controlling AIA Insurance, but has been 
denied his contractual rights by the actions of John Taylor and the three corporations 
represented by Clements Brown, with the assistance of Clements Brown. 
Clements Brown currently represents John Taylor. An interested director, John 
Taylor, who is a director common to AIA Services and CropUSA and purports to be a 
director of AIA Insurance, controls and makes the decisions for all the corporations with 
respect to litigation involving plaintiff and the corporations. John Taylor himself is a 
defendant in the litigation and is the object of claims of breach of fiducimy duties owed 
to the two corporations and to Reed Taylor, directly. Clements Brown received and 
accepted litigation instructions from John Taylor and has joined in most every motion or 
response submitted by Hawley Troxell (another example of exceeding the scope of 
representation and aiding and abetting in the commission of tqrts). Each of Clements 
Brown's past corporate clients had distinct and diverging interests based upon claims 
being litigated, diverging interests so strong that numerous torts such as fraud. fraudulent 
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conveyance, conspiracy and conversion are implicated. Iohn Taylor's interests are 
distinct and diverge from the interests of the corporations based upon claims being 
litigated. These distinct and diverging interests essentially result from: 1) the claim that 
AIA Services is indebted to Reed Taylor by contract; 2) the claim that Reed Taylor is 
contractually entitled to control AIA Insurance and has contractual rights to full 
possession of the revenue commissions; 3) the claim that CropUSA is liable to AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance because of fraudulent conveyances, fraud and other torts; 
and 4) the claims that John Taylor is liable to AlA Services. AIA Insurance and 
CropUSA for breaches of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent conveyance, excessive 
compensation and. other torts. It is also claimed that John Taylor is liable to Reed Taylor 
because of breaches of fiduciary duties owed directly to him. 
The allegations against Clements Brown are for conspiracy andlor aiding and 
abetting in the breach of fiduciary duties. fraud, fraudulent conveyance and conspiracy; 
for interference with Reed Taylor's contractual relationships; and for conversion, and are 
tmderscored by the following facts: 
AIA Services. an insolvent corporation, should be operated exclusively for the 
benefit of creditors, specifically Reed Taylor. The interests of AlA Services are to 
maximize the recovery of assets for its creditors and pursue c1aims against others who 
may be liable the corporation. AlA Services should have separate counsel receiving and 
accepting instructions from independent directors. An attorney representing AIA 
Services should not be taking directions from an interested director like John Taylor 
against whom claims are being made. It was in the best interests of AIA Services and 
AlA Insurance to pursue claims against John Taylor. It was in the best interests of AIA 
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it is alleged is liable to AIA Services. It was in the best interests of AIA Services and 
AIA Insurance to pursue claims against John Taylor. 
In addition, the interests of John Taylor were and are naturally adverse to the 
interests of AIA Services and AlA Insurance. It is inconceivable to expect John Taylor to 
manage his personal assets for the benefit of AlA Services and its creditors, Reed Taylor. 
It is impossible for attorneys, in this case Clements Bro~ to purportedly represent the 
interests of AIA Services exclusively for the benefit the corporation and its creditors 
while at the same time representing the interests of 10hn Taylor and taking directions for 
both clients from an interested director like John Taylor. The conflicts of interest were 
irreconcilable and unwaivable and constitute Clements Brown's breaches of fiduciary 
duties owed to the corporations. 
In. a situation such as described above, Clements Brown cannot avoid representing 
one client to the disadvantage of another client, i.e., the interests of one must necessmily 
predominate over the other. Clements Brown then must impermissibly divide its loyalty 
owed to a present client or former clients and act outside the scope of an attorney-client 
relationship. and then shift its duty of loyalty back to itself to prevent claims from being 
asserted against it while maintaining a steady stream of ill-gotten income from assets 
securing Reed Taylor's debt to further the impossible and unlawful purported 
representations. 
4. Even If Clemenb Brown Was Authorized To Represent AlA Serviees 
And .AlA Insurance, Ita Ads Were Outside Of The Scope Of 
Representation Because They Were Not In The Best Interests Of The 
OrganizatiODB. 
"[A]n attorney may not hide behind a client's instructions in order to perpetrate a 
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fraud against a third party." The Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433. 435 (FIa. 1992). 
RPC 1.13(b) expressly states that a lawyer is required to proceed in the bests interests of 
the corporation: 
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other 
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act 
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation 
of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and this is likely to result 
in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is 
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization ... 
RPC 1.13(b) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 
96 (2008) (virtually identical language to RPC 1. 13 (b». 
Here, the only interests Clements Brown served were those of itself, John Taylor 
and other interested parties. With the assistance of Clements Brown, John Taylor and the 
other parties who should be on the receiving end of claims by AlA Services and AIA 
Insurance, but instead are ensuring that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor are no longer 
being paid any amounts due them. Meanwhile. the funds continue to flow out of the 
corporations to CropUS~ 10hn Taylor, Clements Brown and other interested and 
responsible parties. 
This argument also applies to Clements Brown's representation of John Taylor 
after it withdrew from representing AIA Services and AlA Insurance. It is impossible for 
the best interests of AlA Services and AlA Insurance to benefit from Clements Brown 
dropping them as purported clients so that it can continue representing the key wrongdoer 
and tortfeasor, John Taylor. 
5. Any Purported Agreement For Clements Brown To Provide Legal 
Services Is Void And UnemorceabJe. 
Contracts that violate ethical rules violate public policy and are unenforceable. 
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Evans & Luptak. PLC v. Lizza. 251 MichApp. 187,650 N.W.2d 364.370 (Mich. 2002). 
Once representation has commenced, a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of 
a client if "the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct 
or· the law." RPC 1.16(aXa). A lawyer may not engage in a representation that serves his 
or her self interests and limits the representation of one or more clients. RPC 1. 7(a)(2); 
see also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 403 (CA.D.C. 1996) (simultaneously 
representing multiple parties in violation of the rules of ethics constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
As a result of anyone or more of the ethical violations set forth above, Clements 
Brown was never authorized to represent any of the entities and any purported waiver 
obtain to permit it to continue representing John Taylor was also never authorized. Thus, 
Clements Brown cannot utilize the immunity defense for any of their acts andlor 
omissions and resulting torts. 
6. Clements Brown Unlawfully Dropped AlA Services And AIA 
Insurance To Represent John Taylor. 
An attorney may not represent interests adverse to former clients. RPC 1.9. 
WIth respect to RPC 1.9. courts have adopted the "Hot Potato Doctrine" which states: 
Generally, a lawyer may not drop one client so that be may continue to represent a 
more favored one. The weight of authoritY holds •... that once the lawyers find 
themselves representing clients with adverse interests. they generally may not 
drop one client in order to represent the other. preferred client In other words, !! 
lawyer may pot drop a current client like a "hot POtato" in order to tum the client 
into a former client as a means of curing the simultaneous representation of 
adverse interests. As one commentator explained, courts have agreed that, where 
a lawver has terminated representation of a client for the pUI])Ose of keeping a 
more important client happy. COunsel will be treated as if he is still the client"s 
present attorney for pmposes of determining whether disqualification is 
warrante4 
Flying J. Inc.. v. T.A. Operating Corp., WL 648545 ·4 (D. Utah 2008) (internal citations 
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omitted) (emphasis added); see also GATXlAiriog Co. v Evergreen Inter '/ Ab-lines, Inc., 8 
F.Supp.2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 1998); El Camino Resources, Ltd v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 
WL 2710807 (W.O. Mich. 2007). 
In addition to breaching its fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance by dropping them as purported clients to permit it to continue representing 
John Taylor, Clements Brown could not have received the necessary waivers or consents 
from AlA Insurance or AlA Services to cease purportedly representing them and to 
exclusively represent John Taylor. Moreover, under the same authority in this Response, 
Clements Brown did not obtain the required waivers or consent from authorized or 
disinterested representatives of AlA Services and AIA Insurance. 
E. AasmnJng Clements Brown Was Authorized To Represent AlA Services 
ADd AlA Insurance, It Is Liable For AD Claims Arising Out or Actions 
Exceeding The Scope Of It! Purported Representlltion. 
Attorneys are liable for acts and torts committed outside the scope of their 
representation because the law does not provide absolute immunity. See Alpert v. Crain, 
Caton & James P.C., 178 S.W. 3d 398 (Tex. 2005) (attorney liable for fraud committed 
outside the scope of representation); Kimmel v. Goland, 793 P.2d 524, 530 (Cal. 1990) 
(attorneys may be liable for aiding and abetting violation of privacy act or other illegal or 
tortious conduct). 
Clements Brown correctly notes that attorneys nonnally have the luxury of 
asserting litigation privilege. See Clements Brown's Motion,. pp. 9-12. The only 
problem with Clements Brown's argument is that this is not the nonna! case. Implicit in 
its analysis is the erroneous contention that the facts alleged by Reed Taylor are: 1) 
limited to the advice rendered by Clements Brown to a client; and 2) conceded to be 
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performed within the scope of the attorney-client relationship. These bare conclusions 
ignore the facts alleged in Reed Taylor's Complaint and all of the required inferences. 
Reed Taylor's Complaint is plainly not limited to factual allegations pertaining to 
Clements Brown merely giving legal advice to a client, but alleges acts committed by 
Clements Brown that are clearly outside the proper scope of an attomey-client 
relationship. 
Clements Brown understandably desires to "uncomplicate" this case by citation to 
case authorities involving cases with less complex and inapplicable facts [Le. cases where 
the sued attorney represents only one client and is not burdened by a conflict of interest 
because the attorney has undertaken to represent more than one client or when an 
attorney has not actually committed a tort). This case. however, is compounded because 
Clements Brown undertook to purportedly represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance, 
each with distinct and diverging interests, while taking instructions from John Taylor (a 
person not authorized to act on behalf of AIA Services and AIA Insurance). 
Furthermore. Clements Brown incorrectly received and accepted litigation instructions 
from interested (as opposed to independent) persons who participated in the conspiracy to 
defraud the corporations. Moreover, the interested directors themselves should be the 
subject of pending claims of breach of fiduciary duties to the AlA Services and AIA 
Insurance, but the valid claims were not pursued because of the self interests of John 
Taylor, Clements Brown and the other responsible individuals. 
Clements Brown, while disregarding constant warnings from Reed Taylor's 
counse~ knowingly stepped into a situation complicated by irreconcilable conflicts of 
interest and fraught with individuals committing torts. As will be discussed below, an 
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attorney with a conflict of interest goes outside the scope of an attorney-client 
relationship with respect to one client when the attorney acts fur the benefit of another 
client and/or person to the detriment of the first client (assuming the attorney has 
authority to act). Likewise. the attorney provides more than mere legal advice when the 
attorney so acts. 
There are issues offact pertaining to whether Clements Brown had any authorized 
attorncy-client relationship with AlA Insurance or AIA Services. At a minimum. there 
are issues of fact pertaining to the scope of Clements Brown's purported representation 
and the extent to which they exceeded any pUIpOrted scope of representation. Moreover, 
Clements Brown has not, and cannot, provide any authority holding that a law finn's 
scope of representation of one client or more clients (AIA Insurance and/or AlA 
Services) includes defending another client John Taylor from claims that should be 
asserted by the other clients to recover millions of dollars that were fraudulently 
transferred from the corporations. Clements Brown's acts and subsequent torts exceed 
any permissible scope of representation. 
F. Clements Brown Owed Reed Taylor Spedal Duties As A Secured 
Creditor, Stock Pledgee, And Creditor Of The Insolvent AlA Services. 
Under Idaho law, when a corporation becomes insolvent, its assets are held in 
trust fur the benefit of the corporation's creditors. See e.g., Smith Y. Great Basin Grain 
Co., 98 Idaho 266, 651 P.2d 1299 (1977). Attorneys may not engage in legal 
representations that affect the attorney's responsibilities to third parties. RPC 1.7(8)(2). 
When a corporation is insolvent, attorneys also have special obligations to creditors: 
[W]e hold that if an attorney represents both 8 dissolved or insolvent 
corporation and 8 c:lirector or officer of that finn. and if the attorney 
controls corporate assets, then the attorney must protect the financial 
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rights of creditors to these assets, where he or she knows or should know 
that the director or officer intends to interfere with creditor's claims 
through an improper distribution of these assets. 
Willner's Fuel Distributors, Inc. 'V. Noreen, 882 P.2d 399, 406 (Alaska 1994) (like the 
attorney in this action, Clements Brown was at one time in possession of the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage and funds derived from AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance). The lack of an 
attomey-client relationship does not preclude a finding of a fiduciary duty, which is an 
issue of fact for the jury. In re D. C. equipment, Inc. 'V. Peshtigo National Bank, 112 B.R. 
855, 857 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (balding that an issue of fact as to whether cOIporate 
debtor's counsel owed fiduciary duty to debtor's sale shareholder precluded summary 
judgment). 
Here, Reed Taylor holds a valid and perfected security interest in all of AIA 
Insurance- and AlA Services' commissions and related receivables. Reed Taylor bas a 
valid security interest in the shares of AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor is a creditor owed 
over $8,500,000 by the insolvent AlA Services, thereby making him the beneficiary of 
the funds and assets held in trust by AlA Services and its subsidiary AIA Insurance. 
Moreover, he is the pledgee of all of the shares in AlA Insurance who voted the shares 
and is the only authorized director and officer of AlA Insurance. Clements Brown is 
representing John Taylor with full knowledge of the facts and claims that directly harm 
its fanner clients AlA Services and AIA Insurance. There can be no better example of a 
situation in which corporate a;;sets should be protected or better set of facts to support a 
lawyer's duties owed to a non-client Thus, Reed Taylor'S claims are all valid and 
warranted under the special factual circmnstances of this case as he is the beneficiary and 
secured creditor of the remaining assets and funds of the insolvent AlA Services. 
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G. Reed Taylor Has Pled Suffielent Facts To Support AD Of His Causes Of 
Action. 
Reed Taylor's Complaint specifically states "all applicahle facts alleged below are 
incorporated by reference into each cause of action as necessary to support each cause of 
action." See Complaint, p. 1. Thus, every fact alleged in Reed Taylor's Complaint 
applies as necessary to support each cause of action. As discussed in detail below, the 
facts and causes of action are all more than sufficiently pled. 
H. Reed Taylor Has Suftlelentlv Pled That Clements Brown Has Aided And 
Abetted In Various Torts. 
1. Contrary To Clements Brown's Argument, Idaho Has Numerous 
Aiding And Abetting Cases And Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled 
The Call1Je Of Action And It Is Not Barred By Any Privilege. 
Idaho has a plethora of cases on aiding and abetting. The following listed Idaho 
cases (in reverse chronological order) have clearly established the principles of law 
governing conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims .. In Todd v. Sullivan Cons!. LLC., 
191 P.3d 196, 203 (2008) (Idaho Report cite unavailable) (emphasis added), the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed aiding and abetting: 
As we stated in Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667.682, 34 P 2d 957,963 (1934); 
The law seems to be well settled that, where several people 
actively participate in any manner in the commission of a tort, not 
only the actual actor or assailant is liable but all others who aid, 
abet, counsel or encourage the wrongdoer by words, gestures, 
looks or signs are equally liable with him to the injured person. 
In Highland Enterprises. Inc. v. Barker. 133 Idaho 330, 342, 986 P.2d 996 (1999). the 
Idaho Supreme Court reiterated: 
A person is subject to liability if he or she does a tortious act in concert 
with the other or pursuant to a common design with him. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 876(a) (1977). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has even addressed the mjnjmal jury instructions necessary to 
find that a defendant aided and abetted: 
... the jury was instructed that: 
If you find that a defendant who did not personally perfolDl a 
wrongful act nonetheless did pursue a common plan or design to 
commit that act with the actor by commanding, instigating, 
advising, aiding, abetting or encouraging the actor by words, 
gestures, looks or otherwise; then the conduct of the actor 
physically committing the wrongdoing was also the conduct of that 
defendant. If either is liable then both are equally liable. 
Highland Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 348. In Price Y • .Aztec Ltd, Inc., 108 Idaho 674,677-
78, 701 P.2d 294 (Idaho App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeal addressed aiding and 
abetting: 
Secondly. it is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a 
contributing tort-feasor, joint tort-feasor or cotrespasser for harm resulting 
to" a third person from the tortious conduct of another. Smith v. Thompson, 
103 Idaho 909~ 655 P.2d 116 (Ct.App.1982). See, e.g., Lorang v. Hays. 69 
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho Irrigation Co. Ltd., 39 
Idaho 354, Z27 P. 1055 (1924). Further, it has been held "all persons who 
command, instigate, encourage, advise. countenance, co-operate in, aid or 
abet the commission of a trespass by another, are cotrespassers with the 
person committing the trespass .... » Bailey v. Idaho Irrigation Co. Ltd.. 39 
Idaho at 358,227 P. at 1056. 
When the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and indivisible harm, 
each contributing tort-feasor is liable to the same extent and in the same 
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves; i.e., they are 
jointly and severally liable. Smith v. Thompson, supra. See generally 
RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS § 875, 876 (1977); and cases 
collected at 74 AM.mR2d Torts § 66 (1974). Each tort-feasor is liable for 
the whole damage at the option of the injured party. Spencer v. Spencer, 
91 Idaho 880, 434 P.2d 98 (1967). The rule of joint and several liability 
also prevails where tort-feasors act in concert in the execution of the 
common purpose. The tort liability of persons acting in concert is 
expressed in RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS § 876 (1979): 
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of 
another, one is subject to liability ifbe ... 
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(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and 
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct bimselt: .... 
In the Restatement's comments on clause b it is said that if the 
encouragement or assistance referred to is a substantial factor in causing 
the resulting tort, then the one giving it is himself a tort-feasor and is 
responsible for the consequences of the others act. 
In Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909, 911. 655 P.2d 116 (Idaho App.l982) .• the Idaho 
Court of Appeals noted: 
It is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a contn'buting 
tortfeasor. joint tortfeasor. or "cotrespasser." for harm resulting to a third 
person.from the tortious conduct of another. See. e.g., Lorang v. Hays, 69 
Idaho 440,.209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho 
354, 227 P. 1055 (1924). "All persons who command, instigate, 
encomage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission 
of a trespass by another are cotrespassers with the person committing the 
trespass." Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho at 358, 227 P. at 1056. 
Ftirth.ermore, when the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and 
indivisible harm. each contributing tortfeasor is liable to the same extent 
and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act 
themselves; i.e., they are jointly and severally liable. See Lorang v. Hays, 
supra; Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., Ltd., supra; see generally Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 875, 876 (1977); and cases collected at 74 AmJur.2d 
Torts § 66 (1974). 
As noted in all of the Idaho cases cited above, Reed Taylor has sufficiently pled 
aiding and abetting causes of action against Clements Brown. For example, Reed Taylor 
specifically alleges the following in his Complaint: 
Defendants are liable to Reed 1. Taylor for an amount to be proven at trial 
because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided 
and abetted R. John Taylor. AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance. 
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties in acts of 
fraud, fraudulent conveyances. conversion. civil . conspiracy, and breaches 
of fiduciary duties. 
See Complaint, p. 10-11, '123 (emphasis added). In Reed Taylor's Complaint, he also 
exhaustively pleads various forms of the cause of action of aiding and abetting, along 
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with numerous facts. See Complaint, pp. 18-19,,, 42-46; see also e.g., Complaint, p. 4-
5,112; pp. 6-7, n 15-16; p. 10-11,123; p. 12,126. 
All of the above facts are incorporated by reference into Reed Taylor's causes of 
action. for aiding and abetting. See Complaint, pp. 1 and 18-19. Not only does Reed 
Taylor succinctly and specifically plead aiding and abetting, but he pleads the various 
causes of action. with numerous fact patterns and claims. 
2. Clements Brown Is Liable For Aiding And Abetting In The 
CoDlJlllBlon Of Numerous Torts And Such Claims Are Not Barred By 
The Litigation Privilege. 
Like normal tortfeasors, attorneys may be liable to others under various legal 
theories, including aiding and abetting, conspiracy and other torts. Hearst v. Hearst, 50 
AD. 3d 959 (N.Y. 2008) (factual issues precluded SUIl1.ll18l)' judgment on conversion and 
aiding anti abetting of fraud claim against lawyer); In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 
(D. Colo. 2007); Traub v. Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382 (Ga. App. 2003); Adena, Inc. v. 
Cohn, 162 F. Supp2d 351 (E.D.Pa. 2001); Cacciola v. NeUhaus, 733 N.E2d 133 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2000); In re Atlantic Financial Management, Inc. Securities Litigation v. Paine 
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, et al., 658 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1986) (valid cause of 
action for aiding and abetting securities fraud based upon conflicts of interest). 
A highly illustrative and demonstrative case is In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 
2669150 (D. Colo. 2007). In that case, the federal district court reversed the bankruptcy 
court's order granting a motion to dismiss. A bankruptcy trustee for the estate of a 
corporate debtor sued a law finn for tortious conduct involving certain· financial 
transactions between the debtor and corporate insiders, including one Howard Leach and 
"entities under his control." all referred to in the filcts of the case as "Leach." The facts 
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reveal a series of various transactions which are quite complex but ultimately involve 
Leach obtaining primary liens on debtor's assets when debtor was insolvent The court 
notes that "of critical importance" to the trustee's claims is the fact that the law firm 
(referred. to in the case as "ODe") acted as counsel for both debtor and Leach during the 
transactions which the court characterizes as "dual representation" attendant with 
conflicts of interest and divided loyalties between the debtor and Leach. The district 
court stated: 
The bankruptcy court summarized the basis for Trustee's claims against ODe as 
follows: 
[ODCl. while owing professional duties to [Debtor] acted to 
protect the interests of another client, Leach, contrary to the 
interests of [Debtor]. According to [Trustee], [ODC] undertook to 
structure the Bridge Loans so that Leach, Blue Chip. and Akamai 
would receive securitY interests andlor payments from [Debtor] 
that were either fraudulent or preferential. 
In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 * 3. The district court reviewed the allegations of 
the trustee's complaint relative to claims for conspiracy and aiding and abetting in the 
breach of fiduciary duties! and held that the complaint stated claims. The court stated: 
... I find Trustee sufficiently alleged the following claims on behalf oftbe 
corporation's creditors: (1) ODC engaged in a civil conspiracy with Leach, 
Blue Chip. Akamai, and members of Debtor's management to commit 
fraudulent transfers that breached fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors; 
and (2) GDC aided and abetted Debtor's officers and directors in 
breaching their fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors. Thus, I find the 
bankruptcy judge's determination that Trustee's allegation only supported 
"claims of the debtor against a third party" was in error. [Footnote No.3] 
[Footnote No.3]. Strangely, another portion of the bankruptcy judge's 
opinion supports my finding here. The judge noted: "[T]he basis for all of 
[Trustee's] claims is that [Debtor] committed wrongful acts, i.e., violation 
of fiduciary duties it had to its creditors and shareholders or securities 
• The district court noted that "Colorado state law dictates that when a corporation becomes insolvent, the 
corponmon's crediton> are owed a common law duty by the directors and officers of the corpomtion." 2007 
WI. 2669150 at· 14. 
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fraud, and that [Debtor] was either caused to commit such violations or 
was assisted in committing such violations by [GDC]." 
In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150'" 9. 
The district court quotes the allegations of the trustee's complaint at length which 
allegations are pertinent and instructive for comparing to the allegations of the pIainti.fPs 
complaint in this case. The district court's opinion summarizes the claims and then 
provides quotations from the trustee's complaint: 
Claim three alleges that "[ODe] engaged in a civil conspiracy to commit 
fraudulent transfers in breach of its fiduciary duty by agreements with 
Leach, the Leach Trust. Blue Chip, Blue Chip's counsel, Akamai, 
members of [Debtor's] management including Roger Moody and Robert 
Ogden, and other Bridge lenders." ... Claim four alleges that ODC aided 
and abetted Debtor's officers and directors in breaching their fiduciary 
duties by participating in or approving fraudulent transfers. 
[T]he following allegations [are] contained in [the] amended complaint 
11 135 At all times after December 5,2000, Blue Chip, Leach and 
[Debtor's] management were known by [ODC] to have fiduciary 
duties to unsecured creditors of [Debtor] which prohibited self-
dealing and preferences for insiders and required them to preserve 
the assets in trust for such creditors. 
,., 137 Self-dealing insiders of [Debtor] including Blue Chip. 
Leach. [and] Ogden were unable to ratify or waive [GDC's] 
conflict which was undisclosed to other shareholders and general 
creditors. 
11 143 ODe's fiduciary duties to [Debtor] encompassed duties 
which [Debtor] and its management owed to general creditors at all 
times after December 1, 2000 to avoid self-dealing and insider 
preferences. 
1f 155· The civil conspiracy in which. [GDC] participated was 
attended by circumstances of fraud of willful and reckless 
disregard of the rights of [Debtor], unsecured creditors and smaller 
shareholders. 
1[ 157 The officers and directors of [Debtor] breached their own 
fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors andlor smaller shareholders 
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in [Debtor] by participating in or approving [ODC's breach of 
fiduciary duties]. 
11" 160 ODC's conduct in aiding and abetting those breaches were 
attended by circumstances of fraud or willful and reckless 
disregard of the rights of the debtor. unsecured creditors, the 
Trustee and smaller shareholders . . 
In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 • 9. 
In this case, for the same reasons as in In re MS55, Inc., Reed Taylor's factual 
allegations against Clements Brown state claims upon which relief can be granted. 
Clements Brown. by undertaking to represent multiple clients with conflicting interests, 
and by receiving and accepting directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted 
with their other clients' conflicting interests, inevitably implicated themselves in the 
claims for damages made by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor properly states claims against 
Clements Brown for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor in breaching 
fiduciary duties by acting to protect John Taylor to the detriment of the interests of 
Clements Brown's fonner clients. AIA Services and AlA Insurance, and to the detriment 
of Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor's claims against Clements Brown with respect to 
interference with his contractual relationships and conversion have the same foundation 
because John Taylor is not a party to the contracts in question. 
Another instructive case is Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 
2001). In that case, a closely-held corporation and two shareholders sued a fonner 
majority shareholder ("Malecki') and his law fum ("Cohn'') alleging among other claims 
breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting in the breach of fiduciary duty. The law 
finn moved to dismiss which motion was denied by the court. The facts indicate that 
Malecki, as corporate director and officer, diverted corporate funds to another business 
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"which he owned and operated for his own personal pecuniary gain." In additio~ 
Malecki used corporate "facilities and personnel to further" his other business. The law 
finn had undertaken to provide representation to both Malecki, per:sonally, and the 
corporation and the facts of the case detail a number of personal and corporate 
transactions for which the law fum provided. representation. The court stated the law 
finns' position on the applicable law as follows; "['flhe Cohn Defendants contend that .. 
. an attorney is not liable for aiding and abetting a corporate officer's breach of fiduciary 
duty merely by the provision of advice to the corporation absent direct and knowing 
participation in the breach itself; ... n Adena, Inc., 162 F. Supp.2d at 356. The comt 
addressed the issue, stated the law, and held as follows: 
To establish a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. a 
plaintiff must show: (1) a breach of fiduciary duty owed to another; (2) 
knowledge of the breach by the aider or abettor; and (3) substantial 
assistance or encouragement by the aider or abettor in effecting that 
breach. (Citations omitted). The com in Schuylkill Skyport Inn [v. Rich, 
1996 WL 502280 (E.D.Pa.1996] did not require the direct and knowing 
participation that the Defendants contend is required. Rather, the court 
allowed the claim to proceed based upon a showing of "substantial 
assistance or encouragement. II Moreover, even if such a heightened 
involvement were required, the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the Cohn 
Defendants were indeed knowing and active participants in Malecki's 
breach. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of aiding 
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty against the Cohn Defendants. 
A.dena, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d at 357-358. 
It would certainly appear from the preceding that Pennsylvania law is consistent 
with the law of Idaho as set forth in the cases cited above and follows the Second 
Restatement of Torts § 876 (which is followed by Idaho and is cited several times). It is 
to be emphasized that at the crux of the cause of action against the Cohn Defendants in 
Adena, Inc. v. Cohn was the dual representation of clients and the divided loyalties that 
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inevitably occur. The Cohn Defendants subjected themselves to claims of liability for 
conspiracy and aiding and abetting of various torts by undertaking to represent more than 
one client and then substantially assisting the client in breaching fiduciary duties owed to 
the other client 
Another illustrative case of divided loyalties, conflicts of interest and claims of 
aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty is Cacciola v. NelIhaus, 733 N.E.2d 
133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). That case arose out of a partnership of four brothers. The 
estate of one of the fraternal partners (Salvatore) filed suit against the partnership 
attorney. The partnership attorney had also undertaken to represent one of the three other 
brothers (Edward). individually, when Edward purchased the partnership share of another 
brother (Anthony). This transaction was aI.leged to have disadvantaged the partnership 
(which cbuld have acquired Anthony's share for the partnership as a whole) to the 
advantage of Edward, individually. The appellate court reversed the trial court's 
dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. Citing the Second Restatement of Torts § 876, the 
court specifically addressed a cause of action against an attorney for aiding and abetting 
the breach of a fiduciary duty in a conflict of interest context: 
Indeed the defendant may also be liable for aiding and abetting Edward's 
breaeh of his fiduciary duty to Salvatore. As his partner, Edward owed 
Salvatore a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty," (citations omitted). 
the more so because of the familial relationship. (Citations omitted). 
'[L]iability arises when a person [actively] participates in a fiduciary's 
breach of duty ... such that he ... could not reasonably be held to have 
acted in good faith.' (Citation omitted). Compare Kurker v. Hill, 44 
Mass.App.Ct. 184, 189-190. 689 N.E.2d 833 (1998) (discussing 
Restatement [Second] of Torts § 876(b] [1977] and claim of civil 
conspiracy in context of rule 12(b][6] motion). Here, the plaintiff aI.leges 
that the defendant not only wrongly advised Edward he had no duty to 
Salvatore with regard to the purcbase of Anthony's interest in the 
partnership. but acted as Edward's lawyer in a transaction that conflicted 
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with his duty to the partnership. and then refused to give Salvatore the 
information he requested after the sale had occurred. (Emphasis added). 
Cacciola. 733 N.E. 2d at 139 {emphasis added}. 
To reiterate. in this case Reed Taylor's Complaint states claims against Clements 
Brown for conspiracy and aiding and abetting 10hn Taylor in breaching fiduciary duties 
by acting to protect John Taylor's interests to the detriment of the interests of Clements 
Brown's former purported clients, AlA Services and AlA Insurance; thereby damaging 
Reed Taylor. Likewise. Reed Taylor's claims against Clements Brown with respect to 
interference with his contractual relationships and conversion have the same factual basis. 
L Reed Taylor Has SufficlentII Pled Bread! or Fiduciary Duties And 
Aiding .ADd Abetting Breath Of Fiduciary Duties. 
The pleading requirements necessary to state a cause of action against a lawyer 
for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties is the same as against any other 
person or entity. See e.g., In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1007 
(8th err. 2007); Adena, Inc. v. Cohn. 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Cacciola v. 
Nellhaus. 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). In addition, evidence that an attorney 
bas violated rules of ethics pertafuing to dual representation is sufficient to support a 
claim that an attorney violated common-law fiduciary duty ofloyalty. Hendry v. Pelland. 
73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A shateholder's allegations that a law firm's conflict of 
interest representing two corporations is sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty against the law firm. Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Senft & Cohen UC, 484 F. Supp.2d 
337 (B.D. Pa. 2007). 
Reed Taylor's claims against Clements Brown include aiding and abetting in John 
Taylor and other individuals' breaches of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor. along 
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with independent breaches of fiduciary duties personal to the corporations. See e.g., 
Complaint, p. 6. ,. 15; p. 7 , 17-18; p. 8, 1 19; p. ] 0, , 23; p. 11. ,. 25; pp. 18-19." 42-
46; pp. 21-22. ,,57-61. The claims in this matter are those personal to Reed Taylor and 
claims of AIA· Services and AIA Insurance, which Reed Taylor is entitled to bring 
directly against Clements Brown in lieu of a derivative action. 
J. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Conversion And Aiding And Abetting 
Conversion. 
1. Reed Taylor Has Pled Conversion As A Cause Of .Acl:ioa.. 
When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs. a secured creditor has 
standing to bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g.» 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Abaca Warehouse. Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664 
P2d 281 (Ct App. 1983); u.s. v. McCleskey Mills, Inc., 409F2d 1216 (Ga. 1969). The 
rights of a secured creditor are extensive; 
In some circ1.lIDStm1ces, however, an unauthorized sale or other disposition 
of collateral may constitute conversion as to the secured party. In most 
cases when a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral. the 
security interest survives disposition of the collateral In these cases, the 
secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an 
appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured party 
may claim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course, 
may only have one satisfaction .... 
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a 
conversion of the collateral, there W a conversion on the part of the one 
who sells, as wen as on the part of the one who purchases. or to whom 
property is transferred. or a third party who exercises dominion oyer the 
collateral Of its PWceeds ... 
See 79 CJ.S. Secured Transactions § 157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added); see also Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693,692 P.2d 337 (1984); Lussier 
v. Mau Van Development, Inc., 667 P2d 804,814 (Hawaii App. 1983); Nelson v. Jones, 
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38 Idaho 664, 224 P. 435, 438 (1924); Western Farm Service, Inc. v. Olsen, 151 Wn.2d 
645, 90 P.3d 1053 (2004) (when a debtor transfers collateral subject to a perfected 
security interest. the secured party may commence an action against the purchaser for 
conversion) . . 
Here, Reed Taylor has security interest in the commissions of AIA Services and 
AlA Insurance. Reed Taylor also has all of the shares of AIA Insurance pledged to him 
and holds a security interest in those shares. Moreover. Reed Taylor also bas a security 
interest in the proceeds of all commissions and the distributions from AlA Services' other 
subsidiaries, namely, the $1.2 Million Mortgage improperly pledged to CropUSA 
Clements Brown bas been unlawfully paid with funds derived from assets securing Reed 
Taylor's debt Moreover, the assertion that John Taylor is entitled to have his fees paid 
by the COIpOrations has no application because the funds paying Clements Brown are not 
the corporation's funds (it is noteworthy that proper approval bas never been obtained). 
2. As A Secured CredItor, Reed Taylor Is Not Required To Own The 
ColllDlissioDS And 51.2 Million Mortgage As They Are Pledged To 
Him As Collateral 
One who wrongfully withholds personal property from another who is entitled to 
it under a security agreement may be liable for conversion. In re Bailey, 197 F.3d 997, 
1000 (9th Cir. 1999); Case Corp. Y. Gehrke, 91 P.3d 362, 365 (Ariz. App. 2004) ("A 
secured party has the right to take possession of the collateral upon default, and so has 
sufficient possessory interest to bring a conversion action ... money can be the subject of 
conversionj; Western Farm Service, Inc. v. Olsen, 151 Wn.2d 645, 90 P 3d 1053 (2004). 
Reed Taylor has. since 1996, held a security interest in all of the commissions of 
AlA Services and AIA Insurance and the stock of AIA Insurance. See Complaint, p. 3, , 
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10; pp. 19-20, ,,47-54. The $1.2 Million mortgage was also obtained as proceeds from 
the same commissions and was unlawfully titled and pledged with the assistance of 
Clements Brown. See Complaint, p. 15-16, ,. 35. When AIA Services defaulted, Reed 
Taylor was entitled to possession of the collateral, namely the $1.2 Million Mortgage and 
all the commissions of AlA Services and AIA Insurance (which compnse virtually every 
dollar of their revenue, save the minimal amount of rent received from tenants of the 
building rented by AIA Insurance, which is also subject to Reed Taylor's security interest 
in AJA Insurance's shares and his rightful control of the company). However, the 
property has not been relinquished to Reed Taylor as required, and hundreds of thousands 
of dollars have been wrongfully transferred to Clements Brown and others. In other 
words, those amounts have been "converted" and Reed Taylor is rightfully seeking return 
of the funds from Clements Brown and others. 
3. Clementi Brown Has Asserted Wrongful Dominion Over Reed 
Taylor's Property. 
Under the same authority cited above. Clements Brown bas taken and/or accepted 
funds from sources it knew were subject to a valid security interest in favor of Reed 
Taylor. Clements Brown mistakenly believes that the Idaho Code can strip away a valid 
and perfected · security interest to pay attorneys fees to the very attorneys who have been 
assisting in perpetuating the fraud and corporate malfeasance over the years. See 
Clements Brown's Motion, p. 23. However, the authority cited by Clements Brown has 
no application to Reed Taylor's valid and perfected security interests, which trump any 
right John Taylor may have to the payment of his fees. Significantly. however, Clements 
Brown has full knowledge that John Taylor has not complied with his obligations to 
corporations, yet Clements Brown eagerly accepts the payment of funds from the 
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corporations, which constitutes conversion. 
4. Reed Taylor's Claimed Property Is Identifiable As A Specific ChatteL 
As set forth above, Reed Taylor has a security interest in virtually everything 
owned by AlA Services and AlA Insurance and all of the funds of the companies, all of 
which are clearly identifiable by and through bank statements, money transfers, and loan 
proceeds (Le., money laundered through the unlawful loan from CropUSA wherein John 
Taylor pledged the $12 Million Mortgage (which is subject to Reed Taylor's security 
interests)). All of the money paid to Clements Brown is traceable and all of the money is 
property Reed Taylor is entitled to rightfully possess. 
K. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Conspiracy And Aiding And Abetting 
ConspiRey. 
1. Clements Brown Has Engaged In Civil Conspiracy. 
ldahe law is well settled on claims for civil conspiracy and the minimal pleading" 
requirements. ArgolUlUt Insurance Company v. White, 86 Idaho 374.379,386 P.2d 964 
(1963) ("In the instant case it is alleged that injury resulted from acts done in pursuance 
of the conspiracy" and the "order dismissing the complaint is reversed''); Lorang v. Hays, 
69 Idaho 440, 449, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) ("a concerted series of action on the part of 
wrongdoers, which culminates in producing the injury complained of .. ;pursuant to a 
conspiracy.''); Kloppenburg v. Mays. 60 Idaho 19, 88 P 2d 513 (1939) (an agreement 
becomes a conspiracy when its purpose is to do something that is unlawful or some 
lawful thing in an unlawful manner). 
Attorneys are also subject to liability for claims of civil conspiracy. See e.g., 
Traub v. Washington, 591 S.B. 2d 382. 387 eGa. App. 2003); Banco Popular North 
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America v. Gandi, 876 A..2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a cause of action for a 
conspiracy). In one treatise, civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are distinguished: 
Civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are varieties of concerted-action 
liability. The prime distinction between civil conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting is that a conspiracy involves an agreement to participate in a 
wrongful activity or to commit a tortious act while aiding and abetting 
focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gives (substantial assistance' to 
someone who performs wrongful conduct, not on whether the defendant 
agrees to join the wrongful conduct. 
See 15A CJ.S. Conspiracy § 3 (2008) (emphasis added). 
Like aiding and abetting. Clements Brown attempts to confuse Reed Taylor's 
conspiracy claim by citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions. However, as 
discussed above, Idaho law is well settled on conspiracy claims. Reed Taylor's 
Complaint alleges causes of action against Clements Brown for conspiracy. which are 
both personal to Reed Taylor and which he is pursuing in place of the corporations for his 
benefit The agreement Clements Brown entered into involves the alleged "Joint Defense 
Agreement,tt "Joint Retainer Agreement" and their purported direct and indirect improper 
representation of other individuals for the purpose of interfering with Reed Taylor's 
contractual rights and unlawfully protecting the interests of John Taylor, thereby 
preventing claims from being asserted against Clements Brown. Moreover. the 
conspiracy specifically involves covering up and perpetuating fraud, conversion, and 
breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, as set forth in Reed Taylor"s Complaint 
See e.g., Complaint, p. 4, " 11-12; pp. 6-7.115; p. 10,123; pp. 18-19 n 42-46. 
Similarly, while practicing law is genem11y a lawful activity. practicing law 
becomes illegal when done so in an illegal manner, as set forth in Reed Taylor's 
Complaint Thus, although entering into a joint defense agreement is generally 
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permisSlole, the same joint defense agreement can also be improperly used to illegally or 
unlawfully practice law (and to the detriment of Clements Brown's former clients). 
2. Contrary To Clements Brown's Assertions, Reed Taylor Has 
Sufficiently Pled Conspiracy. 
Clements Brown challenges Reed Taylor's conspiracy claim on various theories 
relating to an attorney being protected by merely giving advice to a client See Clements 
Brown's Motion pp. 14-15. As with Clements Brown's other arguments, the authority it 
relies upon deals with traditional cases with facts and legal issues significantly 
distinguishable. However, as discussed above, Clements Brown's acts do not merely 
involve providing legal advice. Clements Brown was not authorized to represent AlA 
Services or AJA Insurance or to ignore their interests to represent John Taylor, and all of 
its acts arc actionable. Notwithstanding this fact, Clements Brown has exceeded any 
purported scope of representation and engaged in conspiring with John Taylor and others 
to commit various torts and retain property in which Reed Taylor holds valid and 
perfected security interests. 
L Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled TomoWJ Interference And Aiding And 
Abettinl TortioWJ Interference. 
L Reed Taylor Has Pled Tortious Interference With A Contract. 
A prima facie case of the tort [of interfering with a contract] is established where 
the plaintiff adduces proof of the following elements: 
(a) Existence ofa contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on the part of the 
defendant, (c) intentional interl'erencc causing a breach of the contract, and 
(d) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. 
Jensen 1'. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1028, 772 P.2d 228 (1988). Reed Taylor concedes 
that the above elements are required to make a prima facie case for tortious interference 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 49 
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
( 
with a contract. They are not required to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6). Nevertheless. Reed Taylor has one again sufficiently pled the cause of action, 
contrary to Clements Brown's assertions. As with all of Reed Taylor's causes of action, 
he incorporates by reference each fact in the Complaint necessary to support each cause 
of action. See Complaint, p. 1. 
Willi respect to the first and second elements, Reed Taylor pleads the existence of 
contracts. See e.g., Complaint, p. 3. " 8-10; p. 4, 1111-12; p. 17, ,. 38; p. 18, 1 43. 
Thus, the first and second elements are not only pled, but satisfied for purposes of the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement With respect to the third element, Reed Taylor has 
also specifically pled intentionally interferences. See e.g'J Complaint, p. 4, ,. 11; pp. 4-5, 
112; p. 9,123; p. 15,,, 33-34; p. 17;,38; p. 18, ,43. Finally, Reed Taylor has pled 
the final element of damages. See e.g., Complaint. p. 15, 'i 34; p.lO, ,. 23; p. 11-12,125; 
pp.22-23. Thus, Reed Taylor has pled all four elements of tortious interference with a 
contract (as to him and the corporations). 
2. Clements Brown Has Tortio1l51y Interfered With Reed Taylor's 
Contraetu.al Rights By And Through Its Purported Representation 
And Improper Assistance Of John Taylor And CropUSA. 
Employees and agents are third-parties when acting outside of their scope of 
authority. See e.g., Hotlser v. City of Redmond, 91 Wn.2d 36. 586 P.2d 482, 484 (Wa. 
1978). As the pwported (and unauthorized) former agent for AIA Services and AIA 
. Insurance. Clements Brown has tortiously interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual 
rights by exceeding all scope of representation and without proper authorization. By 
representing John Taylor. Clements Brown has intentionally interfered with Reed 
Taylor's contractual rights. Moreover, Clements Brown has also intentionally interfered 
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with Reed Taylor's contractual rights through its unauthorized representation of AJA 
Services and AlA Insurance. Finally, and not exhaustively, Clements Brown has 
interfered with Reed Taylor's rights to be a board member of AIA Services, interfered 
with his rights to possession of ~mmission collateral, intentionally interred with bs vote 
of the shares of AlA Insurance, and interfered with his rights involving the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage, among various others. 
M. Reed Taylor Has Snfticiently Pled Fraud And AJeting And Abetting 
Fraud. 
Generally, the following nine elements in order to state a claim for fraud: 
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; 
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that 
there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; 
(7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Mannos . v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that 
misrepresentations and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded 
summary judgment in buyer's action for fraud). 
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an 
alternative cause of action to common law ''fraud'' and that "constructive fraud" does not 
require a plaintiff to plead the nine elements of common law "fraud." See e.g., Smith v. 
Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977); McGhee v. McGhee, 82 
Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760 (1960) (recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative 
cause of action to fraud and that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine 
elements offraud "is not the case''); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 61, 415 P.2d 698 
(1966)(a promise to build a house to certain standards constitutes "constructive fraud" 
when the builder failed to do so). 
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Moreover. a cause of action under "constructive fraud" is discussed in significant 
detail in numerous treatises (which are frequently followed and cited by the Idaho 
Supreme Comt): 
Constructive fraud is a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, 
the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate 
confidence, or to injure public interests. 
Constructive fraud is fraud that arises by operation of law from conduct, 
which if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage. It 
is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt 
of the fraud feasor. the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to 
deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public 
interests. The legal duty may arise from a statute, a contract, or a trust 
To establish constructive fraud, it is necessary only to prove acts of fraud. 
Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential 
element Thus, a party whose actions constitute constructive fraud might 
still have acted in good faith ... 
37 CJ.S.'Fmud § 5 (2007) (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
Constructive fraud is defined as an act done or omitted that amounts to 
positive fraud, or is construed as a fraud by the court because of its 
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, 
even though the act is not done or omitted with an actual design to 
perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Otherwise stated, 
"constructive fraud" arises by operation of law from a CQurse of conduct 
which. if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage, 
irresJ}ective of the existence or evidence of actual intent to defraud. 
Constructive fraud. sometimes called legal fraud. is nevertheless fraud. 
although it rests upon presumption and rests less upon furtive intent 00 
does moral or actual fraud. It is presumed from the relation of the parties 
to a tra.nsa.ction or from the circumstances under which it takes place. 
Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by ODe in a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship to another that induces justifiable reliance by the 
other to his or her prejudice. 
The conscience is Dot necessarily affected by it Indeed, it bas been said 
that constructive fraud -generally involves a mere mistake of fact It 
requires neither actual dishonesty nor intent to deceive. being a breach of 
legal or equitable duty that, irrespective of the moral guilt of the 
wrongdoer, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive 
others. to injure public interests. or to violate public or private confidence. 
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In its generic sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, and 
concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or 
confidence that results in damage to another. Hence, the terms 
"constructive fraud" and "legal fraud" both connote that in certain 
circumstances one may be charged with the consequences of his words 
and acts as though he has spoken or acted fraudulently, although, properly 
speaking. his conduct does not merit this opprobrium. 
If there is any distinction to be found between the terms "constructive" 
and "legal" as applied to fraud, it probably amounts to this: Breach of a 
fiduciary relationship or of a contract uberrimae fidei is usually called 
"constructive fraud," whereas the term "legal fraud" is generally used to 
cham.cterize a misrepresentation made without knowledge of its falsity. 
Constructiye fraud may result from reckless and heedless representations. 
although they are not made with a deliberate intent to deceive. 
37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 9 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis 
added). Similarly. attorneys are liable for the aiding and abetting of constructive fraud. 
See Hearst v. Hearst, 50 A.D. 3d 959,857 N.Y.S. 596 (N.Y. 2008). 
Clements Brown has assisted John Taylor and others in the commission of fraud, 
including constructive fraud, which simply requires a duty and funds being 
inappropriately diverted or utilized. Moreover, Clements Brown's acts constitute 
constructive fraud and fraud upon AlA Services and AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor has 
sufficiently pled these claims on behalf of himself and as directly asserted for the 
corporations. 
N. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled CIaimB For Malpractice. 
For all of the reasons identified in this Response, Reed Taylor has standing to 
pursue any beneficiary claims and direct claims against Clements Brown for malpractice 
claims owned by AlA Insurance and AlA Services.!! Moreover, certain malpractice 
, Reed Taylor concedes that his independent malpractice claim5 asserted against Clements Brown nre 
supported by the third-party beneficiary and related authority cited above. However, the undersigned was 
also unable to find a single case in which a creditor was owed millions of dollars by a highly insolvent 
corporation, a creditor had a security interest in funds being converted and improperly utilized by the 
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claims are dependent upon whether Clements Brown was ever authorized to represent 
AIA Services or AlA Insurance thereby making the claims alternative in nature (Le., if 
Clements Brown was never authorized to represent AIA Insurance as alleged by Reed 
Taylor,. then its acts were all as joint-tortfeasors. On the other hand, if Clements Brown 
had an attomey-client relationship with AIA Insurance. then Reed Taylor would have 
claims for malpractice and also pursue claims for malpractice owned. by AlA Insurance.). 
Reed Taylor concedes that any claims against Clements Brown for malpractice 
arising from its purported representation of AlA Services would only be warranted by 
way of the extreme facts in this case (facts not seen in other cases, i.e., insolvency and 
rights of secured creditor, etc.). However, this is not true with AlA Insumnce because of 
Reed Taylors special standing as a pledgee, director, officer and secured creditor of AlA 
Insuranc~s shares and assets. 
O. Reed Taylor Has Alleged Valid CJaims Under The Unfair Trade 
Practices Act. 
Clements Brown moves to dismiss Reed Taylor's claim as if the facts supporting 
the claims alleged by Reed Taylor did not exist. See Clements Brown's Motion to 
Dismiss. pp. 26-30. However, like Clements Brown's other arguments. Reed Taylor bas 
alleged valid claims and the facts to support such claims. 
L Reed Taylor Has AJleged A Valid Claim Against Oemenu Brown For 
Unfair Trade Practices. 
Courts do not afford attorneys blanket immunity from claims brought by opposing 
parties under the unfair trade practices acts. See e.g., Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 
288 Conn. 69, 95-96. 95 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008); Burns ex reI Office of Public 
defendant law fum. and the other significant facts in this case.. That being said. Reed Taylor is still entitled 
to bring direct claims for malpractice against Clements Brown that are owned by the corporations in lieu of 
derivative claims as he is the only person entitled to receive any damages from the numerous hanns. 
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Guardian v. Hale and Dorr LLP. 445 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.Ct. Mass. 2006) (allegations by a 
guardian for disabled minor against law firm and trust manager demonstrated 
recklessness necessary to establish claim under unfair trade act); St. Paul Fire and 
Marine.ins. Co. v. Ellis & Ellis, 262 F.3d 53 (lst Cir. 2001); Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 
F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Ct. N.M. 2000) (attorney's misleading conduct violated unfair 
practices act); see also Burnap v. Linnartz, 38 S.W.3d 612. 619-20. In Chapman 
Lumber, inc. v. Tager. 95 A.2d 1. 20-21 (Conn. 2008) citing Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 
Conn. 490, 529 A.2d 171 (Conn. 1987) (other internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a judgment against a debtor's attorney 
under the Unfair Trade Practices Act: 
ITlbis court's refusal to permit litigants to raise claims against opposing 
counsel under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act cannot be 
construed, as the defendant suggests, as affording blanket immunity to 
attorneys foI tortious acts they coIiimit against third parties while 
representing clients. Rather, the evidence shows that the defendant 
negotiated, and directed his client to execute, a note and mortgage relating 
to property that the defendant knew the client did not own ... 
Here, Reed. Taylor's cause of action survives as an exception to any general rule 
that a contract is necessary. The facts in this case are far more extreme than any of the 
cases cited above and are easily distinguished from any cases cited by Clements Brown. 
Reed Taylor has sufficiently pled claims under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act See 
Complaint, pp. 20-21, ,,55-56. 
2. Reed Taylor IIu Alleged A Valid Direct Claim For Unfair Trade 
Practices Agahut Clement! Brown. 
Under the same Jegal authority and argument above and Idaho's Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring claims directly against Clements Brown for 
its violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act involving its purported representation of 
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AIA Insurance and AIA Services, i.e., Reed Taylor should be pern:lltted to bring AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance's claims directly against Clements Brown by way of being a 
stock pledgee, secured creditor, creditor of an insolvent corpomtion. the only authorized 
officer and director of AIA Insurance, and the only person/creditor entitled to any 
recovered damages. All of the actions taken by Clements Brown have directly damaged 
Reed Taylor in a distinct and special manner. None of Clements Brown's actions were 
authorized. Moreover, Reed Taylor's direct claims will prevent duplicative litigation and 
there are no other bona-fide parties entitled to the assets or claims of the companies. to 
F. Although Reed Taylor's Complaint States Valid Causes Of Action, He 
Requests Leave To FDe An Amended Complaint To Clarify Fads And 
Causes Of Ac:tJon. 
The twin purposes behind the court rule governing amendments to pleadings are 
to allow claims to be determined on the merits mther than on technicalities, and to make 
pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the 
facts at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197 
(1999). If a complaint is capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action. a refusal to grant permission to amend would deprive a plaintiff of a 
substantial right Marlrstaller v. Mar/cstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 135,326 P.2d 994 (1958). 
As long as the proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the proposed claim. Christensen Family Trust v. 
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866. 872, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999) citing Duffin v. Idaho 
Improvement Ass'n. 126 Idaho 1002, 1013, 895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995) (emphasis 
added). "Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadings in 
10 In the unlikely event that Reed Taylor is able to recover sufficient funds and assets to satisfy his 
$9,000,000 debt. he will ensure that any other funds are first paid to Donna Taylor, the priority shareholder, 
and deposit the remaining funds in the Court's registry for other innocent shareholders. 
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:fu.rfuerance of justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn. &2 Idaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 348 
(1960). 
Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support all ofbis causes 
of action against Clements Bro~ which are both independently owned by him and 
being pursued directly against Clements Brown for harm against the corporations. 
Neverthel~ Reed Taylor requests leave to file an amended complaint to clarify facts 
and causes of action against Clements Brown, cure any alleged deficiencies. and add 
additional causes of action and facts. II 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Clements Brown's Motion to Dismiss should be 
denied in full. II. 
DATED this .3!-day of October, 2008. 
~dYPLLC 
Michael S. Bissell 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
11 A motion to amend and supplement complaint will be filed before the bc:aring and a draft version of the 
proposed amended complaint w11J be filed at that time. The amended complaint will clarify facts, clarifY 
and add causes of action. and include additional facts ascertained since the Complaint was filed. 
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL. BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, W A 9920 I 
Tel: (509)455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDrCIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, 
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE 
DOES I-V. unknown individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV08-01763 
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF 
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for an Order to Amend 
and Supplement his Complaint in the fonn attached hereto as Exhibit A 
I. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON 
This Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, the attached Exhibit 
A. and the Court's file. 
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
"[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court ... and leave shall be 
l'LAINTfFF REED 1. TAYLOR'S 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF 
LA W TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1 
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freely given when justice so requires ... " LR.C.P. 15(a). Similarly, a party may move to 
supplement a "pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have 
happened since the date of the pleading sough to be supplemented .. :' l.R.c.P. 15(d). 
"Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to 'pleadings in furtherance of 
justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 rdaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 348 (1960). 
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to amend his Complaint in the form 
attached hereto as Exhibit A The purpose of the amendment is to: (1) clarify and 
expand the claims and causes of action; and (2) add derivative claims. 
Justice requires that Reed Taylor be permitted to file his Amended Complaint. 
DATED this tJ!!;Iay of October. 2008. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2day of October, 2008, J caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document with attachment to the 
following: 
_..,.-- HAND DELIVERY 
K U.S.MAlL 
__ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_-,-- FAX TRANSMISSION 
"2< EMAIL (.pdf attachment) 
John J. Janis 
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, CD 83701-2582 
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7111 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 111E COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. T A nOR, an individual, who is 
bringing this action 011 behalf of himself and 
on behalf of the creditors andlor shareholders 




MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS, an individual; 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS, 
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE 
DOES I-V, unknown individuals; 
Defendanls. 
J. FACTS 
Case No.: CV08-0 1763 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 
DAMAGES 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
I. Reed Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL, 
BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all allegations and claims asserted below 
are incorporated by reference into each cause of action, remedy and/or requested relief to 
the cxlenl nccessary to support each such cause of action, remedy and/or requested 
relict): 
EXHIBIT 
fiRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - I I ___ A ___ 
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2. Reed Taylor ("Reed Taylor") is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. Reed Taylor is bringing this action on behalf of himself individually and on 
behalf of all shareholders and creditors of AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services") 
and AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance"). Reed Taylor is an elderly person as defined 
in I.e. § 48-608. 
3. Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. (,'Clements Brown") is an Idaho 
professional corporation in the business of practicing law. Clements Brown is 
vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Defendants. Clements Brown has 
purportedly acted as counsel for AIA Services, AlA Insurance and Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, [nco ("CropUSA"). 
4. Defendant Michael E. McNichols is an individual residing in the state of 
Idaho anp. is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Clements 
Brown. 
5. Jane Does 1-V are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys- that 
participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known dcfendants 
(All of the Defendants are collectively referred to as "Clements Brown" or "its" or 
"Defendants"). 
6. Clements Brown is based in and transacted business through the practice 
of law in Nez Perce County, Idaho, and havc an expectation of being named as 
defendants in Nez Perce County. Idaho. Cl~ments Brown committed tortious acts, 
exceeded the scope of any purported representation, and/or assisted in the commission of 
tortiolls acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho. Clements Brown's tortious acts and/or 
assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
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7. Damages in this action exceed S10,OOO. Jurisdiction and venue are, 
therefore, appropriate ill Nez Perce County District Court. To the extent that there are any 
conflicts or discrepancies alleged in this Complaint, they are to be construed as 
alternative relief. claims, remedies and damages being sought against Clements Bro\'tll 
(i.e., if Clements Brovm had authority to represent AlA Services or AlA Insurance, then 
it still committed certain torts and breached duties). However. no allegations in this 
Complaint should be construed as any admission by Reed Taylor or any of the 
corporations that Clements Brown ever had authority to represent AlA Services or AIA 
Insurance. 
8. AlA Services is a closcly held Idabo corporation. AlA Insurance is a 
closely held Idaho corporation. TI1e present and past relevant purported officers and 
directors .of AlA Insurance and AlA Services (R. John Taylor ('>John Taylor"), Cormie 
Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman) are interested parties by way of 
their tortious acts and ownership of shares in CropUSA. Thus, a direct action for certain 
claims is appropriate because, among other reasons set forth in this Complaint, any funds 
recovered should not be placed in the hands of the foregoing parties. 
9. AlA Services has pledged aU of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance 
that it owns to Reed Taylor pursuant to a $6 Million Promissory Notc dated August 1. 
1995, the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended and Restated 
Security Agreement, the Restructure Redemption Agreement, and Series A Preferred 
Shareholder Agrcement (all of the foregoing. ancillary documents and related documents 
arc collectively referred to as the "Redemption Agreements"). 
10. At all relevant limes of the transactions and causes of action set forth in 
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this Complaint, Reed Taylor was the sale pledgee of all of AlA lnsw-ancc's outstanding 
shares and the only secured creditors of AlA Services and AlA [nsurance entitled to the 
commissions and related receivables received by the corporations and all proceeds related 
thereto. As a stock pledgee and the solc stock pledgee of AlA Insurance's shares, Reed 
Taylor is entitled to bring derivative and/or direct claims as a shareholder since a pledgee 
is entitled to all of the rights and protections of a sharcholtler, in addition to the individual 
rights to protect collateral. As the sole pledgee of all shares of AlA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor is entitled to recover and possess all funds, damages and/or property recovered 
from all direct and derivative causes of action. 
11. As a creditor of the insolvent ALA Services owed over $8,500,000 and a 
secured creditor of the insolvent AlA Services, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative 
and/or direct claims against responsible parties in the place ot: or on behalf of, AlA 
Services. Reed Taylor is the only person entitled to the recovery of funds, damages, and 
thc like because of being (a) the only creditor with a security interest in AlA Insurance; 
(b) the only creditor with a security interest in all past, present and future commissions 
and related receivables of AlA Services and AlA Insurance; (c) the only creditor with a 
security interest in aJl of the shares of AlA Services' subsidiaries and all dividends and 
distributions related to such shares, including, without limitation the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage received from the estate of The Universe; (d) a long standing creditor with 
substantial contractual rights, which such rights and amounts owed to Reed Taylor were 
specifically detailed in the financial statements of AlA Services since 1995, thereby 
placing other creditors on notice of his superior claims; (e) the only person wirh priority 
over all assets, funds and claims of ALA Services by way of the Subordination Agreement 
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with Donna Taylor; and (f) the creditor who is owed over $8,500,000. 
11. To the extent that any bona-fide creditor or shareholders come forward 
with any interests superior to Reed Taylor or to the extent that any dispute may arise 
between Reed Taylor and other creditors, Reed Taylor will, without waiving any legal 
rights or remedies as a pledgee, creditor and secured creditor, either (a) pay the 
crcditor(s) in his sale discretion; (b) seck a dctemlination under the law of the priority or 
rights to any payments or funds; (c) deposit the subject funds and/or property with the 
Court for a dctcnnination of priority or rightful possession pursuant to an interpleader 
action; or Cd) take such other reasonable actions as necessary under the law. 
13. Although Clements Drown, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, 
Connie Taylor and James Beck arc inappropriately and fraudulently asserting that Reed 
Taylor has no rights because his redemption was allegedly illegal (which Reed Taylor 
denies and the applicable law does not support) in an attempt to avoid the causes of 
action, claims, remedies and damages being pursued against them for misappropriating 
the assets, funds, services and opportunities of AlA Service andlor AlA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor will move the Court to deposit all funds and property recovered from Clements 
Brown until the illegality issue has either been withdrawn, voluntarily dismissed, or a 
detennination has been made by the Court in Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. The evidence 
will show that the redemption was not illegal and that Clements Brown and the other 
parties (including John Taylor and JoLce Duclos' alleged intervention) are simply 
attempting to find any way to delay and/or thwart Reed Taylor'S valid rights and causes 
of action, and fraudulently avoid all of their unlawful acts and years of misappropriation 
of AlA Services and/or A fA lnsllTance's assets, funds, services and/or opportunities. 
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14. ALA Services' financial condition far exceeds the "'zone or insolvency" as 
Reed Taylor is owed over $9,000,000 and the prcsent fair-markel value of AlA Services' 
assets are $6,000,000, less than the amount owed Reed Tuylor. But for the unlawful 
actions of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, 
Bryan Freeman and other parties to protect their own interests, AlA Services should be in 
bankruptcy under close scrutiny of a trustee. Clements Brown has full knowledge of 
intimate details of the inappropriate and/or unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of AfA 
Services and/or ALA Insurance's assets, funds and services to CropUSA, John Taylor and 
other parties. 
15. On July 21. 2008, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor served a derivativc 
demand letter upon the purported board of directors of AlA Services and AlA Insur.mcc 
to take various actions, including specified actions against Clements Brown, John Taylor, 
Michael Cashman, James Beck and all responsible parties for various tortious acts and 
the recovery of misappropriated assets, funds, services and/or compensation. Reed 
Taylor has also made other written demands upon the purported boards of AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance to take action, and no actions have been taken. Reed Taylor has also 
made substantial non-frivolous claims against the responsible parties in Taylor v. AlA 
Services, el al., but no actions have been taken as a result of the claims or allegations. 
However, the purported boards of AlA Services and AlA Insurance have failed to act and 
have failed to conduct the corporatiuns in a responsible manner consistent with tbe law. 
16. The purported relcV"dIlt pa<;t and present board members and officers of 
AlA Insurance and AlA Services have failed to conduct shareholder meetings, failed to 
properly disclose facts and transactions to the shareholders, and have wnlinucd to do so 
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even after Complaints were filed and with the full knowledge of Clements Brown. The 
past and present responsible board members and officers have never advised the 
shareholders or creditors of the misappropriation of corporate assets, funds, opportunities, 
services and claims which should be pursued. 
17. Because of the fact that the relevant past and prescnt purported board 
members of AlA Services and AlA lnsurance have a vested interest in nOL pursing claims 
against themselves or the attorneys that have unlawfully assisted them and have utterly 
and completely failed to do so, Reed Taylor believes that he and Donna Taylor will be 
the only parties to pursue the valid claims because the claims will never be pursued by 
the parties currently purported to manage AlA Services and AlA Insurance. This action 
is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court oflhe state ofldaho which it would 
otherwise not have. 
18. Although Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AlA 
Insurance and that the actions of AlA Services' board of directors is not authorized. Reed 
Taylor is purs\ling claims under this Complaint as though the directors were not 
authorized to act and, to the extent that the boards were authorized, then the actions were 
unlawful, inappropriate and exceeded the scope of any agency act on behalf of AlA 
Services and AlA [llsurance. 
19. Clements Brown's acts, omissions. and torts alleged in this Complaint 
exceed any purported attorney-client relationship and are not protected by any litigation 
privilege or immunities. Clements Brown's purported past legal representation was never 
aULhorized by the proper boards of AlA Services or AlA Insurance nor was Clements 
Brown's representation of only John Taylor. Any purported waivers Clements Brown 
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has obtained were not received by authorized and/or disinterested representatives of AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance, and were not authorized. 
20. To the extent that Clements Brown obtained any waivers or consents, its 
purported legal representation exceeded the scope of any representation that was in the 
best interests of AlA Services or AlA Insurance. By taking direction from John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor and/or James Beck, Clements Drown knew that any purported 
representation was not, and could not, be in the best interests of AlA Services or AlA 
Insurance thereby exceeding any scope of purported representation. 
21. AlA Services and AlA Insurance's purported agents, boards andlor 
officers. in which Clements Brown allegedly relied upon, exceeded the scope of all 
proper acts as agents. board members and oLliccrs of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, 
which further resulted in Clements Brown' s acts exceeding the scope of any authorized 
legal andlor attorney-client representation. AU of the actions of Clements Brown, John 
Taylor, 10Lcc Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor and James Beck were outside of 
the scope of their authorized acts and duties. 
22. Reed Taylor'S Complaint is comprised of three types of claims: (a) those 
claims and damages persolll11 and individual to Reed Taylor: (b) those claims and 
damages that are personal to Reed Taylor and ALA Services andlor AlA Insurance, but 
which arc being brought by Reed Taylor directly against Clements Brown; and (c) those 
claims that are owned only by AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance, but which are being 
prosecuted by RCl!d Taylor derivatively on behalf of A IA Services andlor AlA Insurance. 
23. [n addition, Reed Taylor will also pursue claims that are derivatively 
being prosecuted on behalf of AlA Insurance directly on behalf of AlA Insurance should 
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